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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of a number of ownership structures and board of 
directors’ attributes on the level of voluntary disclosure in the context of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). The sample consists of 220 non-financial listed firms in 
seven GCC stock exchanges over a three-year period (2014-2016). The study utilizes 
a disclosure index in order to assess the level of voluntary disclosure. The results of 
the descriptive statistical analysis reveal a low voluntary disclosure, averaging at 12 
per cent, provided by firms in the GCC. The disclosure in terms of various 
components of voluntary disclosure (e.g. strategic, financial and non-financial) also 
appears to be in the same range as total voluntary disclosure. In the country wide 
analysis, the UAE appears to be leading others with an average of around 20 per cent. 
The findings from the multivariate analysis show that family ownership is 
significantly associated with the overall voluntary disclosure and this finding seems 
driven by financial and non-financial components of voluntary disclosure. 
Institutional ownership is not associated with the overall voluntary disclosure score, 
however appears to be influencing the non-financial component disclosure. In similar 
vein, board members’ ownership and audit committee ownership are not significantly 
associated with the total voluntary disclosure however both these aspects are 
associated with the strategic and financial components of voluntary disclosure. Board 
ownership appears to positively impacting the financial component of disclosure and 
negatively influencing the strategic component of disclosure while audit committee 
ownership exerts a positive impact on the strategic component of disclosure and a 
negative one on the financial component of disclosure.  
Furthermore, the study finds largely consistent evidence that board size and the 
number of board meetings during the year exert a negative impact on the level of 
voluntary disclosure suggesting that smaller boards are more effective in promoting 
transparency, and more meetings during the year could indicate difficulties facing the 
firms resulting in less disclosure. The study also finds that the holding of additional 
directorships by the board members exerts a positive impact on the voluntary 
disclosure level, highlighting that high experience is associated with members sitting 
in multiple boards; hence they are more effective in enhancing transparency. The 
study also records a positive and significant relationship between the size of the audit 
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committee and voluntary disclosure. This result suggests that more members on the 
audit committee increase its effectiveness in monitoring the management and 
demanding more information. The results of this study also indicate that board 
independence is positively related to the strategic component of disclosure indicating 
that the independent members demand more strategic information since they are less 
involved in the firm compared to insider. 
This study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the voluntary 
disclosure practice in the context of GCC firms and its association with a number of 
different corporate governance factors (ownership and board of directors). The 
findings of this study will have important policy implications as the GCC market 
regulators continue to improve the corporate governance environment and 
transparency level in order to attract more local and foreign investments. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provide an introduction to this thesis. It starts with a discussion of the 
role of disclosure in corporate governance, then it introduces the background of the 
study. The third section outlines the motivation for the study, including the research 
aim and objectives along with the research questions that the study seeks to answer. 
The fourth section presents the research methods used in the current study followed 
by a summary of the main findings. Section five outlines the study’s contributions to 
the knowledge of voluntary disclosure and its determinants in the context of GCC 
listed firms. The final section of this chapter outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.2 The Role of Disclosure in Corporate Governance 
Disclosure refers to the process of disseminating information to potential users; 
and corporate disclosure in particular is the communication of financial and non-
financial information to the stakeholders of a firm (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). 
Disclosure can be classified into mandatory and voluntary disclosures (Kavitha and 
Nandagopal, 2011). Mandatory disclosure refers to information that is required by the 
laws and regulations (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011), whereas voluntary disclosure 
is any information in excess of that required by the laws (Meek, Roberts and Gray, 
1995; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002). Information reporting both mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure arises from the need to inform the participants in the market 
in which they operate to enable them to take appropriate financial decisions. 
Therefore, the information disclosed by firms is one of the main reliable sources that 
market participants can rely on when evaluating the firm.  
In addition to the informative role of disclosure, it also serves as a monitoring 
mechanism (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). In its role as monitoring 
mechanism, it assists in the process of aligning the actions and choices of the 
managers with the interests of the shareholders (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). 
By providing relevant and reliable information, disclosure is considered to be a 
monitoring tool that allows the stakeholders to verify that the management’s actions 
serve their interests in the best manner. Since, according to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) the interests of owners and managers are misaligned when the ownership and 
  2 
control elements are separated, the owners need to monitor the managers in order to 
protect their interests from any management opportunistic behaviours. Better 
disclosure is associated with higher transparency and lower information asymmetry 
between the firm and its investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006), which leads to an increase in investors’ ability to 
monitor the management.  
The reduction in information asymmetry resulting from increased disclosure and 
financial reporting also influences the functioning of the stock market. Theoretically, 
disclosing more information voluntarily reduces the information asymmetries among 
the market participants and increases stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). 
Firms with a high disclosure level involve less risk and therefore gain investors’ trust 
so that the firms’ stocks are traded at a fair price, resulting in increased liquidity 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). This indicates that market effectiveness and efficiency are 
impacted by investors’ trust that can be gained through the availability and 
accessibility of timely, relevant, and transparent information. Gul and Leung (2004) 
argue that, in order for a stock market to function effectively, the disclosure of 
information needs to be increased. Thus, increased disclosure contributes to the 
corporate governance practice by supporting stock market development through 
increasing the market liquidity and mitigating the agency problem between the 
managers and outside investors. 
Capital markets are of great importance in fostering countries’ economic 
development (Baamir, 2008). Since disclosure is essential for the development of an 
efficient capital market, it is reasonable to expect a positive contribution of disclosure 
and transparency to a country’s economy (Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013). In the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) context where the current study is conducted, the 
national economies are heavily dependent on oil revenues since these countries are 
considered large producers of oil and gas. However, recently, after the decline in oil 
prices, the government in these countries have realized the need to diversify the 
economy to create a more diverse and sustainable economy regardless of oil prices 
changes. Economic diversification is one of the main initiatives in the countries’ 
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national visions1. According to these visions, focusing on capital market development 
to further drive local and foreign investments is one of the essential goals toward 
achieving economic growth and diversity. Therefore, investigating the transparency of 
the GCC stock markets through examining the level of voluntary disclosure and its 
determinants is essential in the current stage of these countries’ development plans.  
The findings of this study contribute to the GCC government effort toward enhancing 
the transparency level through identifying the current level of voluntary disclosure 
and highlighting the ownership structure and board of directors characteristics that 
promote the disclosure of more information voluntarily. 
1.3 Background of the study 
The current study adopts the view of a firm as a nexus of contracts (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), including formal contracts such as 
employment and debt contracts and informal ones that manage the unwritten working 
agreements such as the contractual relationship between the CEO and the board of 
directors (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). These contractual arrangements are 
created to resolve agency conflicts between the contracting parties, mainly between 
the managers and the shareholders. When creating contractual agreements, 
information availability is an essential element. Armstrong, Guay and Weber (2010) 
argue that financial reporting is very important in achieving more efficient contracts 
because the contracting parties commit to a more transparent information 
environment; and having efficient contracts in a more informative environment helps 
to mitigate the agency problem. The current study focuses on the conflicts between 
the shareholders and the managers. While the shareholders provide the capital for the 
firm, they are not involved in the operation and organization of the firm; therefore, 
information asymmetry occurs since the managers have better information than the 
shareholders. This situation places the shareholders at an information disadvantage 
when monitoring and evaluating the managers (Jensen, 1993).  
Indeed, the disclosure of relevant information is viewed as an essential element of 
the contractual agreement between the managers and the shareholders that enables the 
latter to monitor and evaluate whether the former have managed the firm’s resources 
                                                        
1 Saudi National Vision 2030, Qatar National Vision 2030, United Arab Emirates National Vision 
2021, Kuwait National Development Plan 2019, Oman National Vision 2040, and Bahrain 
Economic Vision 2030.  
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in their best interests, which helps to reduce the agency conflicts between these two 
parties (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Depending on the type and amount of the holdings, 
shareholders may vary with regard to their preferences and priorities in terms of 
corporate risk, stability, and performance (Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 2017). Hence, 
different types of shareholders with different control rights are expected to monitor 
their interests differently. Therefore, the current study hypothesises that the difference 
in the shareholders’ monitoring ability impacts on the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided by the managers to outside parties. Similarly, different attributes of the 
board of directors, such as board independence, board compensation, and board size, 
are expected to impact on the board’s monitoring function and thus influences the 
demand for information reporting (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). Ownership 
structure and board composition are viewed by prior researchers as factors impacting 
on the level of disclosure (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010) 
 In the situation of agency conflicts, the need to monitor the managers’ behaviours 
arises, which introduces corporate governance mechanisms by which the shareholders 
ensure that the managers’ actions and decisions are aligned with their interests. The 
current study examines voluntary disclosure as a monitoring tool that enables the 
shareholders to safeguard their interests. It investigates the relationships between the 
level of voluntary disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms such as 
ownership structure and board of directors. The study aims to explore how different 
types of shareholders differ in terms of their ability to monitor their interests through 
demanding more information; and how different attributes of the board of directors 
affect its role in monitoring the shareholders’ interests through the disclosure of 
information. 
Prior empirical researches studies have investigated the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and a number of factors, including firm characteristics, 
ownership structure, corporate governance, and cultural factors (Cooke, 1989b; 
Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 
2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Such studies are mainly 
targeted at developed or East Asian countries, where the economic, institutional, and 
corporate governance environments differ systematically from those of emerging 
countries, which limits the possibility of generalising the results to the less developed 
markets such as those found in the GCC countries. Country-specific characteristics, 
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such as the social, economic, and political environment and the organizational 
structure, are one element that could explain the variation in the informativeness of 
the accounting information and the inconclusive results of the disclosure studies 
conducted in different countries (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
According to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), disclosure practice does not develop in a 
vacuum; rather, it reflects the underlying environmental influences found in different 
countries. These influences include the economy, capital markets, accounting and 
corporate regulations, enforcement level, and culture (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Disclosure practices in less developed countries are more likely to be influenced by 
the cultural environment in which they operate and also by the ownership and 
management structure (Jaggi and Charles, 2000). Cannizzaro and Weiner (2015) 
provide evidence supporting the claim that the context and its specific characteristics 
in which disclosure is examined impacts the results of the study. They investigate the 
voluntary disclosure of multinational enterprises listed on the US stock markets and 
find that firms disclose more when the social expectations of transparency in their 
home countries are high but disclose less when faced with political risk, suggesting 
that countries matter when investigating transparency and disclosure (Cannizzaro and 
Weiner, 2015). 
Furthermore, agency theory, adopted in the current study to explain the relations 
between ownership structure, board attributes and the level of voluntary disclosure, 
was originally considered and formatted based on the Anglo-American context where 
the governance environment and social, economic, and political factors are different 
from any context found globally (Judge, 2012). Agency theory was developed based 
on an examination of a very specific set of large Anglo-American publicly listed firms 
with dispersed ownership (Judge, 2012). Even though GCC corporate governance 
codes are derived from the best international practice and international corporate 
governance principles employed in Anglo-American firms, the corporate, 
institutional, and social setting is distinctively characterised with a number of 
features; namely, the high ownership concentration, the domination of controlling 
shareholders, the high presence of political connections, and the secretive character of 
the culture (Shehata, 2017). Therefore, the assumptions of agency theory may differ 
in their applicability and implementation according to context as Judge (2012) 
emphasises, “the role that context plays in guiding governance behavior and 
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outcomes” (Judge 2012, p.124).  As a result, examining agency theory predictions 
that were established in developed countries in a developing setting like the GCC 
where a different culture and corporate environment exist may lead to different 
conclusions. The examination of voluntary disclosure in the current study using 
agency theory is important to assess the eligibility and suitability of this theory to the 
context of GCC countries.  
As suggested above, GCC countries are different in relation to their social, 
cultural, economic, political, and corporate governance environment, as described in 
details in chapter 3 of this thesis. They differ from developed countries and other 
developing countries. They are Islamic states with large oil dependent economies and 
a culture of secrecy and over-reliance on personal relationships, all operating under 
monarchy systems (Baydoun et al., 2013). Therefore, the current study aims to 
promote our understanding of the financial reporting environment in the GCC stock 
markets and its relations to ownership structure and board of directors’ attributes 
where the corporate governance environment and disclosure practice are expected to 
be influenced by number of distinctive country features. 
1.4 Motivations for the Study and Research Objectives 
Although mandated financial reporting and disclosure are of great importance in 
communicating firm performance and governance to outside investors (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001), it is argued that the disclosure of additional information voluntarily is 
even more important in terms of helping investors to take proper investment decisions 
and maintaining stock market efficiency and transparency. More information 
available through disclosure reduces information asymmetry between the managers 
and shareholders, resulting in less severe agency problems. Furthermore, the 
disclosure of additional information is expected to aid investors more in performing 
their monitoring and evaluating role effectively, which decreases the agency costs 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).  
 The management may be motivated or demotivated to voluntarily provide 
additional information over and beyond the disclosure requirements. It is 
hypothesized in the disclosure literature based on agency theory that the management 
decision to disclose information could be influenced by ownership structure and board 
of directors characteristics (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). For example, as a reduced 
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level of managerial ownership, managers will have more incentives to serve their own 
interests and fewer incentives to maximize the firm performance and investors’ 
returns. This conflict of interests increases the agency costs, especially the cost related 
to the direct monitoring performed by shareholders To reduce the agency costs 
associated with shareholders’ monitoring activities, the management will provide 
voluntary disclosure to allow the shareholders to perform monitoring over 
management behaviours. An example of a corporate governance factor that may 
influence voluntary disclosure is the composition of board of directors. Shareholders 
monitoring is further supported by the existence of an independent board of directors. 
Board independence has been linked to voluntary disclosure in a number of studies 
(Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Barako, Hancock and 
Izan, 2006; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008); however the results regarding the impact 
of board independence on the disclosure level are mixed. While some find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and voluntary disclosure, 
suggesting a complementary relation between monitoring and disclosure (Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006; Lim, Matolcsy and Chow, 2007), others report a negative 
association, indicating that the monitoring provided by the board substitutes the need 
for disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006).  
In addition to the inconclusive results found in the disclosure literature, there is a 
limited number of studies conducted in GCC countries. These studies can be 
classified into three groups. The first group includes studies that examine the level of 
compliance with the corporate governance disclosure requirements, and identify a 
number of firm characteristics and corporate governance factors that influence the 
level of compliance with corporate governance disclosure (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 
2004; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2013; Albassam, 2014). The limitation of these 
studies is that they only examine the level of compliance with the corporate 
governance provisions and recommendations and do not capture any additional 
information disclosed in excess of the requirements. This group of studies focus only 
on the underlying factors that may impact on the companies’ level of compliance with 
the rules and regulations. 
The second group of studies empirically examines the level of voluntary 
disclosure of a specific type of information, like social responsibility disclosure and 
corporate sustainability disclosure (Naser et al., 2006; Nobanee and Ellili, 2016). 
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These studies are limited to one type of information and do not reflect the level of 
voluntary disclosure regarding other information, that is also important in enabling 
investors to form their investment decisions, such as information on future prospects 
and information regarding stock price. 
The third group of studies comprises of empirical research studies that investigate 
the level of voluntary disclosure of a more comprehensive set of information than the 
second group (Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Al-
Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Omar, 2012; Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 
2016). Some of these studies have identified a number of factors determining the level 
of voluntary disclosure; however, they are limited by the relatively small number of 
items on the disclosure index such as 22 items in the study by Al-Janadi, Abdul 
Rahman and Omar (2012), a small sample such as 25 companies in Qatar in the study 
by Hossain and Hammami (2009), and one-year observations. As a result, the findings 
of such studies do not precisely reflect the level of transparency in the whole GCC 
stock markets, which raises the need for a comprehensive examination of the 
voluntary disclosure practice and its determinants in the context of GCC. 
Therefore, the current study is motivated to extend the prior empirical work in 
order to develop a more complete understanding of the voluntary disclosure practice 
in the context of GCC listed firms. The study looks at a comprehensive set of 
ownership features (government, family, institutional, foreign, board members, and 
audit committee members) and board of directors’ attributes (board size, board 
independence, board meetings, board attendance, board compensation, board cross-
directorships, and audit committee size) and their impact on the level of voluntary 
disclosure of firms listed on the GCC stock markets. 2  The study utilises a 
comprehensive disclosure index, which includes 71 items divided into three key 
aspects of voluntary information namely strategic, financial, and non-financial. The 
study sample covers all seven markets in the six GCC countries over a 3-year period 
to achieve the intended objective, the current study seeks to answer the following 
questions: 
                                                        
2 Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Kuwait Bourse, Bahrain Bourse, Muscat Securities Market, 
Qatar Stock Exchange, Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange, and Dubai Financial Market. 
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1. To what extent and form do listed firms in the GCC stock markets provide 
voluntary disclosure? 
2. How do the different types of ownership structure influence the voluntary 
disclosure practice in the context of GCC listed firms? 
3. How do board of directors’ attributes influence the voluntary disclosure 
practice in the context of GCC listed firms? 
The first question helps to identify the level and form of voluntary disclosure 
provided by the listed firms and pin point voluntary disclosure practice across 
countries and amongst big and small firms. The second and the third questions help 
determine the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure in relation to ownership 
structures and various board characteristics. The findings provide crucial insights into 
the voluntary disclosure practice in the GCC and the factors that contribute to the 
disclosure of information such as strategic, financial and non-financial information. 
These findings are of great interest to the GCC regulatory bodies that are intended to 
increase the market transparency and power to attract new investments. 
1.5 Research Method 
The study sample consists of 220 non-financial firms listed in the seven GCC 
stock markets during three years period, from 2014 to 2016. 660 annual reports were 
collected and analysed. The annual report collected includes the financial statements 
and the notes following them, the board of director report (or the corporate 
governance report as named in some countries). In some occasions when the company 
purplish full annual report including all the previous reports in one document, the 
study utilises this report  
In order to achieve the objectives entailed in this research, the study utilises a 
disclosure index with 71 voluntary items that are divided into three main groups of 
information and further categorised into eleven different types of information. The 
study also employs four regression models. A descriptive analysis is applied using 
scores derived form the disclosure index to identify the level of voluntary disclosure 
in general and the level of each information type in particular such as corporate 
strategy information and future prospect information. Then the study implements four 
regression models in order to identify any significant relation between total voluntary 
disclosure and its three different groups of information (strategic, non-financial, and 
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financial) with a number of explanatory variables (ownership structure factors, and 
board of directors attributes). 
1.6 A Summary of the Research Findings 
1.6.1 Voluntary disclosure level 
 The level of voluntary disclosure found in this study is considered to be low at an 
average of 12 per cent across the study sample, ranging from as low as 3 per cent up 
to a maximum of 36 per cent. In terms of voluntary disclosure components, the mean 
of strategic and non-financial voluntary disclosure is 13 per cent with a minimum of 
zero per cent and a maximum of 29 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively. The level 
of financial voluntary disclosure is slightly less than that of the other two groups with 
a mean of 12 per cent starting from zero per cent to a maximum of 39 per cent. The 
low level of voluntary disclosure documented in GCC listed firms may be explained 
by a number of corporate governance and contextual factors. In terms of corporate 
governance, the concentrated ownership by large shareholders, the domination of 
government and family institutions and their significant presence on the board of 
directors, the limited foreign investors holdings, and the ineffective role played by 
institutional investors due to their low sophistication and experience level make it 
easier for major shareholders to extract information privately through their personal 
and political relationships. The low voluntary information disclosed in GCC markets 
is further explained by the secretive culture and the high reliance on family and friend 
relationships.  
The mean of total voluntary disclosure by country is as follows; UAE firms at 20 
per cent, followed by Oman and Bahrain at 13 per cent, Saudi Arabia and Qatar at 12 
per cent, and lastly Kuwait at 8 per cent. The UAE is also proven to have the higher 
voluntary score in the three voluntary groups: strategic, non-financial and financial 
information. This result is attributed to the fact that the UAE has the most welcoming 
business environment for foreign investors (Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Omar, 
2012). This is reflected in the average foreign ownership of 13 per cent documented 
in the current study which is the highest among GCC countries. In addition, while the 
two UAE stock exchanges were the last to be established, they were well structured 
with a corporate governance code in 2007 that was amendment in 2016. Therefore, a 
combination of attractive business environment for foreign investors and well-
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governed stock markets could explain the highest voluntary score found in the UAE 
relative to the other GCC countries. On the other hand, Kuwait has the lowest 
voluntary disclosure level. This is considered to be reasonable taking into account that 
Kuwait was the last country to consider corporate governance rules and regulations. A 
corporate governance code was issued in Kuwait for the first time in 2010, which was 
replaced with new corporate governance regulation in 2013, which have not been 
updated since then. This difference between the UAE and Kuwait in terms of 
voluntary disclosure was also apparent in the process of collecting data for the current 
study. Information is organised and easy to find in the UAE situation compare to 
Kuwait where information is difficult to locate.  
Furthermore, the total voluntary disclosure by year suggests a trend toward 
increased disclosure across the countries. For instance, in 2014, the voluntary 
disclosure score in Saudi Arabia was 11 per cent, which increased to 12 per cent in 
2016. In Kuwait, it increased from 8 per cent to 10 per cent, and in the UAE from 19 
per cent to 21 per cent. Regarding the voluntary disclosure groups, the mean of each 
group also increases over the three-year period. Strategic voluntary disclosure shows 
an improvement in all countries except Kuwait and Oman, non-financial information 
disclosure shows the most improvement among voluntary groups, whereas, financial 
information disclosure shows an increase in only Saudi Arabia and Qatar, indicating 
that the disclosure of financial information observed a slight improvement compared 
to the other groups of disclosure. This improvement in voluntary disclosure across 
GCC countries reflect the recent trend toward developing stock exchanges through 
promoting good practice of corporate governance and increased disclosure and 
transparency. Almost all GCC countries have recently amended their corporate 
governance codes to include more provisions in the disclosure and transparency 
requirements. 
Regarding the disclosure of information within the sub-groups of the three main 
groups, the mean of voluntary disclosure varies widely from as low as 1 per cent for 
future prospect information to a maximum of 55 per cent for general corporate 
information. The GCC listed firms appear to disclose more information in groups 
such as: general corporate, corporate strategy, acquisitions and disposals, foreign 
currency, and stock price. In contrast, they disclose minimal information in groups 
such as future prospects, segmental information, and financial reviews. This reflects 
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the secretive culture in GCC; since financial information like future prospects and 
financial ratios consider sensitive information, firms hesitate to disclose it while 
corporate strategy and other general information are less sensitive and are related to 
mandatory information such as company vision and mission and company main 
practice or products. Therefore, firms find it easier and less costly to reveal this type 
of general information. 
Regarding voluntary disclosure by industry groups, the energy and services 
sectors provide more voluntary disclosure than do the manufacturing and real estate 
sectors. This result is reasonable taking into consideration the political sensitivity and 
competition factors in each industry.  
1.6.2 Voluntary Disclosure and Ownership Structure 
In relation to the six ownership structure aspects, family ownership is the only 
ownership type that has a significant and positive relationship with total voluntary 
disclosure at the 1% level. Family ownership is significantly associated with two 
components of disclosure, non-financial and financial, at the 1% and 5% significance 
levels respectively. This result can be referred to the importance of family in the GCC 
societies. Families in the GCC care about their names and reputations and if this name 
is related to a business, the eagerness to protect the family name becomes more 
important. Therefore, family firms tend to provide more information disclosure in 
order to maintain their relations with minority shareholders. 
 Institutional ownership is not associated with the overall voluntary disclosure 
score, yet is found to be related to non-financial information disclosure implying that 
institutional investors in GCC are able to impact disclosure of non-financial 
information such as social responsibility information and information about board 
members and employees.  Board members’ ownership and audit committee ownership 
are not significantly associated with the total voluntary disclosure. However, 
interestingly they have an opposite effect on strategic and financial voluntary 
disclosure. While board ownership negatively affects strategic information disclosure, 
it is positively associated with financial disclosure. Audit committee ownership 
positively relates to the level of strategic disclosure and negatively affects the level of 
financial disclosure. Government and foreign ownership are not statistically 
significant in any of the four models. 
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1.6.3 Voluntary Disclosure and Board Attributes 
The results show a negative and significant relationship between board size and 
the level of total voluntary disclosure at the 1% level. This negative association also 
exists with regard to the strategic and financial information disclosure at the 1% and 
5% levels respectively, suggesting that fewer members on the board helps to perform 
their monitoring role effectively and promote transparency. This result supports the 
view that suggests more coherence and decision making effectiveness within small 
groups. In contrast to expectations, the number of board meetings held during the year 
has a negative and significant impact on the level of total voluntary disclosure 
suggesting that the number of meeting held during the year is not a sign of board 
diligence and effectiveness rather could be a sign of struggles and difficulties facing 
the firm. The results also indicate that the average number of other directorships held 
by the board members is positively and significantly associated with the level of total 
voluntary disclosure and also with the non-financial and financial information 
disclosure. This result supports the argument that views multiple directorships held by 
the board members as a sign of expertise and knowledge. In GCC, board member who 
sits in multiple boards is more valuable in the market due to the expectation that he 
has high level of expertise and knowledge in different types of businesses; the result 
in this study regarding multiple directorships comes to support this notion. Audit 
committee size is positively and significantly related to the total voluntary disclosure 
as well as to strategic and financial information, suggesting that more members on the 
audit committee is associated with greater diligence and effectiveness and hence 
better voluntary disclosure. The results of this study also indicate that board 
independence, although positively related to total voluntary disclosure, is not 
statistically significant except in the case of strategic information disclosure. Firms 
provide more strategic information when boards contain more independent members. 
The lack of significance regarding board independence could be a result of a 
misclassification of independent members in the GCC firms. The nomination and 
selection of board members rely more in the personal relations and political 
connections. Regarding board compensations and board members’ attendance, these 
are not statistically significant. The structure and policy of board members’ 
compensation is not clear in the GCC firms. In most of the cases, compensations are 
not linked to the performance indicators. Board members are granted a previously 
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specified amount of remunerations. This may explain the lack of significance of the 
impact of board compensations. 
In terms of voluntary information groups, board ownership, audit committee 
ownership, board size, and audit committee size are the determinants of strategic and 
financial information disclosure. Board meeting and firm size significantly explain the 
variation in the level of disclosure regarding strategic and non-financial information, 
while family ownership and the average number of directorships held by the board 
members determine the level of non-financial and financial information. Strategic and 
financial information share the most in common regarding how the ownership and 
board attributes variables affect their level. Non-financial information, although it has 
the highest adjusted R-square at 42%, is explained by a lower number of variables; 
namely, family ownership, Board meetings, average directorships, and firm size. 
Furthermore, the results of a sample t-test indicate that, on average, larger firms 
provide more voluntary disclosure compared to smaller ones; the mean total voluntary 
disclosure as well as the mean of its three main groups is significantly higher in larger 
firms than in smaller ones. This finding supports the view that large firms can afford 
the costs associated with the production and preparation of information as well as the 
costs associated with such information being exploited by competitors. In GCC most 
of the large firms are oil and hydrocarbon related or telecommunications firms. GCC 
governments tend to invest in these large firms. This may add to the pervious 
explanation by suggesting that large firms in the GCC disclose more voluntary 
information due to their political sensitivity and adequate resources, which can be 
further supplied by the government if needed.  
1.7 The Contribution of the Study  
This research makes a number of key contributions to the knowledge on the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. First, the study determines the level of voluntary 
disclosure provided by the listed firms on the seven GCC stock markets using a 
comprehensive disclosure index created by Meek et al. (1995) (Al-Shammari and Al-
Sultan, 2010; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013; Scaltrito, 2016) after modifying it to fit 
the corporate reporting context of the GCC market. The index consists of 71 items 
divided into three groups of information: strategic, financial, and non-financial 
information. The modified version of the index that is utilised in the current study 
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could be used by the regulators and market participants for the purpose of future 
assessment and evaluation of the level of transparency and voluntary disclosure in the 
market. The scope of the study, seven different stock markets in six GCC countries 
over the three-year period, makes a valuable addition to the literature by providing 
evidence of the low voluntary disclosure level in the GCC markets, where the social, 
cultural, and economic environments are distinctive from those in any other 
developing or developed countries and where prior empirical findings are limited.  
The study offers a contemporary analysis of the corporate governance factors’ 
influencing the level of voluntary disclosure since it covers the most recent years of 
2014-2016. The study is comprehensive not only in the selection of the voluntary 
disclosure items included in the index, but also in the selection of the potential factors 
which may impact on the voluntary disclosure level. The ownership structure 
elements examined in the current study include six types of ownership; namely, board 
ownership, government ownership, family ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership, and audit committee ownership. It seeks to explain the variation in the 
voluntary disclosure provided by firms by the variation in the percentage of stakes 
held by the different types of shareholders. In an environment of ownership 
concentration, the domination of government and family holdings, and the restrictions 
on foreign investments, the GCC markets provide an interesting context in which to 
examine whether the identity of the shareholders or the value they hold has the 
influence on their monitoring ability and as a result, on the disclosure level they 
demand. The current study is the first to investigate the impact of such a 
comprehensive list of ownership variables on the level of voluntary disclosure.  
The study also seeks to establish the impact of some of the key board attributes on 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Prior research studies have extensively examined the 
impact of board independence on board performance and various financial reporting 
issues (Jaggi and Charles, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Ajinkya, 
Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; Samaha et al., 2012). They consider non-executive 
directors when measuring board independence. This current study is different from 
most of the prior studies in terms of how it measures the independence of the board 
using only independent directors as classified by the firms to purely reflect the impact 
of independence on disclosure. The study also examines the voluntary disclosure in 
relation to board meetings and board members’ attendance to provide the required 
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empirical evidence of important board attributes that have not been adequately 
examined in relation to disclosure previously. The study also provides support for the 
other less researched aspects of the board of directors, namely board compensation 
and cross directorships that could potentially play a key role in the voluntary 
disclosures practices of the firm. The findings of this study in relation to the board of 
directors’ attributes have policy implications, as the regulators in the GCC capital 
markets continue to define and refine the most desired board characteristics which 
aim to achieve board monitoring effectiveness. Therefore, the results of this study are 
essential to ensure that future regulatory changes are well informed and help enhance 
the transparency and disclosure level in the GCC stock markets. 
The study additionally contributes to the literature of agency theory in the context 
of developing countries. Agency theory in the current study partially explains the 
level of voluntary disclosure in GCC firms using ownership and board factors. 
Agency prediction regarding family ownership, board size, board meetings, board 
directorship, audit committee size, and firm size are supported. However, agency 
theory fails to provide support for other ownership types and board attributes such as 
institutional ownership, foreign ownership, board meeting and attendance, and board 
independence. This may imply that the concentration of ownership, the domination of 
government and family owners, the personal and political connection in addition to a 
group of economic, cultural, and social norms exist in GCC countries work together 
to prevent the agent-principle relationship and agency explanations form overly 
dominating (Judge, 2012; Shehata, 2017). 
As big and small firms differ in their ownership structure and board attributes, the 
current study contribute to the disclosure literature by investigating the difference in 
the influence of these corporate governance mechanism on the voluntary disclosure 
level in big and small firms. Identifying the difference between big and small firms 
has important implications especially in situations where regulators follow ‘one size 
fit all’ approach.  
Overall, the results of the current study contribute to the academic literature by 
providing a better understanding of the voluntary disclosure practice and its 
determinants; namely, ownership structure and board attributes in the context of the 
GCC markets. The results are also of great interest to current and prospective 
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investors as well as to financial analysts, regulators, and academics in order to 
enhance their understanding of the reporting and corporate governance environment 
in the seven stock markets operating across the six GCC countries. 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the empirical literature in the area of corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosure. It starts by presenting an overview of the 
earliest works that investigated a number of firm financial characteristics as the main 
determinants of voluntary disclosure, such as firm size and listing status. The second 
section of the chapter aims to review studies that focused on the associations 
between different types and concentrations of ownership structure and the level 
of voluntary disclosure. Then the chapter continues to review the studies that 
explore the association between the board of directors and the level of 
disclosure. The chapter highlights the mixed results regarding the impact of 
ownership and board factors on the level of voluntary disclosure, which is 
attributed to studying different settings and adopting different measures of 
disclosure. 
Chapter 3 presents a detailed description of the corporate governance 
environment in the GCC countries as the context of the study. It begins by 
presenting a historical background to the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and its stated objective, followed by a historical overview of the GCC 
stock markets’ development and their regulatory bodies. The overview also 
includes general information about the GCC stock markets, like foreign investors’ 
participation, market capitalization, and value traded. Following this, the chapter 
provides a general review of the GCC social and corporate environment. The 
discussion is directed toward three aspects of the environment; namely: social and 
cultural norms, economic features, and the political system. This is followed by a 
detailed discussion of the development of the corporate governance codes by 
presenting an overview of the introduction and amendment of the governance codes 
in each of the GCC countries as well as a brief comparison of these. The chapter then 
concludes by providing a detailed description of the corporate governance 
environment; specifically, the ownership structure and board of directors.  
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Chapter 4 presents the research’s theoretical underpinning, methodology, and 
method used in the study. It starts by outlining the research philosophy and paradigm 
in which this thesis is located. Then explaining the theoretical framework regarding 
corporate voluntary disclosure. This section illustrates the appropriateness of using 
agency theory as a base for forming the research hypotheses related to ownership 
structure and the board of directors. The following section is devoted to the 
hypotheses development. Following this, the chapter presents details of the sample 
selection and the data collection in addition to the research methods relevant to 
achieving the study objectives. Due to the nature of the study, a significant portion of 
the next section of this chapter is devoted to explaining and justifying the use of the 
disclosure index as an instrument for measuring the dependent variable, the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The following section of this chapter provides the definitions 
and measurements of the independent and control variables used in this research. The 
chapter then concludes with a brief explanation of the statistical analysis and tests 
employed in the current study. 
Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the impact of 
various ownership structures and board of directors-related factors on the level of 
voluntary disclosure.  The first section of this chapter presents the descriptive 
statistics of the variables employed in the empirical analysis. The descriptive analysis 
first includes a detailed analysis of the dependent variable, the voluntary disclosure 
score. Then, it presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and control 
variables utilized in this study. The chapter then includes the results of the correlation 
matrix showing the Pearson correlation between all of the variables employed in the 
study. Following this, the chapter provides the results of a multivariate regression 
analysis that tests the hypotheses created in chapter 4. This section includes a detailed 
discussion of the results and their implications for the corporate governance 
environment of the GCC stock markets. The multivariate analysis is followed up by a 
comparative analysis of big and small firms. This includes the independent sample t-
tests and the regression analysis. The chapter then concludes with a summary 
illustrating the main findings of the current study. 
Chapter 6 then draws together the analysis and discussion presented in the 
previous paragraphs by providing a summary of the findings of the study and their 
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implications. In addition it provides recommendations regarding any potential future 
research. This chapter also discusses a number of research limitations of the study.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the initial work in the disclosure literature is understood to dates back to 
Cerf’s (1961) contribution, this remains an active academic area seeking to identify 
the determinants and motivations of such practice in different settings and 
environments. The majority of disclosure studies have been developed based on 
agency theory viewing disclosure as a monitoring tool that results in less information 
asymmetry and so, accordingly; reduces the agency problems between shareholders 
and managers (Cooke, 1989b; Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The early 
disclosure studies focused on firm size and listing status as the main determinants of 
voluntary disclosure relying mainly on the assumption that disclosure policy is 
determined based on a costs and benefits evaluation of disclosure decisions (Cerf, 
1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979). The ensuing studies have continued to 
include firm size as a main factor in explaining the variation in information disclosure 
and added more firm characteristics to the equation, such as international listing, 
profitability, leverage, audit firm size, and industry type, expanding the vision for a 
clearer explanation of disclosure rather than a simpler trade-off between costs and 
benefits (McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 
1989a; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Cooke, 1993; Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; 
Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; Mitchell, Chia and Loh, 
1995; Depoers, 2000; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 
2004; Aksu and Kosedag, 2006; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Iatridis, 2008). Table 2.1 
summarizes the findings and methods of these earlier studies in the field that have 
focused on firm financial characteristics as the determinants of the disclosure 
practices.  
The next generation of disclosure research aimed to examine in greater depth the 
suitability of agency theory for explaining the practice of disclosure. Therefore, these 
researchers examined a more comprehensive set comprising a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms to investigate to a greater extent the connection between 
these mechanisms, as monitoring tools, and disclosure. They linked the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (mainly the board characteristics and ownership 
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structure) to the level of voluntary disclosure assuming that the monitoring role 
performed by such mechanisms impacts on the agency costs and consequently the 
managers’ decisions to disclose additional information. Some focused on board 
attributes (Gul and Leung, 2004; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013; Samaha, Khlif and Hussainey, 2015), others on different aspects of ownership 
structure (Chau and Gray, 2002; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Godfred and 
Zangina, 2009; Rouf and Al Harun, 2011), and the majority combined the analysis of 
board attributes and ownership structure into a single study in order to capture the 
overall influence of corporate governance on the voluntary disclosure level 
(BarakoHancock and Izan, 2006; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007; Samaha et al., 2012). Even though they all document the existence of 
an association between corporate governance and disclosure, the results are 
inconclusive. For example, while government ownership clearly has an impact on the 
level of voluntary disclosure, this impact is documented to be positive in some studies 
(Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang and Claiborne, 2008; Al-Bassam et al., 2015) but 
negative in others (ChoiSami and Zhou, 2010; Choi et al., 2013; Qu, Leung and 
Cooper, 2013). Similarly, board independence is documented as influencing the level 
of disclosure; yet, it resulted in increased disclosure in some studies (Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007; Abdullah, Percy and Stewart, 2015), but in decreased disclosure in 
others (Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006). 
The third generation of the literature recognised the influence of environmental 
factors on disclosure practice. Hence, a number of studies have examined the impact 
of external factors, such as the legal, political, social, cultural, and capital market 
environment, on the firms’ disclosure policies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Bauwhede 
and Willekens, 2008; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Abdullah, Percy and 
Stewart, 2015; Samaha, Khlif and Hussainey, 2015). They provide evidence that such 
factors explain to some extent the variation in disclosure level in different settings.  
Due to the presence of mixed results regarding the determinants of disclosure, as 
documented in different settings, and the recognition of the impact of environmental 
elements on the disclosure practices outlined in several studies, the current study aims 
to examine the voluntary disclosure in the GCC countries, where the social, culture, 
legal, and corporate governance environments are distinct from those found in 
developed and other developing countries. The first section of this chapter will 
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therefore review the literature concerning the relationship between ownership 
structure aspects and voluntary disclosure. The second section of the chapter then 
considers the impact of board attribute on the level of voluntary disclosure provided 
by corporations. Throughout, this chapter provides an overview of both the board of 
directors and the ownership structure influences on the disclosure level as the primary 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms.  
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Table 2.1 Voluntary Disclosure and Firm Financial Characteristics 
Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Cerf (1961) 
University of California Press 
Examines the influence of a number of 
variables on information disclosure 
quality in New York stock exchange 
using a weighted disclosure index 
consisting of 31 items. 
Size, profitability, and number of shareholders impact positively on disclosure 
quality. 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
The Accounting Review 
Examines the characteristics of 
corporations in the US that are 
associated with the quality of 
corporate disclosure. 
Firm size, listing status, number of shareholders, and audit firm size are positively 
associated with disclosure quality. 
Firth (1979) 
Accounting and Business Research 
Examine the relationship between 
voluntary corporate disclosure and 
firm characteristics in the UK using a 
disclosure index of 48 weighed items. 
Firm size and stock market listing are positively and significantly related to the 
level of disclosure. Audit firm size is not significant in influencing disclosure.  
McNally et al. (1982) 
Accounting and Business Research 
Examine the disclosure practice of 
listed companies in New Zealand using 
a disclosure index of 41 weighted 
items. 
A correlation analysis indicates a significant and positive relationship between 
firm size and disclosure level. 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
The Accounting Review 
Examine the relations between firm 
size, financial leverage, and assets in 
place and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by 52 Mexican firms using 
regression analysis and a disclosure 
index comprising of 24 Items; 
weighted and un-weighted. 
Firm size is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. Leverage and 
assets in place were found to be unrelated to voluntary disclosure. The results 
from the weighted and un-weighted disclosure index are equivalent. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Cooke (1989) 
Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting 
Examines the level of voluntary 
disclosure by 90 Swedish listed and 
unlisted firms using a disclosure index 
with 146 items and regression 
analysis models.  
Quotation status and firm size are positively related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Trading companies disclose significantly less than other industry 
sectors. Parent company relations are found to be insignificant.  
Craswell and Taylor (1992) 
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
Investigates the disclosure decision 
regarding estimated reserves by 98 oil 
and gas companies in Australia  
The type of audit firm is significantly and positively related to the disclosure of 
reserves. Choosing a big audit firm is a signal that reflects a high quality auditor 
and financial reporting.  
Cooke (1993)  
Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 
Measure the level of disclosure 
(mandatory and voluntary) in 48 
Japanese listed corporations 
depending on their quotation status 
(unlisted, listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, and multinational listing).  
Quotation status is significantly related to disclosure. Multinational corporation 
provide more disclosure of information compared to domestically listed and 
unlisted firms.  
Gray et al. (1995) 
Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting 
Investigate the impact of international 
capital market pressure on the level of 
voluntary disclosure using a disclosure 
index of 128 items classified into 
strategic, non-financial, and financial 
information. 
Internationally listed corporations disclose significantly more strategic and non-
financial information than domestically listed firms in US. However, no difference 
in the level of overall disclosure is found between internationally listed and 
domestically listed firms in the UK. Participation in the international capital 
markets is significantly associated with increased voluntary disclosure. 
Hossain and Rahman (1995) 
Journal of International Financial 
management and Accounting 
Empirically examine the relationship 
between five firm characteristics and 
the level of voluntary disclosure by 55 
New Zealand firms using regression 
analysis and a disclosure index 
consisting of 95 items. 
Firm size, foreign listing and leverage are significantly and positively related to the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Audit firm size is not a significant explanatory 
variable. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Meek et al. (1995) 
Journal of international business 
studies 
Examine a number of factors 
influencing the level of voluntary 
disclosure by 226 multinational 
corporations in the US, UK, and several 
continental European countries using 
a disclosure index consisting of 85 
items categorized into strategic, non-
financial, and financial information. 
Company size, listing status, and country/region are all significant in explaining 
the variation in the level of disclosure. Larger firms provide more financial and 
non-financial information. Multi-listed companies provide more strategic and 
financial but not non-financial information. Industry type is related to financial 
and non-financial information. Leverage is significant, but, negatively related to 
disclosure contrary to expectation. Profitability is not significant.  
Mitchell et al. (1995) 
Accounting and Finance 
Examine the motivation regarding the 
voluntary disclosure of segment 
information in 29 multi-product 
Australian firms. 
There is a positive association between voluntary segment disclosure and firm 
size and leverage.  
Depoers (2000) 
European Accounting Review 
Examines the determinants of 
disclosure in the annual report of 102 
French listed companies using a 
disclosure index consisting of 65 
financial and non-financial items. 
Firm size and foreign activities are positively related to the extent of voluntary 
disclosure.  Ownership diffusion, audit firm size, and leverage are not statistically 
significant. The study also finds that the extent of disclosure decreases with 
proprietary costs resulting from the potential entry of new competitors.  
Watson et al. (2002) 
The British Accounting Review 
Investigate the voluntary disclosure of 
accounting ratios in the corporate 
annual report of 313 UK companies 
and its association with a number of 
characteristics using multivariate 
analysis. 
Firm size and industry have a significant positive effect on the level of ratios 
disclosure. Performance measures including profitability and leverage appear to 
have a limited effect on ratios disclosure. No significant relation exists for 
liquidity. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Leventis and Weetman (2004) 
Advances in International Accounting 
Examine the association between the 
voluntary disclosure of environmental, 
social, and financial information and a 
number of firm characteristics of 87 
companies listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange using regression analysis. 
The disclosure index consists of 72 
items based on Meek et al. (1995) 
Firm size and is positively and significantly related to the overall voluntary 
disclosure. Profitability, liquidity, and gearing are found not to be significant in 
influencing disclosure. Different factors influence different types of information. 
Aksu and Kosedag (2006)  
Corporate governance: An 
International Review  
Examine the transparency and 
disclosure practice by the 52 largest 
firms on the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
using an index consisting of 106 items 
in three groups. 
Larger and more profitable firms exhibit a higher transparency and disclosure 
score. Leverage was found not to be significant. 
Hossain and Taylor (2007) 
Corporate Ownership and Control 
Empirically use a regression analysis 
to investigate the effect of firm 
characteristics on the voluntary 
disclosure of 22 commercial banks in 
Bangladesh. The disclosure index 
consists of 45 items 
Bigger banks and banks that are audited by an audit firm that has an association 
with an international audit firm tend voluntarily to disclose more information. 
Latridis (2008) 
International Review of Financial 
Analysis  
Analyses the financial characteristics 
of firms that provide extensive 
disclosure in the UK.  
The study shows that in order to raise finance in the capital market, firms tend to 
provide extensive accounting disclosure. Firms that provide extensive disclosure 
tend to be large firms, that are highly leveraged, more liquid and profitable 
indicating that firms that perform well financially tend to provide more detailed 
information in order to impress the market participants. Accounting disclosure 
reduces the level of risk and, as a result, the cost of raising capital. 
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2.2 Ownership Structure and Voluntary Disclosure  
Whether ownership is concentrated or dispersed and its relation to the disclosure 
of information has been intensively examined in the literature. Recently, however, 
researchers have realized that the type of ownership, regardless of its concentration, is 
also an important and influential factor that governs managers’ actions and impacts on 
the disclosure policy (Godfred and Zangina, 2009; Laidroo, 2009; Rouf and Al Harun, 
2011; Jalila and Devi, 2012; Liang, Lin and Chin, 2012). Ownership structure plays a 
central role in determining the extent to which the interests of managers and owners 
are aligned and thereby the level of monitoring needed in this agency relationship. For 
instance, different owners will monitor and control managers differently depending on 
their varying investment objectives and horizons, control rights, and ability to gather 
and process information (Connelly et al., 2010; Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 2017).  
Thus, both the identity and concentration of ownership are significant in identifying 
the level of monitoring managers and the level of disclosure that managers are willing 
to provide to meet the owners’ needs. This section reviews the literature regarding the 
influence of different classes of ownership and concentration level on the corporate 
voluntary disclosure policy.   
2.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
The underlying assumptions regarding the relationship between information 
disclosure and ownership concentration derive from agency perspectives. Using 
agency theory, the dominant prior studies have provided evidence of a negative 
impact of concentrated ownership on the level of disclosure (Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Fan and Wong, 2002; Faten, 2005; Tsamenyi, Enninful-Adu and Onumah, 2007; 
Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Jiang and Habib, 2009; Laidroo, 2009; García-Meca 
and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Jiang, Habib and Hu, 2011; Samaha et al., 2012; Khlif, 
Ahmed and Souissi, 2017; Jankensgard, 2018; Lepore et al., 2018). These studies 
from both developing and developed countries (all characterized by high 
concentration structure settings), support the view that the presence of large block 
holders reduces agency conflicts that arise between managers and major shareholders. 
When a small number of shareholders hold a large portion of the firm’s stock, this 
helps to align the interests of major shareholders and managers. This alignment of 
interests reduces the need for monitoring by outside minority shareholders because 
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they assume that major shareholders have superior power and control rights to closely 
monitor managers’ behaviours. As a result, the demand for information by minority 
shareholders for monitoring purposes is expected to decrease, which results in less 
information disclosure. At the same time, large shareholders with significant control 
rights may intervene in the board’s monitoring function by appointing their 
representatives and convey private information for their own benefits, which may not 
coincide with the minority’s interests, causing the level of information asymmetry to 
increase between the firm and the minority shareholders (Jiang, Habib and Hu, 2011).  
On the other hand, when control rights are widely spread over a large number of 
shareholders, the conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders arise and 
the demand for high quality disclosure and financial reporting to monitor managers 
become significantly important. Thus, ownership diffusion is found to be positively 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure (Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; 
Babío Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). So, financial 
reporting and disclosure seem to be more important in dispersed ownership structure 
where outside shareholders are the main monitoring body, who lack first-hand access 
to information, which leads to greater information and transparency demand than is 
the case within a concentrated ownership structure, in which major shareholders bear 
the responsibility for monitoring the management using their right to convey private 
information. Thus, the literature tends to conclude that a highly concentrated 
ownership can compensate for weak governance by effectively monitoring the 
management and positively impacting on firm performance, which consequently 
reduces the need for disclosure (Abdallah and Ismail, 2016). 
However, several studies have failed to identify a significant impact of ownership 
concentration on the level of voluntary disclosure (Gisbert and Navallas, 2013; 
Scaltrito, 2016). One of these studies was conducted in Spain and another in Italy, 
where ownership structure is typically highly concentrated. One explanation of the 
lack of a significant negative effect of concentrated ownership on disclosure level 
could be the existence of other effective corporate governance mechanisms that play a 
substitute role of monitoring and promoting transparency, which outweighs the role of 
the major shareholders. For example, Gisbert and Navallas (2013) find that the 
presence of independent directors is significantly related to higher voluntary 
disclosure even in a concentrated ownership structure. This mean that the role of the 
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independent director is not impaired by the existence of major shareholders. 
Similarly, the positive impact of ownership diffusion is not significant in a number of 
studies; Raffournier (1995) find no relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in Swiss corporations’ annual reports and ownership diffusions; Depoers 
(2000) shows that ownership diffusion is unrelated to the level of voluntary disclosure 
in France; and Alsaeed (2008) document no association between ownership diffusion 
and voluntary disclosure in Saudi Arabia. These studies are either old or were 
conducted in less developed countries, which may imply that the minority 
shareholders’ rights are not fully developed or weakly enforced resulting in a 
moderate impact of such ownership in terms of monitoring their interests and 
demanding more information.  
2.2.2 Government Ownership 
There is no consensus concerning the relationship between government ownership 
and disclosure in the literature. Most of the studies that examine government 
ownership are mainly conducted in East Asian countries, such as China, Malaysia, 
and Singapore or in other developing markets, where the government institutions tend 
to hold a significant stake of listed companies. Empirically, government ownership is 
recognized as having a positive impact on the financial reporting and disclosure 
policies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Mohd Ghazali, 2007; Wang and Claiborne, 2008; Jiang 
and Habib, 2009; Laidroo, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Haddad et 
al., 2015; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). Even though government ownership is 
not thoroughly examined in GCC countries, where such ownership is highly 
concentrated, a couple of recent studies have identified a significant positive effect of 
government ownership on firm performance (Zeitun, 2014; Abdallah and Ismail, 
2016).  
The positive impact of government ownership on disclosure and performance is 
supported by multiple explanations. First, using agency theory argumentation, the 
presence of government shareholders increases moral hazard and agency problems 
due to the conflict between commercial and political objectives and the easier access 
to different sources of finance, thereby motivating management to provide more 
voluntary disclosure in order to relieve investors’ concerns regarding management 
quality (Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang and Claiborne, 2008). Second, government 
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keenness to maintain its reputation as a promoter of transparency and good 
governance practices, in addition to its eagerness to obtain foreign capital, may 
encourage firms with high government ownership to increase their disclosure to signal 
the government efforts regarding market developments and also to legitimise the firm 
operations (Ntim et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2015). Abdallah et al. (2016) support 
this explanation by showing that government investments in GCC countries are 
targeted more toward firms with better governance. Third, in line with the same 
legitimacy assumption in the second explanation, firms with high government 
ownership are more politically sensitive since their actions and activities are always 
under public attention (Jiang and Habib, 2009; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). 
Therefore, government shareholders are more likely to exert some pressure over the 
management to provide more disclosure in order to gain public trust and live up to the 
society’s expectations.  
However, government ownership is negatively associated with disclosure in some 
studies (ChoiSami and Zhou, 2010; Choi et al., 2013; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013). 
Qu et al. (2013) suggest that government ownership in China lacks incentives to 
encourage disclosure because more voluntary disclosure means enabling other 
shareholders to monitor the management’s related party transactions more closely. In 
addition, government shareholders have privileged access to private information. 
Similarly, in China, Choi et al. (2013) and Choi et al. (2010) provide evidence that 
government ownership is related to more information asymmetry in the market, 
indicating that government ownership chooses to exploit their private information 
advantage for their own interests rather than improving the general market 
transparency. All three studies were conducted in China during the period from 1995 
to 2003. Two of the studies have examined government ownership pre and post 2000 
and find that, while the negative effect of government ownership remains, this is not 
significant after 2002, suggesting that the institutional changes that took place in the 
Chinese stock market had a positive impact on the corporate governance environment, 
which affected the role of government ownership in the information environment.  
In spite of the significant positive impact of government ownership documented in 
the literature and the negative effect of such ownership recognized in the Chinese 
market in the early period of 1995-2000, a number of studies found no explanatory 
power of government ownership on the level of voluntary disclosure (Mohd Ghazali 
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and Weetman, 2006; Naser et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Jalila and Devi, 
2012; Sepasi, Kazempour and Mansourlakoraj, 2016). Huafang and Jianguo (2007)’s 
result of no significant effect of government ownership in 2002 is consistent with 
Chinese studies where the significant negative impact of government ownership 
disappeared from 2002 onward, due to several institutional reforms on the stock 
market environment. In Malaysia, Mohd Ghazali (2007) and Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) show inconsistent results regarding government ownership. The 
underlying reason for this is that Mohd Ghazali (2007) examined social responsibility 
disclosure and found the government to be an influential corporate governance factor 
in increasing this type of disclosure, which could be explained based on legitimacy 
theory, while Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) examine voluntary disclosure in 
general after the financial crisis of 1997 and find no significant association. The 
remaining studies that failed to find any statistical significance for government 
ownership were conducted in countries like Iran, Qatar, Malaysia, and China.   
2.2.3 Institutional Ownership 
The disclosure literature mainly suggests a positive impact of institutional 
ownership on the disclosure level, recognizing the active role played by institutional 
shareholders in monitoring the management and controlling the agency costs through 
reducing information asymmetry (Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 2017). Institutional 
ownership is confirmed to be associated with higher voluntary disclosure in a number 
of studies (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Laidroo, 2009; Khodadadi, Khazami and 
Aflatooni, 2010; Rouf and Al Harun, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012; Al-Bassam et al., 2015). 
Due to their level of knowledge and expertise, and their large ownership holdings and 
control rights, institutional shareholders have extra incentives to monitor the 
management and demand additional information reporting. Moreover, as outside 
professionals with a high level of information demand, institutional investors are 
unable to directly oversee the management activities, which increases the managers’ 
motivations to provide more information voluntarily in order to meet their demand. 
However, when the institutional ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of 
a few large institutions who maintain a long-term relationship with the firm, they 
might act as insiders. Consequently, they fail to place pressure on the management for 
higher disclosure while securing private information for their own benefits, which 
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results in lower voluntary disclosure (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; Jiang and 
Habib, 2009; Choi et al., 2013). Jiang and Habib (2009) and Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
empirically support this argument by providing evidence that the positive impact of 
institutional ownership on voluntary disclosure becomes negative when such 
ownership is highly concentrated, suggesting that concentrated institutional ownership 
is likely to have an adverse effect on the level of transparency and disclosure, taking 
into consideration their ability to obtain private information and their readiness to 
provide a big portion of the capital. This could motivates managers to collaborate 
with them in the expropriation of other capital providers, specifically when the type of 
institutions is banks or investments management companies (Choi et al., 2013).  
Institutional ownership is not significant in a number of studies (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Jalila and Devi, 2012). Two of these 
studies were conducted in Malaysia and one in Ireland. This may indicate that 
institutional investors in these markets are insufficiently eager to demand extra 
information in order to evaluate the managers’ decisions or they have an alternative 
channel besides annual reports to extract valuable information (Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008). 
 In summary, institutional ownership is well documented in the literature to have a 
positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure until it reaches a certain level of 
concentration that enables such ownership to obtain private benefits. This adverse 
influence at a high concentration level is also driven by other factors, such as the 
power of institutions as capital providers, the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
the capital market, and the amount of protection provided for minority shareholders. 
2.2.4 Family Ownership 
In the case of family ownership, the disclosure literature targets East Asian 
countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Singapore because holding a large stake 
by the founding family members is very common in these countries. Studies 
conducted in this context, with a culture of a high level of secrecy and strong 
uncertainty avoidance, document a negative association between disclosure level and 
both family ownership and the proportion of family members on the board (Jaggi and 
Charles, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Jalila and Devi, 2012). The results of these 
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studies imply that firms with substantial family ownership have little incentive to 
disclose information in excess of the mandatory requirements since the separation of 
ownership and control is limited, which gives the main owners (the family members) 
great access to private information in order to monitor their interest; thus, demand for 
public disclosure will be relatively low compared to within a firm with a wider 
ownership structure. Unlike other types of ownership, the family interests are aligned 
with those of the other shareholders because the wealth of the family is closely linked 
to the firm’s value. Therefore, the demand for information for monitoring purposes by 
other shareholders will be limited. In addition, the presence of family ownership may 
impair the positive impact of other corporate governance mechanisms, like the 
influence of independent directors on the board through the nomination of family 
representatives to the board, allowing only the minimum number of outside 
independent directors to participate. Thus, family firms’ boards tend to be less 
independent and dominated by family member representatives (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 2015). Ali et al. (2007) find that family firms are less 
likely to provide voluntary disclosure, especially information regarding corporate 
governance practice, in order to facilitate the appointment of family members to the 
board. Jaggi and Charles (2000) show that the positive association between board 
independence and financial disclosure is weaker in family controlled firms, 
suggesting that the monitoring role of independent directors is impaired by family 
shareholding, which consequently reduces the level of disclosure provided over and 
above the mandatory.  
Even though firms with family ownership face less severe agency problems 
between the owners and managers, they encounter more serious agency problems that 
arise between the majority family shareholders and other minority shareholders (Ali, 
Chen and Radhakrishnan, 2007). Therefore, it is argued that firms with significant 
family holdings are motivated to provide more information in order to reduce the type 
two agency costs and satisfy the minority’s needs (Wang, 2006). In the USA, Ali et 
al. (2007) conclude that family firms provide better financial reporting and report 
higher quality earnings than non-family firms. Facing substantially higher agency 
conflict between the controlling and non-controlling shareholders, family firms are 
more likely to warn of bad news and offer more accurate and informative forecasts. 
Wang (2006) provides comparable results, showing that founding family ownership is 
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significantly associated with higher earnings quality and informativeness. Similarly, 
Cascino et al. (2010) document that family firms provide higher quality earnings 
compared to their non-family counterparts in Italy, concluding that family financial 
reporting is both more transparent and less managerially manipulated. In addition, 
family ownership is characterized by a long-term investment horizon and a desire to 
maintain their family name’s reputation, generation after generation. This, among 
other reasons, makes the family members who hold managerial positions keen to 
increase the value of the firm as a whole and satisfy the corporate demand for 
transparency. Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes (2015) find that managerial ownership in Saudi 
family firms is associated with higher firm performance. In summary, the relationship 
between family ownership and financial reporting is influenced by the level of 
severity of type two-agency conflict occurring between the family and the minority 
shareholders, as well as, by the unique nature of family shareholders as long-term 
investors who care most about their family reputation. 
2.2.5 Foreign Ownership 
There exists a considerable body of literature that associates higher disclosure 
with a larger proportion of foreign ownership (Depoers, 2000; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Faten, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007; Wang and Claiborne, 2008; Webb, Cahan and Sun, 
2008; Liang, Lin and Chin, 2012; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013; Alhazaimeh, 
Palaniappan and Almsafir, 2014; Muttakin and Subramaniam, 2015). These studies 
are diversified in terms of their contexts; some are conducted in East Asian countries 
like Malaysia, China, and Taiwan, some in African countries such as Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, and some in European countries like France. Prior studies attribute the 
positive impact of foreign shareholding on the level of disclosure and transparency to 
the information disadvantage facing foreign investors compared to domestic ones. 
Foreign investors bear higher information asymmetry due to their geographical 
distance, language barriers, and lack of knowledge of the local accounting and 
corporate environment, which make them more vulnerable to expropriation by 
corporate managers and controlling shareholders. Therefore, the management is 
motivated to provide voluntary information to satisfy the foreign ownership needs, 
retain their funds, and attract new investments. Retaining and attracting foreign 
ownership will benefit the general information environment, especially in emerging 
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economies, bearing in mind that they probably come from more developed and 
transparent corporate settings and have high expectations regarding information 
disclosure. Foreign ownership is considered to be an important type of shareholding 
in emerging markets because of their long-term investment horizon, which helps to 
stabilize the stock volatility, and also because of their fundamental research they 
conduct on potential markets raising the level of awareness and knowledge for all 
market participants (Liang, Lin and Chin, 2012). 
 Contrary to the above arguments, foreign ownership is found inversely to affect 
the level of disclosure in Ghana and Baltic countries (Godfred and Zangina, 2009; 
Laidroo, 2009). These results may be attributed to the size of foreign ownership. The 
average foreign shareholding on the Ghanaian stock exchange is 31 % while on the 
Baltic’s three stock exchanges it is 32%, which is considered to be high compared to 
the mean in other studies. This may suggest that, when foreign investors become 
major shareholders, they will have the ability to extract information privately, so the 
management will have fewer incentives for disclosure and transparency since funds 
are mainly acquired from foreign investors (Laidroo, 2009). However, this argument 
is insufficiently supported by the literature since Choi et al. (2010), in China, find a 
similar negative impact of foreign ownership on information transparency while the 
average foreign shareholding is very low, at 6.8%. Therefore, it is unclear whether the 
negative impact of foreign ownership is to be attributed to high concentrated 
shareholding or to other environmental features. 
The minimal proportion of foreign ownership could reduce the explanatory power 
of such a factor in recognizing its impact on the level of disclosure. Jalila and Devi 
(2012) find no significant relationship between foreign ownership and voluntary 
segment disclosure in Malaysia, while Zeitun (2014) shows an insignificant effect of 
foreign ownership on firm performance in the GCC, which he attributes to limited 
foreign ownership investment in the GCC markets.  
2.2.6 Board Ownership 
The theoretical justifications for the relations between board ownership and 
information disclosure originate from two hypotheses. Considering board ownership 
as a corporate governance mechanism that acts as a substitute for monitoring and 
disclosure anticipates a negative relationship between board ownership and voluntary 
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disclosure (Chau and Gray, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006; Mohd Ghazali, 2007; Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010; Pergola and Joseph, 2011; 
Rouf and Al Harun, 2011; Haddad et al., 2015; Sepasi, Kazempour and 
Mansourlakoraj, 2016). The convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that the 
alignment between the management and shareholders resulting from managerial 
shareholdings reduces the agency conflict and so, consequently, reduces the need for 
monitoring by outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which lowers the 
need for voluntary disclosure. Managers who own shares in the firm are expected to 
work to increase the firm value. Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes (2015) show a positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in Saudi Arabia, 
suggesting that there exists a better association of the goals of the shareholders and 
managers when the managers hold stocks in the firm. When the management holds a 
smaller stake, on the other hand, the management entrenchment hypothesis applies. 
They are motivated to prioritize the maximization of their benefits over the benefit of 
the firm. In this instance, outside shareholders may need to monitor their interests 
more closely, which means incurring additional agency costs. To reduce the cost 
associated with monitoring, managers are willing voluntarily to increase the 
disclosure to enable the outside shareholders to evaluate the management behaviours.  
However, Jiang and Habib (2009) argue that managerial ownership is negatively 
related to disclosure at a low ownership concentration level, and a high proportion of 
managerial ownership has a positive impact on the disclosure level. They suggest that 
when, managers hold a substantial amount of shares, they will be motivated to 
accommodate the shareholders’ disclosure preferences. Managers with large 
shareholdings are willing to extract share-market benefits through better disclosure. 
Nevertheless, this argument needs more investigation to order ascertain its validity.  
Some studies have failed to identify any significant impact of managerial 
ownership on voluntary disclosure (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Donnelly and 
Mulcahy, 2008; Jalila and Devi, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012). The absence of a 
significant association may be due to the low proportion of managerial ownership in 
the market, as in the study of Huafang and Jianguo (2007) in which the mean of such 
ownership is 0.48%, or may be attributed to the type of information disclosure under 
investigation, as in Jalila and Devi’s (2012) study, which focuses on the disclosure of 
segment information.  
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2.2.7 Audit Committee Ownership 
The presence of an audit committee has been positively linked to corporate 
disclosure practice in the literature (Ho and Wong, 2001; Babío Arcay and Muiño 
Vázquez, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; 
Samaha, Khlif and Hussainey, 2015). These researchers view an audit committee as 
an effective monitoring mechanism that mitigates the agency cost and improves the 
quality of the financial reporting presented to the stakeholders, suggesting that an 
audit committee plays an important role in overseeing the corporate reporting process 
(Ghafran and O' Sullivan, 2013) and fulfilling the shareholders’ need for more 
transparent disclosure. Therefore, the existence of an audit committee is shown to 
encourage firms to convey more information voluntarily in order to give the 
shareholders a chance to evaluate the management behaviour and take appropriate 
investment decisions.  
However, previous studies have almost exclusively focused on the existence of an 
audit committee as a variable explaining the level of disclosure. As far as we know, 
no previous research has investigated the ownership of the audit committee members 
and its association with the voluntary disclosure level. Therefore, the current study is 
motivated to examine the effect of the ownership held by audit committee members 
and the level of voluntary disclosure by GCC firms. Does holding a stake in the firm 
increase the incentives for audit committee members to perform their monitoring role 
more effectively and improve the reporting environment? Or do such shareholdings 
reduce the demand for more disclosure by outside shareholders since insiders who 
hold the firm’s share conduct the role of monitoring?  
To summarize, the above section reviews the academic literature concerning the 
association between ownership structure and the level of voluntary disclosure. Table 
2.2 contains details and findings summarising of the studies undertaken in the area of 
ownership structure and corporate disclosure. It is noticeable that there is no 
consensus regarding the effect of the different types and concentration of ownership 
on voluntary disclosure. Shareholders’ identity and concentration have both a positive 
and negative impact depending on both the jurisdiction and the time period under 
investigation. In addition, due to their nature as both dependent and independent 
variables, voluntary disclosure, ownership structure, and board attributes are largely 
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influenced by corporate governance practices, the legal environment, and the cultural 
setting. Therefore, the current study is motivated to examine the relationship between 
ownership structure and voluntary disclosure in GCC firms. GCC countries are 
different due to multiple factors. Hence, voluntary disclosure in the GCC environment 
may be explained differently in terms of its determinants and their impact compared 
with previous research studies.  
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Table 2.2 Voluntary Disclosure and Ownership Structure 
Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Hossain (1994) 
International Journal of 
Accounting 
Examines the relationships between 
voluntary disclosure and a number of 
firm characteristics in 67 Malaysian 
firms using a disclosure index 
consisting of 78 items. 
Firm size, ownership diffusion, and foreign listings are positively associated with 
the level of disclosure. Leverage and audit firm size are found to be insignificantly 
related to disclosure. 
Raffournier (1995)  
The European Accounting Review 
Examines the association between the 
level of voluntary disclosure and a 
number of determinants in 161 Swiss 
firms using a disclosure index 
comprising 30 items. 
Large firms and internationally diversified firms tend to disclose more 
information than small domestic ones. Audit firm size and profitability are also 
significantly and positively related to disclosure. No relationship is found between 
disclosure and ownership diffusion and leverage.  
Depoers (2000) 
European Accounting Review 
Examines the determinants of 
disclosure in the annual report of 102 
French listed companies using a 
disclosure index consisting of 65 
financial and non-financial items. 
Firm size and foreign activities are positively related to the extent of the voluntary 
disclosure.  Ownership diffusion, audit firm size, and leverage are not statistically 
significant. The study also finds that the extent of disclosure decreases with the 
proprietary costs resulting from the potential entry of new competitors.  
Jaggi and Charles (2000) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
Examines if any relationship exists 
between mandatory financial 
disclosure and the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors 
in family controlled firms compare to 
non-family ones in Hong Kong using a 
disclosure index consisting of 30 
items.  
The ratio of independent directors on the board is positively associated with the 
comprehensiveness of the financial disclosure and this association tends to be 
weaker in family controlled firms.   
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Ho and Wong (2001) 
Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing, and Taxation 
Study the relationship between four 
corporate governance attributes and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
listed firms in Hong Kong using a 
weighted disclosure index consisting 
of 20 items.   
The existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively related to the 
level of voluntary disclosure while family members on the board is negatively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. Independent non-executive directors is not 
significant. 
Chau and Gray  (2002) 
International Journal of Accounting 
Examine the association of ownership 
structure with the voluntary 
disclosure of listed companies in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. The disclosure 
index is based on that developed by 
Meek et al. (1995) 
The level of information disclosure is likely to be lower in firms with more insider 
(concentrated ownership) and family shareholders. A wider ownership structure 
found to affect the level of disclosure positively. 
Fan and Wong (2002) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Examine the relationship between 
earnings informativeness and 
ownership structure in997 companies 
in seven East Asian countries 
High ownership concentration is associated with low earnings informativeness. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
ABACUS 
Statistically, using multiple regression 
analysis, examine the association 
between voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia and a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics. The disclosure index 
consists of 65 items selected based on 
previous studies.  
Firms with non-executive chairperson disclose less than companies with an 
executive one. They also provide evidence that family members on the board 
negatively impact the level of disclosure and that foreign ownership is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. Cross-directorship is not statistically 
significant. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Eng and Mak (2003) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
A quantitative regression analysis of 
the impact of ownership structure and 
board composition on voluntary 
disclosure in 158 firms listed on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange. The 
disclosure index consists of 44 items 
and is grouped into three information 
types. 
Disclosure decreases with greater managerial ownership and increases with 
government ownership. They also find that increased presence of outside 
directors is associated with reduced disclosure. The level of disclosure is not 
significantly related with blockholder ownership. 
Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
Examine the association of outside 
directors and institutional investors 
with management earnings forecasts 
occurrences.  
Firms with higher institutional investors and outside directors are more likely to 
issue management forecasts. Yet, when institutional investors are highly 
concentrated, the effect of earning forecast becomes negative.  
Babio Arcay and Muino Vazquez 
(2005) 
Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 
Examine the relationship between 
firm and corporate governance 
characteristics and the disclosure 
policy of 91 Spanish firms using a 
disclosure index consisting of 15 
items. 
Firm size, independent directors, and the existence of an audit committee are all 
positively associated with greater voluntary disclosure. Board size is not 
significantly associated with disclosure level. Ownership concentration is found to 
be negatively associated with the adoption of good governance practices in 
general. 
Faten (2005) 
Review of Accounting and Finance 
Studies the relationship between 
voluntary earnings disclosure and a 
set of corporate governance attributes 
in 207 French firms 
 
Voluntary earnings disclosure is negatively related to ownership concentration 
and positively associated with foreign institutional ownership. Board size and 
independent directors are not statistically significant in explaining disclosure. 
Large firms and firms with multiple listing provide more earnings disclosure 
voluntarily. 
Alsaeed (2006) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Assess the level of disclosure and its 
associations with a number of firm 
characteristics in 40 Saudi Arabian 
firms using a disclosure index of 20 
items. 
The mean of the disclosure score is low at 33 per cent. Larger firms disclose more 
voluntary information. Ownership dispersion, leverage, profitability, liquidity and 
audit firm size are not significantly related to the level of disclosure by Saudi firms. 
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Barako et al. (2006) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Investigate the extent to which the 
corporate governance attribute, 
ownership structure, and firm 
characteristics impact on the 
voluntary disclosure practice of 
companies listed in Kenya. The 
disclosure index consists of 47 items 
classified into four categories  
The presence of an audit committee significantly and positively influences the 
level of voluntary disclosure, and the proportion of non-executive directors is 
negatively related to voluntary disclosure. They also find that institutional and 
foreign ownership positively impacts the level of disclosure. Large firms and firms 
with high debt disclose more voluntary information. Liquidity, profitability, and 
the type of audit firm are not statistically significant. 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation 
Examines the association between 
ownership structure and board 
attributes with voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of 87 Malaysian 
firms after the financial crisis of 1997 
using a disclosure index with 53 
voluntary items categorized into three 
groups and a multiple regression 
analysis. 
Director ownership and the proportion of family members on the board are 
negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. Government ownership is not 
significant in any information disclosure category. Size and profitability show a 
positive effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. Board independence is not 
significant. 
Naser et al. (2006) 
Advances in International Accounting 
Investigate the determinant of 
voluntary corporate social disclosure 
by 21 Qatari listed firms using a 
disclosure index of 34 items. 
Firm size and leverage are positively related to corporate social disclosure. 
Government, institutional, and blockholders ownership are all not significant. 
Wang (2006) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
Examines the association between 
founding family ownership and the 
quality of financial reporting using 500 
companies from Standard and Poor’s 
index. 
Founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality 
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Ali et al. (2007) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 
Compare family and non-family firms 
regarding their disclosure practice in 
500 US firms using a disclosure index 
of 98 transparency and disclosure 
questions collected by the Standards 
and Poor’s. 
Compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to warn of bad news, 
have better quality earnings, have more analysts following them and more 
informative forecasts. However, family firms are less likely to make voluntary 
disclosure about their corporate governance practice, possibly in order to 
facilitate the appointment of family members to the board without any 
intervention by other shareholders.   
Ghazali (2007)  
Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in 
Society 
Investigates the influence of 
ownership structure on corporate 
social responsibility disclosure in 87 
Malaysian firms using a disclosure 
checklist containing 22 items. 
Companies with a high proportion of board (managerial) ownership significantly 
disclose less social responsibility disclosure and companies with more 
government ownership report more information. 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Test the relations between different 
types of ownership, board 
compositions, and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in China using 
regression analysis 
Higher blockholder and foreign ownership is associated with increased voluntary 
disclosure; however, managerial and government ownership are unrelated to 
disclosure. Board independence and firm size positively impact the level of 
disclosure. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) 
Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting 
Empirically, using multiple regression 
analysis, examine the relationship 
between foreign ownership and 
disclosure practice in Zimbabwe. The 
disclosure index is developed base on 
that of Meek et al. (1995). 
Foreign share ownership is more likely to be greater in firms that provide more 
disclosure, have more non-executive directors on the board, and have more 
independent members on the audit committee. They prove that effective 
corporate governance structure and disclosure policy are important in attracting 
foreign investors. 
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Patelli and Prencipe (2007) 
The European Accounting Review 
Empirically test the relationship 
between two control mechanisms, 
voluntary disclosure and independent 
directors in a setting where a 
dominant shareholder is present in 
175 Italian companies using a 
disclosure index and multiple 
regression analysis. 
The relationship between independent directors and voluntary disclosure is 
positive and significant; thus the two mechanisms tend to coexist. Firm size is 
positively related to voluntary disclosure. Ownership diffusion is significant at the 
10% level and positive in influencing disclosure. Leverage and profitability were 
found not to be significant determinants of the level of disclosure. 
Tsamenyi et al. (2007) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Examine the corporate governance 
and disclosure practice of 22 firms 
listed on the Ghanaian Stock Exchange 
using a correlation matrix.  
Larger firms and firms with a dispersed ownership structure tend to provide more 
disclosure. They document a negative relationship between blockholder 
ownership and disclosure level. 
Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Examine the determinant of corporate 
governance disclosure by 130 firms 
from the European Union using a 
disclosure index of 14 corporate 
governance items. 
Firms whose shares are more concentrated disclose less corporate governance 
information. Companies from non-common law countries report less information 
than firms in common law countries.  
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) 
Corporate governance: An 
International Review 
Investigate the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance in Ireland. 
Greater disclosure is associated with a greater proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board. Institutional and managers ownership are not significant 
in relation to disclosure.  
Wang et al. (2008) 
Journal of International Accounting 
Auditing and Taxation 
Empirically examine the determinant 
of voluntary disclosure in Chinese 
listed firms. The disclosure index is 
adopted from Meek et al. (1995). 
The extent of voluntary disclosure is positively related to foreign ownership, state 
ownership, firm performance, and the reputation of the auditor (big 4). They also 
find no relation exist between the level of voluntary disclosure and the cost of debt 
capital. 
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Webb et al. (2008) 
The International Journal of 
Accounting 
Examine the effect of globalization 
(measured by foreign sales, number of 
foreign subsidiaries, and number of 
foreign listings) and legal environment 
on the level of voluntary disclosure in 
643 firms from 30 countries using a 
disclosure index of 11 items. 
Voluntary disclosure increases with globalization, indicating that foreign 
involvement motivates firms to improve their disclosure. This effect is greater for 
firms from a weak legal environment.  
Godfred and Zangina (2009) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Examine the effect of corporate 
governance and disclosure on foreign 
share ownership in Ghana using a 
disclosure index consisting of 106 
items.  
There is a significant but inverse interaction between foreign ownership and 
disclosure and transparency contrary to expectations. Foreign ownership has a 
positive and significant relationship with market capitalization as a measure of 
size. Leverage is negatively related to foreign share holdings.  
Jiang and Habib (2009) 
 Accounting Research Journal 
Investigate the impact of different type 
of ownership concentration on the 
level of corporate voluntary disclosure 
in New Zealand. 
Concentrated institutional ownership negatively affects voluntary disclosure while 
firms with high government and management concentration disclose more 
voluntary information, suggesting a positive monitoring effect of government and 
management ownership at a high concentration level. They also find that the 
negative effect of institutional investors becomes positive when they are not 
concentrated.  
Laidroo (2009) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Studies the impact of ownership 
structure on annual report disclosure 
in the context of public 
announcements in three stock 
exchanges from the Baltics. 
Public announcement disclosure is negatively associated with ownership 
concentration and foreign ownership and positively associated with institutional 
ownership government ownership. 
Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) 
Asian Review of Accounting 
Examine the linkage between board 
ownership and independence of the 
audit committee and corporate 
voluntary disclosure in 124 listed 
companies in Malaysia. 
Board ownership is associated with lower voluntary disclosure. This association 
becomes weaker in firms with a more independent and expert audit committee. 
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Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) 
International Journal of Disclosure 
and Governance 
Examine the relationships between a 
number of corporate governance 
mechanisms and voluntary disclosure 
in 170 Kuwaiti companies using a 
disclosure index consisting of 76 
items. 
Only the existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively related to 
the level of voluntary disclosure. The proportion of non-executives on the board, 
audit firm, and leverage are not statistically significant. 
Cascino et al. (2010) 
Family Business Review 
Examine the impact of family 
ownership on the quality of 
accounting information reporting 
measured by earning quality based on 
accounting and market based 
attributes in 114 Italian firms. 
Family firms report higher quality earnings compared to their non-family 
counterparts.  
Choi et al. (2010) 
China Journal of Accounting Research 
Examine the effect of government 
ownership on information asymmetry 
measured by the bid-ask spread. 
They find that government ownership raised the bid-ask spread in the early 
periods between 1995-2000 implying that more government ownership is 
associated with more information symmetry. However, in the period between 
2001-2003, after changes in the ownership structure and corporate governance 
mechanisms in China, the link between government ownership and information 
asymmetry becomes insignificant. 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 
(2010) 
European Accounting Review 
A meta-analysis of 27 empirical 
studies to examine the association 
between ownership concentration and 
board independence and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Firms with more independent directors on the board and less concentrated 
ownership structure are more likely to disclose more voluntary information. They 
also prove that investor protection and the measurement of variables may explain 
the variability between the results of disclosure studies. A positive association 
between board independence and voluntary disclosure only occurs in countries 
with high investor protection rights and high legal enforcement.  
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Khodadadi et al. (2010) 
Business Intelligence Journal 
Investigate the relations between 
corporate governance attributes and 
voluntary disclosure provided by 106 
Iranian firms using a disclosure index 
consisting of 31 items. 
Voluntary disclosure increases as the percentage of institutional investors 
increases. Board independence is not statistically significant. 
Jiang et al (2011) 
The British Accounting Review 
Investigate the impact of ownership 
concentration on information 
asymmetry measured by the bid-ask 
spreads and on voluntary disclosure in 
103 firms in New Zealand. The 
disclosure index consists of 39 items. 
A positive association exists between ownership concentration and information 
asymmetry. Specifically, when the ownership is concentrated by managerial 
ownership, more voluntary information is provided in order to reduce the 
information asymmetry. 
Pergola and Joseph (2011) 
Corporate Governance: the 
International Journal of Business in 
Society  
Investigate the association between 
board ownership and earnings quality 
to document whether the convergence 
of interests theory or entrenchment 
theory apply in this relationship. 
Entrenchment theory is supported. There is a negative impact of board ownership 
on earnings quality suggesting that board members who own shares are 
entrenched and do not act in the interests of the shareholders. 
Rouf and Al Harun (2011) 
Pakistan Journal of Commerce and 
Social Science  
Examine the relations between 
ownership structure and the voluntary 
disclosure of 94 Bangladeshi firms 
using a disclosure index comprising of 
68 items. 
The level of voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with managerial 
ownership and positively related to institutional ownership. Profitability is 
negatively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure and firm size is not 
statistically significant. 
Jalila and Devi (2012) 
Procedia Economic and Finance 
Examine the association between 
ownership structure and the segment 
disclosure provided by Malaysian 
listed firms. 
The higher the percentage of shareholding by the family, the less the extent of 
segment disclosure by Malaysian firms. Segment disclosure is not statistically 
associated with government, institutional, foreign, and managerial ownership. 
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Liang et al. (2012) 
Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting 
Examine the association between 
foreign institutional ownership and 
the likelihood of holding conference 
calls in Taiwan using regression 
analysis. 
Foreign institutional ownership, despite its small shareholding, impacts on the 
management’s decision to hold conference calls. The presence of such ownership 
improves the corporate transparency for the investing public.  
Ntim et al. (2012) 
Journal of Applied Accounting 
Research 
Investigate the major factors 
influencing the voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure by 169 South 
African corporations using regression 
analysis and a disclosure index 
consisting of 50 corporate governance 
items. 
Blockholder ownership significantly reduces voluntary disclosure while board 
size, audit firm size, government ownership, and institutional ownership 
significantly increase disclosure. 
Samaha et al. (2012) 
Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 
Assess corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure and its relations 
to a number of board attributes and 
ownership aspects in 100 listed firms 
in Egypt using a multiple regression 
model and a disclosure index of 53 
items divided into five categories. 
Corporate governance disclosure decreases with increasing ownership 
concentration and increases with more independent members on the board. 
Board size and director ownership are found not to be significant. Firm size is 
positively related to disclosure and leverage is not significant in any information 
category. 
Choi et al. (2013) 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial 
Studies 
Examine the effect of foreign 
ownership on information asymmetry 
measured by bid-ask spread in the 
emerging market of China. 
Firms with higher foreign ownership have a higher information asymmetry. 
Similarly, government and institutional ownership is positively associated with 
information asymmetry. 
  49 
Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Gisbert and Navallas (2013) 
Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 
Study the role of independent 
directors in promoting transparency 
in a high ownership concentration 
setting in 62 Spanish firms using a 
disclosure index consisting of 76 
items. 
Even in the presence of significant blockholder, independent directors affect the 
quantity of voluntary disclosure positively; thus, a high ownership concentration 
dose not outweigh the role of independent directors in enhancing transparency. 
Firm with a larger board  engage in more voluntary disclosure. Ownership 
concentration is found not to be significant. 
Qu et al. (2013) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Investigate the stakeholders’ impact 
on firm disclosure decisions in 297 
listed Chinese firms during a 12 year 
period using stakeholders theory and 
a disclosure index of 50 voluntary 
items. 
The higher the percentage of government ownership, the lower the voluntary 
disclosure of the corporation and the higher the foreign ownership, the more 
voluntary disclosure the firms make. They also find that the number of board 
meetings and board independence are positively and significantly related to the 
level of voluntary disclosure; however, board size is not statistically significant in 
affecting disclosure decisions. Leverage is found to be positively related to 
voluntary disclosure and profitability negatively impacts voluntary disclosure. 
Al-Bassam et al. (2015) 
Business and Society 
Investigate the voluntary compliance 
and disclosure of the recommended 
good corporate governance practice in 
145 Saudi listed firms. The index 
consists of 65 corporate governance 
provisions. 
The average corporation compliance with the corporate governance provisions is 
44.61 per cent. Government and institutional ownership are positively impact the 
level of compliance and disclosure of Saudi firms. Also, firms audited by one of the 
big four and have big board of director disclose significantly more corporate 
governance information. Blockholder ownership is negatively associated with the 
level of disclosure. 
Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) 
Procedia – Social and Behavioural 
Sciences 
Investigate the relations between 
corporate governance and ownership 
structure on voluntary disclosure in 
Jordan. 
Blockholder ownership negatively affects the level of disclosure, while foreign 
ownership and board compensation impact disclosure positively. Board size, 
board meetings, and board independence are not significant. 
Zeitun (2014) 
Review of Middle East Economics and 
Finance 
Investigates the impact of ownership 
structure and concentration on firm 
performance of 203 firms listed in five 
GCC countries 
Government ownership positively affects firm performance in the GCC while 
foreign and institutional ownership are not significant in impacting performance. 
Ownership concentration is positively associated with performance.  
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Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes (2015) 
International Journal of Economics 
and Finance 
Examine the determinants of 
corporate performance for Saudi 
firms, comparing family firms with 
non-family ones using regression 
analysis. 
The performance of Saudi firms increases as ownership concentration increases in 
family firms. Managerial ownership is also associated with better performance in 
family firms. Board size is positively related to firm performance in family firms. 
Haddad et al. (2015) 
Eurasian Business Review 
Examine the impact of ownership 
structure, family board domination 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in 
57 Jordanian companies using a 
disclosure index containing 62 items. 
Voluntary disclosure is positively associated with government ownership and 
negatively related to managerial ownership. 
Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015) 
Sustainability Accounting, 
Management and Policy Journal 
Investigate the relations between 
ownership structure, board 
characteristics and corporate social 
disclosure in India using a disclosure 
index of 17 items. 
Corporate social disclosure is positively associated with government ownership, 
foreign ownership, and board independence and negatively related to CEO duality.  
Samaha et al. (2015) 
Journal of International Accounting 
Auditing and Taxation 
Using a meta-analysis of 64 empirical 
studies, examine the association 
between board and audit committee 
characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Country geographic location affects the association between board size, board 
composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. They also find that investor 
protection; the type and method of disclosure, and measures of the explanatory 
variables impact the relations between some corporate governance mechanisms 
and voluntary disclosure. Board size and independent directors are positively and 
significantly associated with voluntary disclosure but not in the MENA region. 
Audit committee is positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
Abdallah et al. (2016) 
Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Money 
Investigate how different levels of 
ownership concentration affect the 
relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate 
performance in GCC listed firms. 
Well-governed firms outperform other firms, with Muscat, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi 
being in the lead while Riyadh and Kuwait are last. They find that ownership 
concentrations of 5% or 10% strengthen the positive relationship between 
governance and performance especially when the major shareholder is the 
government. However, when the concentration is 20% or higher, no significant 
association is found between governance and performance. 
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Scaltrito (2016) 
EuroMed Journal of Business 
 
Examine the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure by 203 Italian 
listed firms using a disclosure index 
consisting of 38 main group of items. 
Firm size and the big 4 audit firms impact positively and significantly the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Ownership concentration, leverage, and profitability are 
found not to be significant in determining the level of disclosure in Italy.  
Sepasi et al. (2016) 
Procedia Economics and Finance 
Examine the association between 
ownership structure and disclosure 
quality for a sample of 80 Iranian 
firms. 
Managerial ownership has a significant negative impact on disclosure quality and 
government ownership is not significant in affecting disclosure.  
Jankensgard (2018) 
International Review of Financial 
Analysis 
Examines the relation between 
ownership structure and voluntary 
disclosure in Sweden using 188 firms 
in the period between 2007 and 2012. 
The disclosure is measured using 
ranking of disclosure by Swedish 
firms. 
Ownership structure influences the level of voluntary disclosure significantly. The 
presence of block ownership improves the voluntary disclosure. However, at high 
level of block ownership an entrenchment effect is evident. 
Lepore et al. (2018) 
Corporate Governance 
Examines the disclosure of corporate 
governance information in relation to 
ownership structure in 75 non-
financial firms listed in Italy in 2016 
using content analysis of the corporate 
governance statement. 
There is a negative association between ownership concentration and the 
corporate governance disclosure and this relationship become stronger when a 
dominant financial shareholder is among the owners of the firm. 
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2.3 Board Attributes and Voluntary Disclosure 
Along with ownership structure, the board of directors is perceived as the 
central internal supervising and monitoring tool through which shareholders can 
exercise control over the management (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). In order to 
mitigate the agency problems that may arise between the shareholders and the 
management, the board of directors has a duty to evaluate the management’s 
performance and safeguard the shareholders’ interests. Hence, the effectiveness 
of the board in performing its monitoring role will have an impact on the 
financial reporting practice since the level of monitoring is connected to the level 
of disclosure in the corporate literature (Eng and Mak, 2003). To determine the 
association between the board of directors and the level of disclosure, it is 
important to examine how different board attributes impact on board 
effectiveness and consequently influence the disclosure policies of firms. The 
following section reviews the empirical literature that associates a number of 
board characteristics with the level of disclosure provided by firms.  
2.3.1 Board Independence  
The empirical evidence concerning the association between independent 
directors and the disclosure level is inconclusive. Consistent with agency theory, 
which argues that the presence of independent directors on the board increases 
its effectiveness and monitoring capability over managerial opportunism (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), a number of studies have documented a positive relationship 
between board independence and disclosure level (Jaggi and Charles, 2000; 
Ajinky, aBhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; Babío Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005; 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Lim, Matolcsy and 
Chow, 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; García-
Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Samaha et al., 2012; Gisbert and Navallas, 
2013; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013; Abdullah, Percy and Stewart, 2015; Muttakin 
and Subramaniam, 2015; Samaha, Khlif and Hussainey, 2015; Al-Janadi, Abdul 
Rahman and Alazzani, 2016). In an intense monitoring environment where 
outside independent directors exist, managers will be less likely to withhold 
information to use it for expropriation purposes. Hence, the information 
reporting is expected to be more transparent and informative. In addition, 
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independent directors as outsiders, with high expertise, a professional 
reputation, and no management role or ownership ties to the company, are more 
likely to promote voluntary disclosure in order to signal that they are fulfilling 
their duty of monitoring and reducing the information asymmetry, and also to 
protect their reputation as expert independent directors in the market (Lim, 
Matolcsy and Chow, 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). In these situations, a 
complementary relationship is suggested between the two monitoring 
mechanisms (voluntary disclosure and independent directors). 
However, in some empirical studies, board independence is found to have a 
negative impact on the disclosure level (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 
2004; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2013). These 
studies suggest a substitute relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. Their argument is based on the 
balance between costs and benefits. If the presence of independent outside 
directors effectively monitors and prevents any management opportunistic 
behaviours, the need for additional disclosure will be reduced since disclosure 
does not come free of charge, taking into account the proprietary costs 
associated with more disclosure.  Therefore, voluntary disclosure and 
independent directors are seen as alternative mechanisms. While some 
researchers support the substitute relationship between these two controls, 
others attribute the negative association to the possibility of collusion between 
independent directors and the major shareholders (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 
2006). They claim that outside directors may not be truly independent since they 
may be appointed by the large shareholders based on their personal relations 
rather than their qualifications. This may harm board members’ independence 
and inversely affect their duty of monitoring. While this argument maybe 
applicable in certain settings, it is not supported in a highly concentrated 
ownership context. Gisbert and Navallas (2013) in Spain and Patelli and 
Prencipe (2007) in Italy provide evidence that independent directors still 
exercise control and monitoring over the management even in the presence of a 
dominant shareholder suggesting that the agency and reputation theories still 
apply to the case of major shareholders’ dominance in these contexts. The reason 
  54 
underpinning such a result could be the strong investor protection and legal 
environment that prevent any collaboration between independent members and 
major shareholders at the expense of the minority, or the results might simply 
imply that the major shareholders desire more disclosure in order to extract 
capital market benefits (Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). 
Moreover, a number of studies document a lack of significance of the 
relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure (Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Faten, 2005; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Al-Shammari and 
Al-Sultan, 2010; Khodadadi, Khazami and Aflatooni, 2010; Allegrini and Greco, 
2013; Alhazaimeh, Palaniappan and Almsafir, 2014). This Failure to find a link 
between independent directors and disclosure may be due to the measure of 
board independence adopted in the study (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 
2010). Some include non-executive directors who do not hold a management 
position, yet maintain personal or professional relationships with the firm. The 
inclusion of non-executive directors who are not fully independent may explain 
the insignificant impact of board independence in some studies.  
Altogether, the question remains whether board independence and voluntary 
disclosure tend to coexist or are alternatives to each other. The context of the 
study plays a crucial role in answering this question. The legal environment, 
investor protection programmes, corporate governance structure, and minimum 
independent representation on the board required by law are all elements that 
determine whether these two mechanisms complement or substitute for each 
other.  
2.3.2 Board Size  
While the majority of the literature focuses on examining the impact of board 
independence on the level of disclosure, a few studies have included board size 
as a variable that could provide an additional explanation for the variation in 
disclosure level. Earlier studies that were conducted in the 1990s suggest that 
smaller boards are more effective in performing their duties (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Goodstein Gautam and Boeker, 1994; Yermack, 1996). Despite the 
argument that smaller boards limit the diversity and pool of expertise, these 
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studies provide evidence that the benefits of a having more diverse board are 
offset by the costs associated with having a slower and less effective decision-
making process. As the board of directors grow in size, it becomes less 
productive due to communication, coordination, and decision-making problems, 
which hinders its role as an internal monitoring and control mechanism. In 
contrast, when boards are small, the members get to know each other, and can 
involve in productive discussions that lead to a consensus regarding strategic 
decisions. Thus, some researchers believe that the difficulty that large board 
members face in expressing their ideas and opinions freely and frequently 
outweighs the advantage of having a more diverse group with a variety of 
perspectives and views. Moreover, when boards exceed seven or eight members, 
it become easier for the CEO to control them; whereas, smaller boards with 
fewer executive members are less likely to be influenced by the CEO (Jensen, 
1993). Yermack (1996) confirms this argument by documenting that smaller 
boards are more likely to replace CEOs following periods of poor performance.  
However, most recent studies have found a positive association between 
board size and firm performance and disclosure (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow, 2007; 
Ntim et al., 2012; Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013; 
Abdullah, Percy and Stewart, 2015; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Al-Ghamdi and 
Rhodes, 2015; SamahaKhlif and Hussainey, 2015). Large boards are 
characterized by diversity in terms of experience and knowledge, which 
increases the monitoring capacity of the board resulting in a positive impact on 
transparency and disclosure. The positive association documented by these 
studies may be explained by the high concentrated ownership structure 
associated with these settings. To mitigate any controlling behaviour by the 
dominant shareholders over the board of directors, increasing the other 
shareholders’ representation may be one solution. Larger boards, with more 
independent directors may help to manage the board toward effectively 
performing their supervisory and monitoring role. In other words, larger boards 
are more representative of the shareholders’ interests in situations of high 
ownership concentration level. Supporting this claim, Abdullah et al. (2015) find 
that board size is positively associated with firm performance in family-
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controlled firms in Saudi Arabia, yet, this association disappears in non-family 
firms. This indicates that boards in family-owned firms become more effective as 
they grow in size aiming to increase the representation of the minority 
shareholders. 
Despite that board size is considered a significant indicator of monitoring 
quality (Jensen, 1993), some studies have found a limited or even no relationship 
between board size and voluntary disclosure as a monitoring tool (Faten, 2005; 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Samaha et al., 2012; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013; 
Alhazaimeh, Palaniappan and Almsafir, 2014). Therefore, the impact of board 
size on corporate governance and financial reporting remain an empirical issue 
that needs further investigation.  
2.3.3 Board Meetings and Attendance  
Board meetings and attendance are used in the literature to measure board 
due diligence. Board members are considered to fulfil their duties when they 
attend board meetings, review the meeting materials, engage in a productive 
discussion, and exercise their independent judgment. Thus, the frequency of 
meetings and the attendance behaviour may affect the supervisory and 
monitoring effectiveness of the board which, according to agency theory, will 
have an impact on the financial reporting practice. Board meetings’ time is an 
important resource for improving board performance, especially when firms face 
difficulties (Vafeas, 1999). Vafeas (1999) finds that boards that meet more 
frequently have less market value based on the share price, suggesting that the 
role of the corporate board becomes increasingly important during crisis. His 
study provides empirical evidence that boards meet more frequently after crises 
and that the firm performance increases accordingly. Studies that directly link 
the number of board meetings during the year with the level of disclosure are 
limited. Some studies document a positive relation between board meeting 
frequency and the level of voluntary disclosure (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013). The results of these 
studies indicate that managers who are well-monitored and supervised by an 
effective board that meets more frequently face greater pressure to provide 
more information voluntarily. However, this association is not significant in the 
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study of Alhazaimeh et al. (2014). Therefore, the current literature is insufficient 
to draw a firm conclusion regarding the association between board meetings as a 
reflection of board effectiveness and information disclosure practices.  
Having more frequent board meetings with a low attendance rate could limit 
the effectiveness of the board of directors. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine 
the association between board attendance and voluntary disclosure level. 
However, the literature lacks such an attempt. Lin et al. (2014) investigate the 
association between board meeting attendance and board supervisory quality 
and firm performance. They suggest a positive relationship between board 
attendance and board monitoring quality that positively impacts firm 
performance. They show that directors who fail to attend meetings have less 
time to perform their duties of monitoring and, thus, inversely impact board 
effectiveness. In order to support this relationship thoroughly, more research in 
different corporate governance settings is required.  
2.3.4 Board Compensation 
Directors’ compensation is seen as one of the corporate governance 
mechanisms that motivates directors to work in the best interests of the firm and 
shareholders. It is recommended that directors should be compensated 
adequately for the amount of time and effort associated with accepting a 
directorship (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992).  Some studies assume a relationship 
between the Board of directors’ remunerations and firm performance based on 
the notion that well-compensated members provide more effective monitoring, 
which positively impacts firm performance (Cordeiro, Veliyath and Neubaum, 
2005; Aggarwal and Ghosh, 2015). Aggarwal and Ghosh (2015) find that 
directors’ remuneration has little impact on the overall performance of the firm, 
but a significant correlation with profit after tax as an absolute measure of firm 
performance. Cordeiro et al. (2005) also demonstrate a positive association 
between firm performance and stock options as directors’ compensation. 
However, an investigation into the linkage between board compensations and 
disclosure practice is absent in the literature. Therefore, assuming and exploring 
such a relation based on agency theory premises will add value to both the 
remuneration and disclosure literature.  
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2.3.5 Board Members’ Cross-directorship  
Two competing hypotheses regarding cross-directorship are present in the 
literature; namely: the busyness hypothesis and the experience and reputation 
hypothesis. Under the premises of the former, holding multiple seats on the 
board of other companies, leaves board members with insufficient time to 
perform their duty of monitoring and supervision (Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard, 2003). This claim is supported by the study of Lin et al. (2014) who 
find that multiple directorships significantly and negatively correlate with board 
attendance, meaning that members who hold multiple seats on the boards of 
other companies are overly busy, preventing them from attending meetings. 
However, Ferris et al. (2003) fail to find the negative relationship, predicted by 
the busyness hypothesis, between multiple directorships and firm performance. 
On the contrary, they support the reputation hypothesis by providing evidence 
that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of the board seats held 
by a director, suggesting that directors holding multiple seats in different, well- 
performing companies have developed a reputation capital as experts.  
Therefore, the number of other directorships held by the board members has 
been used as a proxy for their reputation capital (Vafeas, 1999) claiming that 
directors with cross-directorships have more experience and networking that 
enables them to effectively monitor the management and demand more 
disclosure. Thus, they are less likely to engage in opportunistic behaviours with 
the management since that will result in tremendous damage to their reputation 
(Vafeas, 1999). Based on this hypothesis, some studies have predicted a positive 
association between other directorships and firm performance and disclosure 
level; but find no significant relationship (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdullah, 
Percy and Stewart, 2015), or a negative one (Gul and Leung, 2004). It is hard to 
decide which hypothesis is more applicable since the empirical evidence is 
minimal. Therefore, more research on the impact of multiple directorships on 
firm performance and disclosure practices would enhance the corporate 
governance and disclosure literature.  
The previously-reviewed studies regarding board attributes provide an 
insight into the existing literature and the gaps where further investigation is 
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needed in order to make a valid interpretation of any board attribute and its 
impact on the corporate disclosure practices. Table 2.3 contains details and 
summaries of finding of the studies undertaken in the area of board of directors’ 
attributes. It is obvious that the relation between some board attributes and voluntary 
disclosure is not clearly defined based on the inconsistent results, while other 
attributes have not yet been investigated in relation to financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure in particular. Therefore, the current study is an attempt to further 
explore the impact of board attributes on the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC 
countries where the corporate governance environment significantly differs from that 
found in developed or East Asian countries, in addition to some unique features 
regarding economics, culture, and social norms.  
2.3.6 Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee is viewed as a corporate governance monitoring mechanism 
that supervises the preparation and communication of the financial information 
(Forker, 1992).  It is suggested by agency theory that an audit committee mitigates the 
agency costs through reducing the information asymmetry (Samaha et al., 2012). 
Audit committee characteristics have been linked to disclosure in Prior empirical 
work. The size of audit committee which refer to the number of members in the 
committee is found to be positively related to the disclosure implying that bigger audit 
committees have adequate expertise to discharge the committee’s monitoring and 
reporting responsibilities (Appuhami and Tashakor, 2017). However, there is a 
downside of large audit committees such as the potential poor communication usually 
associated with large groups (Jensen, 1993). Empirical evidence regarding the 
association between audit committee size and disclosure are both limited and mixed. 
Some studies document a positive relationship between audit committee and 
disclosure of information (Ahmed Haji, 2015; Appuhami and Tashakor, 2017). In 
contrast, other studies find no significant relationship between the size of the audit 
committee and the disclosure (Naimah and Mukti, 2019). 
 
  60 
Table 2.3 Voluntary Disclosure and Board Attributes  
Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
The Business Lawyer 
Recommend a proposal for improving 
corporate governance in the United 
States. 
Smaller boards are more effective. The optimum number of members in the board 
is eight or nine, with at least two independent directors. It is suggested that 
directors should spend more than 100 hours annually on each board and should 
be compensated adequately.  
Goodstein et al. (1994) 
Strategic Management Journal 
Examine the association between 
board size and diversity with board 
performance in the health care 
industry using 334 US hospitals.  
A bigger and more diverse board initiates fewer strategic changes, so, there is a 
negative association between board size and strategic change.  
Yermack (1996) 
Journal of Financial Economic  
 
Evaluates the relationship between 
board of directors size and firm value 
in the largest 500 U.S listed 
corporations 
He finds an inverse association between board size and firm value. 
Vafeas (1999) 
Journal of Financial Economics 
Examines the impact of board meeting 
frequency on corporate governance 
and board performance 
Boards that meet more frequently are valued less by the market based on share 
price decline, suggesting that the board of directors’ role becomes increasingly 
important in time of difficulty; thus, boards are likely to be more active as 
performance declines.  
Jaggi and Charles (2000) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
Examine if any relationship exists 
between mandatory financial 
disclosure and the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors 
in family-controlled firms compared to 
non-family ones in Hong Kong using a 
disclosure index consisting of 30 
items.  
The ratio of independent directors on the board is positively associated with the 
comprehensiveness of the financial disclosure and this association tends to be 
weaker in family-controlled firms.   
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Ho and Wong (2001) 
Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing, and Taxation 
Study the relationship between four 
corporate governance attributes and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
listed firms in Hong Kong using a 
weighted disclosure index consisting 
of 20 items.   
The existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively related to the 
level of voluntary disclosure while family members on the board is negatively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. Independent non-executive directors is not 
significant. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
ABACUS 
Statistically, using multiple regression 
analysis, examine the association 
between voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia and a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics. The disclosure index 
consists of 65 items selected based on 
previous studies.  
Firms with a non-executive chairperson disclose less than companies with an 
executive one. They also provide evidence that family members on the board 
negatively impacts the level of disclosure and that foreign ownership is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. Cross-directorship is not statistically 
significant. 
Eng and Mak (2003) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
A quantitative regression analysis of 
the impact of ownership structure and 
board composition on voluntary 
disclosure in 158 firms listed on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange. The 
disclosure index consists of 44 items 
and is grouped into three information 
types. 
Disclosure decreases with greater managerial ownership and increases with 
government ownership. They also find that the increased presence of outside 
directors is associated with reduced disclosure. The level of disclosure is not 
significantly related to blockholder ownership. 
Ferris et al. (2003) 
Journal of Finance 
Examine the impact of additional 
directorships held by board members 
on other companies. 
They provide no support for the busyness hypothesis. They provide evidence 
consistent with the reputation effect in the market of directors, suggesting that 
directors who have served in well-performing firms are more likely to receive 
multiple appointments in the future.  
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Gul and Leung (2004) 
Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy 
Investigate the linkage between board 
structure and voluntary corporate 
disclosure in Hong Kong using a 
disclosure index containing 44 items.  
Firms with a higher proportion of expert independent directors (measured by 
other directorships) are associated with a lower level of voluntary disclosure.  
Ajinkya et al. (2005) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
Examine the association between 
outside directors and institutional 
investors with management earnings 
forecast occurrences.  
Firms with higher institutional investors and outside directors are more likely to 
issue a management forecasts. Yet, when institutional investors are highly 
concentrated, the effect of earning forecasts becomes negative.  
Babio Arcay and Muino Vazquez 
(2005) 
Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 
Examine the relationship between 
firm and corporate governance 
characteristics and the disclosure 
policy of 91 Spanish firms using a 
disclosure index consisting of 15 
items. 
Firm size, independent directors, and the existence of an audit committee are all 
positively associated with greater voluntary disclosure. Board size is not 
significantly associated with disclosure level. Ownership concentration is found to 
be negatively associated with the adoption of good governance practices in 
general. 
Cordeiro et al. (2005) 
Journal of Applied Business Research 
Investigate the association between 
stock-based compensation for outside 
directors and firm performance in the 
USA. 
Provides evidence that stock options and stock grants are positively related to 
future firm performance, suggesting that board compensation is an effective tool 
for aligning the board members’ interests with those of the firm’s shareholders.  
Faten (2005) 
Review of Accounting and Finance 
Studies the relationship between 
voluntary earnings disclosure and a 
set of corporate governance attributes 
in 207 French firms 
 
Voluntary earnings disclosure is negatively related to ownership concentration 
and positively associated with foreign institutional ownership. Board size and 
independent directors are not statistically significant in explaining disclosure. 
Large firms and firms with multiple listings provide more earnings disclosure 
voluntarily. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
Journal of Accounting Research 
Examine the association between 
corporate board and audit committee 
with voluntary financial disclosure 
practice, measured by management 
earnings forecasts. 
Firms making management forecasts have a hgher proportion of institutional 
investors, their audit committee meets more frequently, and they tend to be large.  
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
The International Journal of 
Accounting 
Examine the association between 
board monitoring and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in Singapore 
using a disclosure index of 72 items. 
The results suggest that firms with boards containing a high proportion of 
independent directors disclose more voluntary information. Board size; however, 
is not associated with voluntary disclosure.  
Barako et al. (2006) 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Investigate the extent to which the 
corporate governance attribute, 
ownership structure, and firm 
characteristics impact on the 
voluntary disclosure practice of 
companies listed in Kenya. The 
disclosure index consists of 47 items 
classified into four categories.  
The presence of an audit committee significantly and positively influences the 
level of voluntary disclosure, and the proportion of non-executive directors is 
negatively related to voluntary disclosure. They also find that institutional and 
foreign ownership positively impact the level of disclosure. Large firms and firms 
with high debt disclose more voluntary information. Liquidity, profitability, and 
the type of audit firm are not statistically significant. 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation 
Examine the association between 
ownership structure and board 
attributes with voluntary disclosure in 
the annual reports of 87 Malaysian 
firms after the financial crisis of 1997 
using a disclosure index with 53 
voluntary items categorized into three 
groups and a multiple regression 
analysis. 
Director ownership and the proportion of family members on the board are 
negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. Government ownership is not 
significant in any information disclosure category. Size and profitability have a 
positive effect on the level of voluntary disclosure. Board independence is not 
significant. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Huafang and Jianguo (2007) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Test the relations between different 
type of ownership, board 
compositions, and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in China using 
regression analysis 
Higher blockholder and foreign ownership is associated with increased voluntary 
disclosure; however, managerial and government ownership are unrelated to 
disclosure. Board independence and firm size positively impact the level of 
disclosure. 
Lim et al. (2007) 
European Accounting Review 
Examine the association between 
board composition and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual report of 181 
Australian listed companies using a 
disclosure index consisting of 67 items 
based on that created by Meek et al. 
(1995) 
There is a positive association between board independence and board size with 
overall voluntary disclosure. The positive relationship specifically exists between 
board independence and forward looking and strategic information. On the other 
hand, board independence is not significant in explaining non-financial and 
historical financial voluntary disclosure. 
Patelli and Prencipe (2007) 
The European Accounting Review 
Empirically test the relationship 
between two control mechanisms, 
voluntary disclosure and independent 
directors in a setting where a 
dominant shareholder is present in 
175 Italian companies using a 
disclosure index and multiple 
regression analysis. 
The relation between independent directors and voluntary disclosure is positive 
and significant; thus the two mechanisms tend to coexist. Firm size is positively 
related to voluntary disclosure. Ownership diffusion is significant at the 10% level 
and positive in influencing disclosure. Leverage and profitability are not found to 
be significant determinants of the level of disclosure. 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) 
Corporate governance: An 
International Review 
Investigate the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and corporate 
governance in Ireland  
Greater disclosure is associated with a greater proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board. Institutional and managers ownership are not significant 
in relation to disclosure.  
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) 
International Journal of Disclosure 
and Governance 
Examine the relationships between the 
number of corporate governance 
mechanisms and voluntary disclosure 
in 170 Kuwaiti companies using a 
disclosure index consisting of 76 
items. 
Only the existence of an audit committee is significantly and positively related to 
the level of voluntary disclosure. The proportion of non-executives on the board, 
audit firm, and leverage are not statistically significant. 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta 
(2010) 
European Accounting Review 
A meta-analysis of 27 empirical 
studies to examine the association 
between ownership concentration, 
board independence and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Firms with more independent directors on their board and a less concentrated 
ownership structure are more likely to disclose more voluntary information. They 
also prove that investor protection and the measurement of variables may explain 
the variability in the results of different disclosure studies. The positive 
association between board independence and voluntary disclosure only occurs in 
countries with high investor protection rights and high legal enforcement.  
Khodadadi et al. (2010) 
Business Intelligence Journal 
Investigate the relation between 
corporate governance attributes and 
voluntary disclosure provided by 106 
Iranian firms using a disclosure index 
consisting of 31 items 
Voluntary disclosure increases as the percentage of institutional investors 
increases. Board independence is not statistically significant. 
Ntim et al. (2012) 
Journal of Applied Accounting 
Research 
Investigate the major factors 
influencing the voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure by 169 South 
African corporations using regression 
analysis and a disclosure index 
consisting of 50 corporate governance 
items 
Blockholder ownership significantly reduces the voluntary disclosure while board 
size, audit firm size, government ownership, and institutional ownership 
significantly increase disclosure. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Samaha et al. (2012) 
Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 
Assess corporate governance 
voluntary disclosure and its relation to 
a number of board attributes and 
ownership aspects in 100 listed firms 
in Egypt using multiple regression 
model and a disclosure index of 53 
items divided into five categories 
Corporate governance disclosure decreases with more ownership concentration 
and increases with more independent members on the board. Board size and 
director ownership were found not to be significant. Firm size is positively related 
to disclosure and leverage is not significant in any information categories. 
Allegrini and Greco (2013) 
Journal of Management and 
Governance 
Examine the relations between 
corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure in Italian listed 
corporations using a disclosure index 
of 60 items. 
Board size and meeting frequency are positively related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Board independence is not statistically significant. Firm size is 
positively associated with disclosure level. Profitability and leverage are not 
significant. 
Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2013) 
Journal of Economics and 
Management 
Examine the relation between some 
corporate governance mechanisms 
and the level of compliance with 
corporate governance disclosure 
requirements in 97 Saudi firms.  
Board independence is negatively associated with disclosure practice in Saudi 
Arabia. They also find that audit committee size is positively and significantly 
related to disclosure and that more profitable and more liquid firms are more 
likely to follow the corporate governance guidance.  
Gisbert and Navallas (2013) 
Advances in Accounting, 
Incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 
Study the role of independent 
directors in promoting transparency 
in a high ownership concentration 
setting in 62 Spanish firms using a 
disclosure index consisting of 76 
items. 
Even in the presence of significant blockholders, independent directors affect the 
quantity of voluntary disclosure positively; thus, high ownership concentration 
does not outweigh the role of independent directors in enhancing transparency. 
Firm with a larger board make more voluntary disclosure. Ownership 
concentration is found not to be significant. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Qu et al. (2013) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Investigate the stakeholder impact on 
firms’ disclosure decisions in 297 
listed Chinese firms over a 12 years 
period using stakeholders theory and 
a disclosure index of 50 voluntary 
items. 
The higher the percentage of government ownership, the lower the voluntary 
disclosure made by corporations and the higher the foreign ownership, the more 
voluntary disclosure the firms make. They also find that the number of board 
meeting and board independence are positively and significantly related to the 
level of voluntary disclosure; however, board size is not statistically significant in 
affecting disclosure decisions. Leverage is found to be positively related to 
voluntary disclosure and profitability negatively impacts voluntary disclosure. 
Alhazaimeh et al (2014) 
Procedia – Social and Behavioural 
Sciences 
Investigate the relations between 
corporate governance and ownership 
structure on voluntary disclosure in 
Jordan. 
Blockholder ownership negatively affects the level of disclosure, and foreign 
ownership and board compensation impact disclosure positively. Board size, 
board meetings, and board independence are not significant. 
Lin et al. (2014) 
Total Quality management and 
Business Excellence  
Examine the relationship between 
board attendance as a proxy for board 
supervisory quality and firm 
performance in Taiwan. 
Higher board attendance is associated with higher firm accounting performance. 
In addition, higher director shareholdings and board independence are positively 
related to board attendance; however, other directorships, the number of 
meetings, and board size negatively affect board attendance. 
Abdullah et al. (2015) 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting 
and Economics 
Investigate the determinants of the 
voluntary corporate governance 
disclosure of 67 Islamic banks in 
southeast Asian and the GCC region 
using a multiple regression analysis 
and self-constructed disclosure index. 
Strong corporate governance (board independence, board size, audit committee 
size) is highly and positively associated with more voluntary corporate 
governance disclosure by Islamic banks. They also find that bigger Islamic banks 
disclose more and banks operating in countries with more freedom in their 
political and civil systems tend to provide more corporate governance disclosure.  
Aggarwal and Ghosh (2015) 
International Journal of Law and 
Management 
Study the relationship between 
directors’ remuneration and firm 
performance in 34 Indian companies  
Directors’ remuneration has little impact on firm performance; however, a 
significant correlation is found between remuneration and profit after tax  
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Al-Bassam et al. (2015) 
Business and Society 
Investigate voluntary compliance and 
disclosure regarding the 
recommended good corporate 
governance practice in 145 Saudi 
listed firms. The index consists of 65 
corporate governance provisions. 
The average corporation compliance with the corporate governance provisions is 
44.61 per cent. Government and institutional ownership positively impact the 
level of compliance and disclosure by Saudi firms. Also, firms audited by one of the 
big four and with a big board of directors disclose significantly more corporate 
governance information. Blockholder ownership is negatively associated with the 
level of disclosure. 
Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes (2015) 
International Journal of Economics 
and Finance 
Examine the determinants of 
corporate performance of Saudi firms 
by comparing family firms to non-
family ones using regression analysis. 
The performance of Saudi firms increases as the ownership concentration 
increases in family firms. Managerial ownership is also associated with better 
performance in family firms. Board size is positively related to firm performance 
in family firms. 
Muttakin and Subramaniam (2015) 
Sustainability Accounting, 
Management and Policy Journal 
Investigate the relations between 
ownership structure, board 
characteristics and corporate social 
disclosure in India using a disclosure 
index of 17 items. 
Corporate social disclosure is positively associated with government ownership, 
foreign ownership, and board independent and negatively related to CEO duality.  
Samaha et al. (2015) 
Journal of International Accounting 
Auditing and Taxation 
A meta-analysis of 64 empirical 
studies to examine the association 
between board and audit committee 
characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Country geographic location affects the association between board size, board 
composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. They also find that investor 
protection; the type and method of disclosure, and measures of the explanatory 
variables impact the relation between some corporate governance mechanism and 
voluntary disclosure. Board size and independent directors are positively and 
significantly associated with voluntary disclosure but not in the MENA region. 
Audit committee is positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
Al-Janadi et al. (2016) 
Managerial Auditing Journal 
Examine the effect of government 
ownership on the association between 
corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure in 87 Saudi firms using a 
disclosure index consisting of 22 
items. 
Non-executive directors on the board, board size, and audit firm all have a positive 
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. However, the positive association 
between these variables and voluntary disclosure is weakened by the existence of 
government ownership. 
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Author, Date, and Journal Research Method Key Findings 
Appuhami and Tashakor (2017) 
Australian Accounting Review 
Examines the influence of audit 
committee characteristics on the 
voluntary corporate social 
responsibility disclosure in the annual 
reports of 300 Australian listed firms 
using a checklist consists of 98 items 
categorise in eight groups. 
Audit committee size, the frequency of its meetings, committee independence, and 
its level of gender diversity are found to be positively associated with the level of 
disclosure 
Naimah and Mukti (2019) 
Asian Journal of Accounting Research 
Investigates the influence of a number 
of audit committee’s and firm’s 
characteristics on intellectual capital 
disclosure in Indonesia using a 
checklist comprises of 61 items.  
Audit committee size is not statistically significant in impacting intellectual capital 
disclosure. The frequency of audit committee meeting and company size are 
positively influencing the intellectual capital disclosure. Leverage is found to be 
negatively associated with the intellectual capital disclosure 
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2.4 Summary 
Over the last few years, voluntary disclosure has attracted very significant 
attention. The academic interest in voluntary disclosure has developed in 
parallel with regulatory moves toward boosting the level of transparency in the 
stock market above and beyond what is mandatory by the law and regulations. 
Most researchers view voluntary disclosure as a governance mechanism that 
could provide an effective substitute for monitoring. Since monitoring is 
achieved by a number of corporate governance mechanisms, and the empirical 
work have focused on the relationships between these mechanisms and the level 
of voluntary disclosure that the management is willing to provide. Therefore, the 
academic literature has moved its earlier focus on the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements and the factors influencing the 
management’s decision to comply or not to the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure provided by firms.  More recent work acknowledges the influence of 
ownership structure and board attributes as the main corporate governance 
determinants of voluntary disclosure practices in many countries.  
This chapter sought to review the academic literature on voluntary disclosure 
by seeking to segregate it into two groups. The First consists of studies that 
focused on the associations between different types and concentrations of 
ownership structure and the level of voluntary disclosure. Overall, there is clear 
evidence that ownership concentration negatively impacts voluntary disclosure 
suggesting that major shareholders have the power and rights to monitor their 
interests internally, which reduces the demand for more disclosure. Whereas, 
when the ownership structure is more diffused, investors will demand more 
information disclosure in order to monitor the management behaviours and 
management is motivated to meet this demand in order to reduce the agency 
costs. Regarding the different types of ownership, the results are very mixed 
depending on the jurisdiction and the time period of the study. The findings 
regarding the impact of the government, institution, family, board, audit 
committee, and foreign ownership on the level of voluntary disclosure are 
inconclusive, implying that other context elements may influence this 
relationship.  
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A second group of research studies considered the impact of a variety of 
board attributes, mainly board independence and size, on the level of voluntary 
disclosure.  The reported findings regarding board independence are mixed 
having both a positive and negative effect on the level of disclosure depending on 
either the complementary or substitute relationship between board 
independence and disclosure as monitoring tools. Similarly, board size results 
are incomparable with a negative impact, supporting the poor communication 
hypothesis and a positive impact aligned with the reputation and experience 
hypothesis. The existing research on the other board attributes, such as board 
meetings and attendance, and other directorships, has only focused on the 
impact of these attributes on firm performance. Thus, further investigation is 
needed in order to provide empirical results on the impact of such attributes on 
the level of voluntary disclosure.  
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Chapter 3: Corporate Governance Environment and 
Characteristics in GCC Countries 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to describe the corporate governance environment within GCC 
countries. It starts by presenting a historical background of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council establishment, followed by a historical overview of the GCC capital markets 
development and regulatory reforms. Then the chapter moves to outline the unique 
social, economic, and political features present in GCC countries. Since the study 
focus is on ownership structure and board attributes, the remaining of the chapter then 
specifically present the distinctive features of the ownership patterns and board of 
directors as the main corporate governance mechanisms. 
3.2 History and Background 
3.2.1 Gulf Corporate Council (GCC) 
The GCC was formed on May 25th 1981 as a cooperation of six Arab countries, 
including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates, aiming to achieve a high level of institutional coordination and integration 
in the economic, social, political, defence and security sectors in order to establish 
unity between them. Deep religious, cultural, and social ties link these six states 
(Pillai and Al-Malkawi, 2016). These ties are enhanced by geographical, political, and 
economic factors. They all share a deeply rooted Islamic beliefs, follow a civil law 
legal system, have a monarchy political regime, and possess significant oil and gas 
reserves with a high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Baydoun et al., 2013). 
Hence, the common characteristics found across these six states underpin the rationale 
for combining them into a single study to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on the level of voluntary disclosure. This closeness suggests 
that their voluntary disclosure practices will be similar. Section 3.3 discusses the 
common features of GCC countries in detail in order to understand the setting in 
which the current study is conducted, and consequently make sense of the empirical 
results.   
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It is argued that corporate financial reporting, as an important tool for maintaining 
investor confidence, as well as corporate decisions are influenced by a number of 
environmental factors, including economic, cultural, political, stock market 
development, law and enforcement tools, and corporate characteristics (AlNodel and 
Hussainey, 2010; Shehata, N.F., 2015). Therefore, each of these factors is expected to 
affect the nature and availability of information in any settings, and helps us to 
understand why a specific level of financial reporting and its determinants are evident 
in a particular setting. The following part of this chapter presents an overview of the 
history and development of the GCC stock markets, an outline of the GCC economic 
and cultural features, a review of the development of the corporate governance codes, 
and a discussion of the unique structure of the GCC corporate setting.  
3.2.2 GCC Capital Markets 
Equity markets in the gulf region are relatively new compared to the global 
financial markets. Most of them were formally established in the 1980s and 90s, and 
only recently have they adopted an electronic trading platform where trading can be 
performed through official trading websites, and where every listed company is 
required to publish historical and fundamental information frequently (Jamaani and 
Roca, 2015).  
 Stock trading first began in Saudi Arabia in 1935 when shares in the Arabian 
Automobile Company were floated (Alajlan, 2004; Bley and Chen, 2006). This was 
followed by the offering of shares in the Saudi Cement companies and the 
privatization of three electricity companies. The next market to emerge was in Kuwait 
in 1952 with the incorporation of Kuwait’s first joint stock company, the National 
Bank of Kuwait, followed by the formation of the National Bank of Bahrain in 1957 
(Al-Ajmi and Kim, 2012). These equity markets remained disorganized until the 
1980s and 90s, when the GCC countries started to regulate them officially. Table 3.1 
presents information about the GCC stock exchanges. 
During the early 1980s, the oil prices increased rapidly, resulting in large liquidity 
and investment opportunities. As a result, investing in the capital markets became 
highly appealing, which necessitated a form of regulation and supervision over the 
stock exchanges in the GCC countries. The first market to be regulated in the region 
was the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange (KSE) in 1983, which was administered by an 
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executive committee until 2010 when the Kuwaiti Capital Market Authority was 
established with the purpose to oversee stock trading, enhance transparency, and 
enforce and implement good corporate governance practice. The next market to be 
officially organized was the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) in 1984. The capital 
market was first regulated by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) until the 
Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) took over responsibility for supervising and 
controlling all aspects of financial activities in the stock market in 2003.  Then, the 
Bahrain stock Exchange (BSE) was formed in 1987, which was replaced by the 
Bahrain Bourse (BB) in 2010. The Central Bank of Bahrain is the capital market’s 
regulatory body that governs all listed companies (Bley and Chen, 2006; Shehata, 
2015). Muscat Securities Market (MSM) was the next to be formed in 1988. The 
exchange is a governmental entity regulated by the Oman capital market authority. 
Then, the trading on the Doha Securities Market (DSM) started in 1997 with only 17 
listed companies at that time. The Qatar Financial Market Authority (QFMA) 
regulates and supervises the trading in the Doha securities Market. The youngest 
markets in the region are the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and Abu Dhabi 
securities Exchange (ADX), which were founded in 2000 under the supervision of the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) (Bley and Chen, 2006).  
All GCC stock exchanges are fully government-owned except for the Dubai 
Financial Market, as which 20% of its shares were listed to be traded by the general 
public on March 7th 2007 (Al-Ajmi and Kim, 2012). Even though the GCC countries 
are heavily dependent on the oil sector for economic growth and government revenue, 
none of the oil companies are fully or partially listed on any of the exchanges. They 
are all exclusively state owned enterprises. Regarding stock market classification, 
MSCI, one of the largest providers of stock market indices, upgraded the UAE and 
Qatar capital markets from frontier to emerging markets in May 2014, classified 
Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain as frontier markets, and recently, in May 2019 has 
upgraded the Saudi Stock Exchange from a standalone market to an emerging one. 
According to the MSCI framework, market classification is based on a selection of 
criteria; namely, economic development, size and liquidity requirements, and market 
accessibility criteria, which include openness to foreign ownership, ease of capital 
inflows/outflows, availability of investments instruments, and the efficiency and 
stability of the operational and institutional framework. 
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Over the last few years, market regulators in GCC have realized the important role 
played by foreign investors in developing the market and promoting transparency. 
Therefore, the restrictions on foreign investments have begun to ease, even though 
some of these markets remain not fully open to international investments. The most 
restrictive market was in Saudi Arabia until 2015 when the capital market authority 
allowed qualified foreign institutional investors to hold up to 49% of listed companies 
after they were exclusively permitted to invest through mutual funds. In Qatar, the 
limit on foreign investments was raised in 2014 to up to 49%, from the previous limit 
of 25%. Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE allow up to 49% of foreign investments. In 
Oman foreign ownership is limited to 49% that can be increased up to 65% or 100% 
subject to government entities approval. Bahrain was the earliest to open its market 
and the most relaxed in relation to foreign investment; foreign ownership reaches 
100% in some of the financial institutions and banks. Despite the relaxation on 
foreign investment’s limitation, foreign ownership remains very low in the GCC stock 
markets. This limited success in attracting foreign investors may be attributed to the 
significant government ownership of listed companies, the limited number of analysts 
who publish recommendations and forecasts, and the low level of transparency and 
disclosure (Al-Ajmi and Kim, 2012). Some also attributes the low foreign 
participation to the economic and political uncertainty exist in the region (Bley, 
2011). GCC stock markets are highly sensitive to the fluctuations on oil prices and 
regional political events (Bley, 2011). 
In terms of market capitalization, the Saudi Stock Exchange is by far the largest of 
the GCC markets, as illustrated in table 3.1, followed by Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait; 
while Bahrain and Oman are the smallest. Similarly, Saudi Arabia clearly dominates 
the GCC stock markets’ activities and has the largest trading value, followed by 
Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE while Bahrain and Oman have the least value traded 
among the GCC exchanges.  
The GCC stock markets are similar concerning the markets’ trading trends and 
market level of development. Evidence of market integration and linkages between 
the GCC markets are acknowledged in a number of studies (Mohammed and Hassan, 
2003; Al-Khazali, Darrat and Saad, 2006; Jamaani and Roca, 2015). They document a 
long-term relation between share prices in the GCC stock markets, indicating that 
future movements in one market can be predicted by the historical trends of another 
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market. The financial markets linkages in the GCC countries are further enhanced by 
the social, economic, and political ties among them. 
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Table 3.1 GCC stock markets 
Country Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE UAE 
Exchange Tadawul KSE BB MSM DSM ADX DFM 
Stock trading began in 1934 1952 1957 1988 1997 1989 1989 
Date of establishment 1984 1983 1987 1988 1997 2000 2000 
Electronic trading since 1990 1995 1999 1998 2002 2000 2000 
Securities regulator Saudi Capital 
Market Authority 
(CMA) 
Kuwait 
Capital 
Market 
Authority 
Central Bank 
of Bahrain 
(CBB) 
Oman Capital 
Market 
Authority 
(CMA) 
Qatar 
Financial 
Market 
Authority 
(QFMA) 
Emirates 
Securities and 
Commodities 
Authority 
(ESCA) 
Emirates 
Securities and 
Commodities 
Authority 
(ESCA) 
Year of establishment (regulator)  2003 2010 2006 1998 2005 2000 2000 
Number of listed companies, end of 2016 176 216 44 131 42 68 61 
Number of listed companies, 1Q of 2019 201 216 44 131 42 70 67 
Market capitalization ($ millions), end of 2016 448,305 87,288.5 19,222 44,904.2 154,739 120,947 91,928 
Market capitalization ($ millions), Q1 of 2019 557,602 104,482.4 22,992 47,857.0 155,924 140,908 95,390 
Value traded ($ millions), end of 2016 79,861 2,978.1 125.3 571.7 4,307.8 3,287 11,426 
Value traded ($ millions), Q1 of 2019 47,214 6,133.3 236.9 392.6 4,882.7 3,244 3,080 
 
Where: Tadawul, Saudi Stock Exchange; KSE, Kuwait Stock Exchange; BB, Bahrain Bourse; MSM, Muscat Securities Market; DSM, Doha Securities Market; ADX, 
Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange; and DFM, Dubai Financial Market. 
Source: Bley and Chen (2006); Al-Ajmi and Kim (2012); Arab Monetary Fund Report 2016 and 2019.
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3.3 Common Features of the GCC Countries 
This section provides a general review of the unique nature of the GCC 
environment. The discussion is directed toward three aspects of the environment; 
namely, the social and cultural norms, economic features, and the political system. 
Understanding the environmental factors in the GCC countries helps to explain the 
corporate governance practice regarding the disclosure in general and voluntary 
disclosure strategy in particular. Disclosure practice is a reflection of the underlying 
environmental influences in different countries including the economy, capital 
market, enforcement mechanisms, culture, and political system (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; AlNodel and Hussainey, 2010). Thus, disclosure decisions may be established 
in response to social values and informal cultural norms. AlNodel and Hussainey 
(2010) argue that the weakness of the capital financing reporting in Saudi Arabia 
could be explained by obtaining the required information from the related parties to 
the loan agreement rather than the traditional and formal reporting avenues. Further, 
the environmental factors effect may extend to the corporate governance and firm 
characteristic factors as the main determinants of voluntary disclosure. For instance, 
the government and family dominance in GCC markets and the reliance on informal 
relationships could impact the effectiveness of some corporate governance 
mechanisms such as ownership structure and board independence, and therefore 
impact the influences of these mechanisms over the corporate governance and 
disclosure practices. Hence, the aim of this section is to describe briefly the distinctive 
environment in GCC countries in order to clarify the voluntary disclosure practices 
and their relations with a number of determinants (ownership structure and board 
attributes), as documented in chapter five of this thesis, the empirical analysis chapter.  
3.3.1 Social and Cultural Norms 
The GCC’s social and cultural values although similar to those in certain 
developing countries, are distinctive in several ways. In particular, the GCC countries 
are Islamic states (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008), where Islamic principles and 
Shariah law provide a common foundation for the rules, regulations, and codes 
(Baydoun et al., 2013). These religious principles cover all aspects of life including 
business, economic, politics, and social issues, making Islamic societies committed to 
fundamental Islamic values and views in their daily activities (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that these values influence the society as a 
whole, including the corporate operations. Islam embrace the core values of honesty, 
trust, accountability, justice, morality, transparency, and truthfulness (Baydoun et al., 
2013). 
In the religious context, accountability is one of the essential Islamic values that is 
used to describe the relationship with God and the responsibility of individuals’ 
actions (Alkhamees, 2012). Accountability, therefore, is an indication of the Muslims 
responsibility to fulfil their duties as illustrated by Islamic principles. It is also a 
reference to Muslims’ fulfilment of the financial trust placed in them when 
conducting business transactions. This feeling of responsibility, therefore, is expected 
to spread into the financial reporting practice by encouraging transparency and the 
disclosure of accurate and trusted information to the public. It is likely to produce 
adequate and accurate information that is needed to form a proper business decision 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). It is also an important value when it comes to calculating the 
right amount of Zakat3, which is the 2.5% in alms that is taken annually from capital, 
based on true and sufficient information (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). The strong belief in 
accountability in Islamic society is likely to have a major impact on people’ lives, and 
therefore predicted to extend into the business and corporate environment also.  
Another essential value in Islam is fairness and honesty in conducting businesses 
and a prohibition against all kinds of exploitations, particularly, riba (interest) (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009). Accordingly, Muslims avoid dealing with businesses that involve 
riba and, on the other hand strongly support businesses that forbid any trading linked 
with riba, as well as those that provide alternative financing products which comply 
with Islamic principles. Thus, the level of compliance with Islamic values and 
principles may influence the disclosure decisions, especially those relating to the 
capital structure and financing information. Businesses may be motivated to make 
voluntarily disclosure about their financing information when they are avoiding riba 
in order to gain public trust and support; in contrast, they may withhold information 
about their capital structure when involving interest to avoid a negative reaction from 
the public, who disapprove such practice. One study, conducted in a conservative 
Muslim society like Saudi Arabia, investigated investors’ reaction to announcements 
                                                        
3 Paying zakat is the third of the five pillars of Islam. 
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of bank loans granted to listed firms depending on their compliance with Islamic 
principles (Almansour and Ongena, 2018). Interestingly, they find that investors react 
negatively to the announcements of non-compliance loans with respect to cumulative 
abnormal returns, suggesting that Islamic-compliant loans are associated with positive 
returns while conventional loans are associated with negative ones. Furthermore, A 
research that examined the impact of religious preferences on the performance of 
Islamic and conventional stock returns in Saudi Arabia found that Islamic stocks are 
more liquid, have a higher turnover, and have a broader investor base than 
conventional stocks (Alhomaidi et al., 2019). This suggests that a firms compliance 
with the religious and social norms has an effect on the investor decisions in a 
predominant Islamic market such as the Saudi Stock Exchange. Another study 
conducted on the GCC stock markets found that non-Islamic stocks are neglected and 
have lower liquidity relative to Islamic stocks (Al-Awadhi and Dempsey, 2017), 
suggesting that investors’ investment choices in these highly-religious societies are 
guided by the social norms. Therefore, firms that comply with the religious principles 
may be motivated voluntarily to demonstrate their compliance through information 
reporting while they may be unwilling to report any additional information when their 
practice fail to match the public’s preferences.  
Another trait of GCC culture and society is the high level of secrecy and 
conservatism (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; AlNodel and Hussainey, 2010; 
Baydoun et al., 2013; Abdallah and Ismail, 2016). Specifically, Arabs in general are 
not open about disclosing their wealth, so, financial and corporate information are 
considered confidential (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). For instance, the 
disclosure of the shareholders and their proportion of stocks in GCC listed companies 
is limited to the major shareholders who own 5% or more, which is required by law. 
Almost all of the companies in the GCC stock market fail to provide any information 
about the shareholders who own less than 5% of the company. Private companies in 
the MENA region, including the GCC do not publish any financial information and 
most of the listed companies comply only with the minimum disclosure requirements 
(Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). Secrecy is also apparent when the researchers and 
analysts seek basic information from companies (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). 
For instance, information about the ownership structure in Saudi Arabia is unavailable 
to outsiders and researchers alike (Alajlan, 2004). The information does not need to 
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be sensitive or proprietary in order for companies to be reluctant to share it; it is not 
about the nature of the information but, rather, a culture of extreme secrecy. For the 
purpose of this study, efforts were made to obtain data on the ownership structure of 
listed companies by contacting the official departments, like the capital market 
authorities and stock exchanges, or emailing the companies directly. They either 
declined claiming that such information is confidential or did not respond. Therefore, 
this feature of GCC countries may explain the level of voluntary disclosure by the 
listed companies. 
GCC society is also characterized by the influence of informal and personal social 
relations (Baydoun et al., 2013). Families in the gulf region have very strong ties 
between the members, which can be extended to distant relatives and even the 
members of the tribe. These strong ties are also applicable among different families 
that are linked by marriage. Family and friendship relations are highly valued to the 
extent that they exceed the power of the regulations (AlNodel and Hussainey, 2010). 
It is common for family firms to be dominated by relatives, implying that employees 
are hired not solely based on their qualifications or experience but out of 
consideration of personal relations and loyalty. Opportunities are given to informal 
relations over formal rules. Most GCC firms recruit their board members based on 
seniority from a fairly small circle of elites (Hertog, 2012). Hertog (2012) presents 
numerous examples where board members were chosen based on their political 
connections and personal relations, which resulted in having boards that staffed with 
directors with political connection, limited specialised knowledge and expertise, and 
limited spare time due to their multiple directorships. This practice is likely to have a 
significant impact on the corporate governance settings in these countries, which 
might result in having board members who are not fully independent because they 
gained their seat through help from their personal relations, with a higher level of 
information asymmetry since stakeholders have their informal/personal avenues for 
collecting the required information, and a higher chance of conflicts of interest and 
related party transactions. Understanding the role of the family and friend relations in 
the GCC may enhance our interpretations of how the ownership structure and board 
of directors, as corporate governance mechanisms, impact the financial reporting 
practice.  
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3.3.2 Economic Features 
GCC countries are oil-exporting countries where the economies are heavily 
dependent on oil, and governments strongly control the major economics activities 
(Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). Saudi Arabia 
accounts for around 25% of the world’s total oil reserves, and Qatar represent 5% of 
the world’s total gas reserves (Shehata, 2015). The collective GCC oil and gas 
reserves in 2011 were 33.5% and 21.3%, respectively, of the total world reserves 
(Jamaani and Roca, 2015). The hydrocarbon sector in GCC has generated the 
majority of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and government revenues, as shown in 
table 3.2, and is expected to remain the main contributor in the future. Oil revenues 
represent between 50 and 90 per cent of the total government revenues during 2012 to 
2015 in the six GCC states (The International Monetary Fund, 2016). This substantial 
reliance on oil revenues could create economic challenges when the value of this 
natural resource fluctuates or becomes unavailable.  
Oil price volatility has forced the GCC policy makers to look for new resources to 
depend on for local and economic growth. Since 2015, oil prices have rapidly 
declined resulting in a sharp cut in GCC government spending and a decline in 
economics activities. The fiscal deficit for GCC countries is expected to grow and is 
projected to be above 4 per cent of GDP in 2021 (The International Monetary Fund, 
2016). GCC governments have realised these economic issues and initiated several 
plans aimed at diversifying their economies. One of these initiatives is stock markets 
development through enhancing their efficiency and making them attractive to new 
investment (Jamaani and Roca, 2015). Relaxing the limitations on foreign investment 
in the GCC countries’ markets could be an opportunity that serves the plan of 
economic diversification through developing the stock markets into well-functioning 
markets that employ the best international corporate governance practices including 
transparency and disclosure. Therefore, the need to diversify the economy could lead 
to transparency enhancement in the stock market, which may have an impact on the 
disclosure practice in GCC listed companies.  
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Table 3.2 GCC countries’ revenue structure 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
As a percentage of the GDP 
Total revenue 46.4 45.7 41.9 31.8 
Non-oil revenue 6.6 7.8 7.9 10.0 
Oil revenue 39.8 37.9 33.9 21.8 
As a percentage of total revenue 
Non-oil revenue 14.2 17.0 19.0 31.6 
Oil revenue 85.8 83.0 81.0 68.4 
Source: The International Monetary Fund (2016) 
3.3.3 Political System 
The political setting in the GCC is a family monarchical system (Eulaiwi et al., 
2016), which is concentrated by royal family, state officials,  and tribal leaders 
(Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008). Personal relations with royal family members can 
remarkably facilitate business activities and access to the market in the GCC 
countries. Having a member of the royal family on the board helps entrepreneurs to 
gain a major advantage in the market (Mazaheri, 2013). This highly concentrated 
political system is therefore expected to extend into the business environment and its 
practice of corporate governance. Mazaheri (2013) argues that the political setting in 
the GCC helps to initiate a program of business environment reform; he states that 
“monarchies are better able to solve the credible commitment problem between the 
government and existing private sector elites than non-monarchical, authoritarian 
states” Mazaheri (2013, p. 296) suggesting that governments in a monarchical system 
facilitate business reform by being able to provide a reliable assurance to the private 
sector elites that their interests are protected during the reform process.  
Furthermore, the political system of the GCC countries implies the minimal or 
even an absence of activist groups, specifically shareholder activism (Piesse, Strange 
and Toonsi, 2012). This suggests that the dominant shareholders and royal family 
members are able to intervene in corporate decisions and exercise strong control over 
firm management. In particular, they can effectively govern the appointment of the 
board members and the top management positions (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). 
Many GCC listed firms have at least one royal family member on the board of 
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directors (Al-Hadi, Taylor and Al-Yahyaee, 2016). This dominance of the royal 
family and major shareholders has an impact on the corporate governance setting. The 
political power of the ruling family members may exacerbate the agency problem 
between the board and management or between the minority and majority 
shareholders (Al-Hadi, Taylor and Al-Yahyaee, 2016). Al-Hadi et al. (2016) provide 
evidence supporting the claim that the ruling family members on the board transfer 
wealth to their own interests at the expense of the other stakeholders. They find that 
the strong representation of the royal family on GCC boards is negatively and 
significantly associated with the extent and the quality of the risk disclosure, 
suggesting that the political orientation of the board members is influenced by their 
political power, which as a result impacts their level of transparency. Hence, the 
common feature of monarchical systems in the GCC, such as the reliance on family 
relations, and the favouritism in hiring and promoting royals and their relatives 
(Eulaiwi et al., 2016) could have an impact on the corporate governance practice in 
the GCC stock markets. 
3.4 GCC Corporate Governance Codes 
In line with the region’s rapid economic growth and the move toward diversifying 
the economy, developing the stock markets, and enhancing transparency, there is an 
increased focus on improving the corporate governance codes across the GCC. 
Improving the governance codes implies upgrading the corporate governance 
environment to make it more appealing for new local and foreign investments. The 
focus on the corporate governance codes in GCC considerably increased after the 
collapse of many firms due to their failure to meet their liabilities and obligations to 
the financial institutions and investors during the global financial crisis and the crash 
of 2006 in the GCC markets. In 2006, the Saudi market dropped significantly losing 
45% of its market value (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008), resulting in a massive 
demand from the banks and investors to raise the corporate governance standards and 
increase disclosure and transparency (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Eulaiwi et al., 
2016). This necessitates the introduction of new or the amendment of the existing 
corporate codes in the GCC countries. The GCC market regulators became aware of 
the important role of corporate governance in the recovery process from the crisis for 
retrieving market confidence, improving foreign and minority shareholder protection, 
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diversifying the economy, and creating investments opportunities (Eulaiwi et al., 
2016). 
A corporate governance code was first introduced in Oman in 2002 by the Omani 
capital Market Authority (Baydoun et al., 2013). This version of the code was revised 
in 2003 and then replaced with a newer version in 2015, which came into force in 
2016. In 2006, the Capital Market Authority in Saudi Arabia followed suit by issuing 
and implementing the corporate governance code that was issued as part of the CMA 
efforts to overcome the losses due to the 2006 market crash and regain investor 
confidence in the stock market (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Shehata, 2015). The 
Saudi stock market lost about 45% of its value in the crash of 2006 (Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel, 2008). As a result, all of the GCC stock markets witnessed similar losses 
that year, which motivated the market regulators to introduce corporate governance 
rules that mainly focus on disclosure requirements regarding insider trading and 
related party transactions (Amico, 2016). The Saudi corporate governance code was 
amended in 2009, then reintroduced in 2017 and recently amended in May 2019. In 
the United Arab Emirates, the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority issued 
the corporate governance codes in 2007; yet, companies had three years to adapt to 
the new regulation; it became mandatory to comply in 2010. The code of 2007 was 
replaced with a new one in 2016. In 2009, the Qatar corporate governance code was 
implemented by the Qatar Financial Market Authority and amended in 2016. Kuwait 
and Bahrain were the last to issue corporate governance codes. In Kuwait, the Capital 
Standards Rating Agency issued the corporate governance code in 2010, which was 
replaced with the corporate governance regulations issued by the Kuwait Capital 
market Authority in 2013. In Bahrain, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce in 
cooperation with Bahrain Central Bank issued the corporate governance code in 2010; 
all listed companies had to comply with the code by the end of 2011. Before 
generating corporate governance codes in Kuwait and Bahrain, company laws were 
the source of corporate governance-related matters, such as the board of directors’ 
obligations, composition, and voting rights (Shehata, 2015). It is clear that most of the 
codes were issued after 2006 and have been recently amended which reflects the 
intention of the GCC governments and market regulators to develop their corporate 
government environments and diversify their economies.  
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A comparison between the GCC corporate governance codes reveals that the 
codes differ is some of their provisions as shown in table 3.3 based on the most recent 
corporate governance code issued in each GCC country. In terms of their enforcement 
requirements, the code in the UAE is the strictest since it is based on mandatory 
compliance (comply or penalty), whereas in Saudi Arabia the code was voluntary 
except for certain provisions that were mandatory to comply with until 2017 when the 
code was reintroduced and became mandatory with the exception of some guided 
voluntary provisions. The rest of the GCC codes are on the basis of comply or 
explain. In terms of disclosure provisions, the GCC codes are comparable with some 
differences in the disclosure requirements. For example, information about 
shareholders’ stakes is only required in Bahrain and Oman and only recently in the 
UAE by the new code of 2016. Similarly, market capitalization and the share price 
trends during the year are only obligated by the Omani corporate governance code 
and the UAE’s new corporate code of 2016. The identifications and positions of the 
senior managers are not required in Saudi Arabia and Oman, while these are required 
to be disclosed by companies in Qatar, In Kuwait and Bahrain, this information is 
required to be available upon shareholders’ request, and in the UAE such information 
was not required until the code of 2016 was issued. Another disclosure requirement 
that differs in the GCC codes is the education qualifications and commercial 
experience of the board members. While the Qatar and Bahrain codes request that this 
information is made available but not necessarily in the annual report, Kuwait, the 
UAE, and Oman do not require the disclosure of such information and in Saudi 
Arabia, companies were not required to disclose board education and experience until 
the code of 2017 which explicitly requires the disclosure of this information in the 
board of directors’ report.  
The latest versions of the corporate codes in most GCC countries have raised the 
level of disclosure requirements as a means of enhancing the transparency within their 
stock markets. For instance, the newly-issued Saudi corporate code in 2017 includes 
more disclosure requirements like details of the company’ social contributions, a 
description of the company’s significant plans and decisions including changes to the 
structure or operations and the future expectations, and information on any 
operational, financial, or market-related risks facing the company and the policy for 
managing and monitoring these risks. Similarly, the code of 2016 in the UAE has 
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upgraded the disclosure and transparency requirements stated in the 2007 code to 
include details and justifications of any compensation paid to any member of the 
board or its sub committees, details of the positions, appointment date, and salaries 
and bonuses for the first and second lines of company management, and the 
establishment of investor relations services through companies’ websites. This 
upgrading of the corporate codes illustrates the recent notion about enhancing the 
market transparency by the GCC market authorities and the importance of corporate 
codes to facilitate the communication process with the market participants in order to 
achieve market development and economic objectives. Some of these provisions 
updates may not be reflected in the current study’s results due to a misalignment 
between the period of the study and the year in which these new codes become 
enforceable. However, it reflects the recent awareness of the need to change and 
improve the corporate reporting environment where disclosure and transparency are 
necessary for making these changes. Therefore, the current study is motivated further 
to prove the need for greater attention to be paid to the disclosure provisions of the 
corporate governance codes as a means of improving the GCC stock market to attract 
new local and foreign investments and become an essential part of these countries’ 
economies.  
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Table 3.3 A comparison between the six GCC corporate governance codes 
Item Saudi 
Arabia 
Kuwait Bahrain Oman Qatar UAE 
Name of the 
code 
Corporate 
governance 
regulations 
Corporate 
governance 
code 
Corporate 
governance 
code 
Code for 
corporate 
governance 
of public 
listed 
companies 
Governance 
code for 
companies 
and legal 
entities 
listed in the 
main market 
Discipline and 
governance of 
public 
shareholding 
companies 
Date of 
publication/ Last 
version 
2006/2019 2010/2013 2010 2002/2015 2009/2016 2007/2016 
Legal status Mandatory 
with the 
exception of 
some guided 
voluntary 
provisions. 
Comply or 
explain 
basis 
Comply or 
explain 
basis 
Comply or 
explain 
basis 
Comply or 
explain 
basis 
Comply or 
penalise 
Board 
independence 
At least one 
third of the 
board or two 
members, 
whichever is 
greater 
At least one 
member 
and shall 
not exceed 
half of the 
members of 
the board 
At least 
three 
members 
At least one 
third of the 
board 
or a 
minimum of 
two 
members 
 
At least one 
third of the 
board 
 
At least one 
third of the 
board 
 
Roles of the 
chairman and 
CEO 
Must be 
separated 
Must be 
separated 
Must be 
separated 
Must be 
separated 
Must be 
separated 
Must be 
separated 
Board size A minimum 
of three and 
not more than 
eleven 
Not 
specified 
Not more 
than 15 
members 
Not 
specified 
Not 
specified 
Not    
specified 
Board meeting 
frequency per 
year 
At least four 
meetings per 
year 
At least six 
meetings 
per year 
At least four 
meetings 
per year 
At least four 
meetings 
per year 
At least six 
meetings 
per year 
At least four 
meetings per 
year 
Number of other 
directorship 
holdings allowed 
A maximum 
of five 
directorships 
Not 
specified 
A maximum 
of three 
directorships 
Not 
specified 
A maximum 
of three 
directorships 
Not    
specified 
Audit committee Required Required Required Required Required Required 
Nomination 
committee 
Required Required Required Required Required Required 
Remuneration 
committee 
Required Required Required Required Required Required 
Risk 
management 
committee 
Required Required Required Not required Not required Not required 
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3.5 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
3.5.1 Ownership Structure 
Another key contextual factor of the corporate governance environment in GCC 
countries is the ownership structure of listed corporations. Unlike the diverse 
shareholder ownership found in most developed countries, the control in GCC listed 
firms is strongly concentrated in a small number of shareholders4 (Baydoun et al., 
2013; Santos, 2015). In most cases, government and family ownership are the 
dominant shareholders in GCC listed corporations (Alajlan, 2004; Piesse, Strange and 
Toonsi, 2012; Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 2016). Other forms of 
ownership found to a lesser extent in GCC firms include the institutional, foreign, and 
managerial. 
Government ownership is highly present in the GCC stock markets through a 
number of institutions, such as the General Organization of Social Insurance, the 
General Retirement Organization, and the Public Investment Fund in Saudi Arabia, 
the Social Insurance Organization in Bahrain, the Kuwaiti Investment Authority, the 
Government and Ministry of Finance in Oman, the Qatar Investment Authority and 
Qatar Holdings, the Dubai Investments corporation, the Emirates Investment 
Authority, and Sharjah Assets Management in the UAE. While government 
ownership is spread across the market sectors, it is more central in capital–intensive 
sectors like petrochemicals and telecommunications (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 
2012). Governments in GCC countries tend to invest in the stock markets through 
their treasury funds, which explain the high percentage of government shareholdings 
in market capitalization. Moreover, GCC governments still maintain control over 
governmental corporations after being listed in the stock market as a result of the 
privatization reform that took place at the end of the twentieth century (Al-Janadi, 
Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 2016). For example, the Saudi government still holds 
70% of both Saudi Basic Industries (SABIC) and the Saudi Telecom Company (STC), 
and 81.22% of Saudi Electricity. In the UAE, the Abu Dhabi government holds 
74.05% of the Abu Dhabi National Energy Company, and Emirates Investment 
Authority holds 50.12% of the Emirates Integrated Telecommunication Company 
(du) and 60% of the Emirates Telecom Group Company (Etisalat). 
                                                        
4 Average block holders ownership in GCC firms documented in the current study is 45% 
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Family ownership is also present in the GCC stock markets. Founding families 
and their descendants maintain control over their companies after these are listed on 
the market and usually hold senior managements positions (Piesse, Strange and 
Toonsi, 2012). The power of the family exceeds the power of individuals in the GCC 
region (Eulaiwi et al., 2016). Piesse et al. (2012) show the benefits of concentrated 
family ownership as stated by a number of executive managers in Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt; family firms benefit from quick decision making, better knowledge of the 
business, the stability of the share price due to the large stake held by the family over 
a long period of time, low internal transaction costs between companies in a holding 
group due to the lower degree of information asymmetry compared to transactions 
between unrelated parties, and the families’ ability to provide capital when their 
companies are struggling financially. Moreover, a well-known family with good 
connections benefits the company and all shareholders by using their influence over 
direct policy-making and government funding in their companies’ interests (Piesse, 
Strange and Toonsi, 2012). This shows the significant importance of family and 
personal relations in forming the corporate environment in the GCC business setting.  
Another distinctive feature of the ownership structure found in the MENA region, 
and more specifically in the GCC markets, is that government and family ownership 
are the two largest sources of institutional capital whereas investment funds and 
insurance companies dominate the institutional investments in the western markets 
(Amico, 2016). Institutional investors play a crucial role in monitoring the 
management and promoting transparency (Ajinky, aBhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; Rouf 
and Al Harun, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012); however, in GCC countries, the role of 
institutional investors is minimal (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012; Amico, 2016), 
owing to the fact that the majority of institutional investors are either the government 
or family members, in addition to the low participation by large foreign institutional 
investors in the GCC markets. Government and family ownership in the MENA 
region represent over a third and almost a quarter of the total value held by 
institutional investors in the region, respectively (Amico, 2016). Particularly in the 
GCC markets, the government and family institutions hold about 53% and 21% of the 
overall value held by institutional investors, respectively (Amico, 2016). Government 
institutions in the GCC countries dominate the institutional investors’ holding 
compared to other countries in the MENA region; 75% in the UAE, 66% in Qatar, 
  91 
49% in Bahrain, and 45% in Saudi Arabia compared to the regional average of 41% 
(Amico, 2016). Therefore, the impact of institutional investors as professionals with 
long-term investment objectives is limited. As a result, the most predominant 
investors in terms of market trading activities in the GCC are retail investors who 
mostly act in accordance with the economics changes, resulting in wide market 
volatility (Amico, 2016). This strand distinguishes the GCC markets from other 
global developed markets where institutional investors represent a large stake of the 
market and have an effective role in monitoring the management and developing the 
market both in terms of promoting transparency and supporting market stability due 
to their long-term investments horizon and large holdings.  
Furthermore, foreign ownership in the GCC market is relatively low (Piesse, 
Strange and Toonsi, 2012; Amico, 2016). The main reason for the low degree of 
foreign participation evident in the GCC stock markets is the restrictions imposed by 
the market regulators on foreign ownership along with the low level of transparency 
resulting from weak financial market development (Jamaani and Roca, 2015). Foreign 
investors are allowed directly to own up to 49% of listed companies in the UAE, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and recently Saudi Arabia, while they can own up to 100% of Bahraini 
and Omani companies subject to government approval. Nevertheless, foreign 
ownership in these markets remains relatively below the maximum allowance. For 
example, as of 2012, foreign investors participate in only 6%, 3.3%, and 28% of listed 
companies in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman (Jamaani and Roca, 2015), which 
indicates that regulatory restrictions are not the only reason discouraging foreign 
investors from actively participating in the stock markets. The low foreign capital 
flows might be attributed to the lack of transparency and market development. 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) provide evidence supporting this claim by 
documenting how foreign investors have a preference for companies with effective 
corporate governance and less information asymmetry. They tend to invest in 
companies where they are well informed and their investments are well protected. 
Therefore, information availability and corporate governance effectiveness appears to 
play an important role in foreign investors decision to invest in a particular market. 
This could explain the low participation by foreign investors in the GCC stock 
markets where the level of transparency and market development are low (Jamaani 
and Roca, 2015). 
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In conclusion, ownership in the GCC stock markets is characterized by a high 
concentration level, the domination of the government and family institutions over 
institutional investments, and low foreign investor participation.   
3.5.2 Board of Directors 
In corporate governance, the board of directors represents the shareholders’ 
interests and supposedly act according to their preferences. Therefore, it is likely that 
the board will be influenced by the structure of the shareholders in the firm. Thus, the 
role of the board as a corporate governance mechanism monitoring the management 
could be inversely affected by the concentred ownership structure present in the GCC 
companies. Major shareholder representatives are populating the boards in GCC 
countries, which implies the domination of the major shareholders’ role over the role 
of the board (PiesseStrange and Toonsi, 2012; The Institute For Corporate 
Governance (Hawkamah), 2017). By dominating the board, the major shareholder 
could significantly control the management, decision-making process, and voting 
agenda (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). Consequently, corporate governance in 
the MENA region is described as shareholder-centric rather than board-centric (The 
Institute For Corporate Governance (Hawkamah), 2017). More specifically, the 
boards of family firms in the GCC markets are dominated by family members, their 
friends and relatives (Baydoun et al., 2013; Shehata, 2015; Eulaiwi et al., 2016). 
Major shareholders maintain control over the board of directors through influencing 
the process of nominating and appointing board members suggesting that the 
appointment of non-executive independent directors with no relations to the major 
shareholders is not a common practice in the MENA region (Santos, 2015). Even 
though the structure of the board and its composition are relatively well-governed by 
the rules and regulations outlined in the GCC corporate governance codes, major 
shareholders can exercise their power to undermine the rules and harm the nomination 
process (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 2012). This situation would notably impair board 
independence since members who have been selected based on the independence 
criteria set out by the market regulations are acting in accordance with their loyalty to 
the major shareholders rather than seeking to fulfil their duties as independent board 
members. As a result, the GCC corporate governance environment suffers from a lack 
of protection of minority shareholders’ interests, related party transactions, conflicts 
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of interests and information asymmetry (The Institute For Corporate Governance 
(Hawkamah), 2017). 
Likewise, the multiple appointments of board members in GCC firms may further 
complicate the issues of the related party transactions and conflicts of interests. It is 
common for board members in the GCC to sit on more than one board (Santos, 2015). 
The restrictions on the number of directorships allowed for each member are not 
clearly defined in the GCC codes. For instance, the corporate governance code in 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain restricts the number of seats on another company’s board to 
five and three, respectively, yet the number is not specified in the other countries 
codes. Closely-related links created as a result of cross directorships could exasperate 
the problem of related party transactions and conflicts of interest between 
corporations, which may negatively impact the corporate governance environment in 
the GCC.  
In addition, board member remuneration is a key corporate governance 
mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is suggested by agency theory that 
providing board members with appropriate incentives is essential to motivate them to 
carry out their board responsibilities to their best ability. In the GCC, most firms 
disclose an aggregate amount of board members and senior managers’ compensation. 
However; a detailed disclosure of the compensation, how it is structured, and whether 
or not it is linked to any performance indicators is not available (The Institute For 
Corporate Governance (Hawkamah), 2017). Therefore, the potential for improvement 
regarding the disclosure and policy of board compensation exists in GCC firms. It is 
important for the compensation to be structured in a way that reflects the firm’s 
strategic objectives, and creates a balance between fixed and variable incentives in 
order to achieve the effect of motivating board members to perform their role 
effectively (The Institute For Corporate Governance (Hawkamah), 2013). . 
3.6 Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the distinctive features of the social, 
economic, political, and corporate environment of GCC countries. The illustration of 
the unique characteristics found in the GCC help in the understanding of the practice 
of corporate reporting and its determinants. More specifically, it assists in making 
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sense of the relationships between the voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
factors documented in the current study.  
The GCC provides an interesting environment in which to study the level of 
voluntary disclosure and its determinants due to its distinct characteristics that are not 
found collectively in any other developed or developing countries. The GCC are 
Islamic states with oil dependent economies and concentrated political systems. The 
majority of their population are Muslims who are determined to follow Islamic values 
and principles thorough their life activities. The GCC economies are heavily 
dependent on oil; however, there have been recent initiatives to diversify their 
economy through developing their stock markets to attract new investments. 
Politically, they are all related to monarchy regimes where royal families control the 
political system. 
In terms of the corporate governance environment, the GCC corporate settings are 
distinguished by a high level of ownership concentration that is dominated by the 
government and family shareholders, in addition to the minimal role of institutional 
shareholders who are in most cases either government or family institutions, and the 
low participation of foreign investors. Regarding the board of directors, the board 
independence is questionable due to the intervention of the major shareholders in the 
process of nominating and selecting board members. Multiple cross directorships 
exist in GCC listed firms, resulting in the potential for related party transactions and 
conflicts of interests when conducting business among these firms. Lastly, disclosure 
of detailed board members’ compensation and the related policy are unavailable 
implying that the structure of compensation and how far it is related to performance 
indicators are difficult to determine.  
In light of these unique features that characterize the GCC environment, one is 
motivated to investigate the impact of different types of ownership and the board of 
director’s attributes on the functionality and effectiveness of these corporate 
governance mechanisms in monitoring the management and consequently affecting 
the reporting practice, more specifically voluntary disclosure. The level of 
significance of the association between voluntary disclosures in the annual reports of 
GCC listed firms and the number of independent variables investigated in this study 
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(ownership structure and board attributes) could be easier to appreciate after gaining a 
clear understanding of the environment where these listed firms operate.  
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework, Methodology and 
Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
A review of the disclosure literature reveals that firms provide information in 
excess of that required by statute or other corporate governance rules. This literature 
also provides evidence of an association between disclosure practice and corporate 
governance (Firth, 1979; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). 
 Using agency theory, the prior research hypothesises that corporate disclosure is 
related to information asymmetry between the management and owners (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991). Disclosure tends to be mostly linked to a number of firm-
specific characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms in disclosure 
researches as a way of explaining the variation in the level of disclosure among 
corporations. Agency theory has helped to make sense of the significant relations 
identified between disclosure and several firm and corporate governance factors 
(Cooke, 1989b; Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate the theoretical framework of this study 
based on agency theory, and to develop a number of hypotheses in order to explain 
the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure among GCC listed firms from 
ownership and board of directors’ perspectives. The first part of this chapter will 
elaborate upon the methodology and methods of the study while the second part is 
dedicated to hypotheses’ development. 
4.2 Methodology and Methods 
The underlying meta-theoretical and methodological (in the sense of a philosophy 
of method) assumptions are implicit. In this section the focus will be to make these 
aspects more explicit as reflecting on these could even improve the particular choice 
of the research methods and the application thereof in this thesis (Laughlin, 1995). 
This current methodology section outlines the research philosophy and approach, and 
forms a link to the empirical methods of this study. The underlying philosophy of the 
method influences the research question of a study or how that question is approached 
(Gallhofer, Haslam and Yonekura, 2013) . The philosophy and the questions 
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influence the choice of specific research methods. Hence, reflecting on the study 
objectives which aim to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed 
corporations and to explain the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure with 
reference to the size and type of ownership structure and board of directors attributes, 
this section focuses on the philosophical assumptions and paradigm in relation to the 
empirical methods that are appropriately adopted in order to achieve the objectives of 
the study. 
4.2.1 Research Philosophy 
A research process according to Saunders et al. (2015), involves a number of steps 
that are viewed as six layers of an onion; namely, the research philosophy, approach 
to the theory, methodological choices, strategies, time horizon, techniques and 
procedures, as shown in figure 4.1. Researchers are supposed to peel off each layer of 
the research onion, starting with the research philosophy, in order to proceed to the 
next step of their research journey. 
Figure 4.1 The Research Onion 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2015, P.124)   
 
The term ‘research philosophy’ refers to a set of beliefs and assumptions regarding 
knowledge and its development (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). All social 
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scientists carry out their research studies based on a number of assumptions about the 
nature of the social world and how it may be examined (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Philosophical assumptions for Burrell & Morgan (1979) include assumptions about 
the nature of reality (ontology), about the ground of knowledge (epistemology), about 
the relationship between human beings and their environment (human nature), and 
about approaches to investigation (methodology). Each of these four assumptions has 
two different angles of perspectives regarding social science. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) classify each philosophical assumption into two extreme dimensions, the 
subjective and the objective approach to social science, as shown in figure 5.2 below. 
 
Figure 4.2 The Subjective – Objective Dimension 
        the subjective approach                     the objective approach 
                        to social science                                     to social science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
      Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, P.3) 
 
The first assumption, ontology, concerns the very essence of the phenomenon 
under investigation. In other words, it is about the question: whether the reality is 
external to the individual’s cognition or a product of the individual’s mind (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979). Two contrasting positions can be classified in ontology: 
nominalism and realism. While the former suggests that the social world is nothing 
more than names, concepts, and labels that are used to structure the reality, the latter 
postulates that the social world and reality exist externally to individual cognition 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). For the realist, the social world has a reality of its own 
and exists independently of an individual’s appreciation of it. 
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The second assumption is epistemology, which is interested in how the individual 
understands the world and communicates this as knowledge to the whole society 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It deals with the question of whether knowledge is 
something that can be obtained as universal or as quite specific personal experience. 
Two positions are identified in epistemology: anti-positivism and positivism. For the 
anti-positivist, the individual needs to be directly involved in the activities that are 
under review; the social world can only be understood from the individual’s point of 
view. It may also involve an interpretation of the views of others (an interpretation of 
interpretations). Anti-positivist research starts by investigating existing experience in 
order to formulate theories, and typically involves research methods such as action 
research, case studies, ethnography, feminist perspectives, and participative enquiry 
(Collis and Hussey, 2009). The positivist understanding of the social world is 
typically driven by determining a causal relationship between the world’s elements 
and using these relations to predict and explain what happens in the social world 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Thus, theories provide the basis for explanation and 
allow the anticipation of phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
The third assumption, human nature, relates to the relations between human 
beings and their environment. Two extremes positions can be identified within the 
field of human nature assumptions: Voluntarism and Determinism (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979). While Voluntarism regards the human being as the creator of the 
environment, determinism views human beings and their experience as products of 
the environment; therefore, their activities can be completely determined by the 
situation or environment in which they are located (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Based on the above three assumptions, the last assumption regarding the nature of 
methodology in the sense of the actual methods is shaped or influenced. It concerns 
the methods used to investigate and obtain knowledge about the social world. Two 
approaches or tendencies can be identified within this assumption: the Ideographic 
and the Nomothetic. The Ideographic approach is based on the view that the social 
world can only be understood by obtaining first-hand knowledge of the investigated 
subject. This approach stresses the importance of direct involvement in the 
investigation process and the interpretation of interpretations (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). The nomothetic approach in contrast places emphasis on the importance of 
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basing research on a systematic protocol and technique and the use of hypotheses’ 
testing (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
These four sets of assumptions about the nature of social science provide a 
framing for conducting studies and analyzing social theories. For the purpose of 
achieving the current study objectives, social assumptions that lean more toward the 
objective dimension are adopted. The important features of the corporate governance 
context of the current study have a concrete and accessible reality, and the study seeks 
to understand and explain the variation in the level of voluntary disclosure by 
searching for regularities and casual relationships based on a well-developed theory, 
and the understanding and interpretation of the results are based on hypotheses and 
analytical testing. Therefore, the current study embraces the four assumptions related 
to the objective approach in its attempt to understand the disclosure practices within 
GCC listed firms.  
4.2.2 Research Paradigms  
Like the subjective – objective dimension that comprises assumptions which deals 
with the nature of science, Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest an additional 
dimension that includes two opposing assumptions regarding the nature of society 
namely, the regulation – radical change dimension. This dimension helps to 
differentiate between research philosophies related to the political or ideological 
standpoints adopted by researchers when investigating the social world (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). Researchers working within the regulation standpoint 
focus on the need to regulate societies and human behaviors. They effectively tend to 
accept the need for the current regulations and seek to improve them rather than 
radically change them. Business and management research is usually placed in this 
regulation stance since it investigates the society or organization with the aim of 
providing suggestions for improvement rather than radically challenging the current 
position (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). The radical change perspective on 
the other hand, seeks to solve the organizational problems by offering an insight to 
completely change the existing situation, including even society or the global context 
as a whole (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). It concerns more the alternatives to 
the current state rather than suggesting regulations for its improvement.  
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Burrell and Morgan (1979) combine the subjective–objective dimension with the 
regulation–radical change dimension to create a 2X2 matrix consisting of four 
distinctive paradigms for viewing the social and organizational world; namely, 
Radical humanist, Radical structuralist, Interpretive, and Functionalist, as shown in 
figure 4.3. These four paradigms are mutually exclusive. Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
view them as contradictive alternatives and therefore they cannot be combined. 
 Figure 4.3 Four Paradigms for the analysis of Social Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, P.22) 
 
In the top corner of the matrix, located within the subjective and radical change 
dimension, lies the radical humanist paradigm. Working on this paradigm means 
approaching the social and organizational world critically and aiming to change the 
status quo while adopting a subjective perspective of ontology, epistemology, human 
nature, and methodology (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015).  
The radical structuralist is located within the objective and radical change 
dimension. Although it shares the desire to achieve a fundamental change in the social 
world with the radical humanist paradigm, the radical structuralist paradigm adopts an 
objective perspective regarding social science assumptions (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2015). 
 The current study aims to investigate the corporate disclosure environment in the 
GCC countries with the purpose of evaluating the current state and suggesting some 
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recommendations about improving the transparency and disclosure regulations in the 
stock market; hence, the first two paradigms that stress on radical change are 
considered irrelevant to this study.  
In the bottom right corner of the matrix lies the functionalist paradigm, which is 
where most of the business and management studies are positioned (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2015). It is located within the space created by the intersection of the 
objective and ‘regulation’ dimensions. Research that operates in the functionalist 
paradigm rationally examines the organizational world and provides rational 
explanations and suggestions designed to improve it; in doing so, it relies on the 
positivist research philosophy (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). 
Finally, the interpretive paradigm is located in the bottom left corner, combining 
the subjective and regulation dimensions. Research in this paradigm focuses on 
discovering the irrationalities in the social and organizational world (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2015). It requires the researcher to be involved in the organization’s 
everyday activities in order to understand and explain the situation rather than change 
it. 
The current study is placed in the functionalist paradigm, leaning more toward the 
centre of the matrix. Due to the study objectives, the current research adopts a 
functionalist perspective in examining the voluntary disclosure environment and 
underpins this perspective with objective assumptions about the social world. 
Therefore, philosophically, the current study is epistemologically a positivist research. 
4.2.3 Research Approach 
The relation between a research project and the theory can determine whether the 
research adopts a deductive or inductive approach (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). Deductive reasoning happens when the conclusion is 
rationally derived from a set of premises while in the inductive reasoning, there exists 
a gap between the conclusion and the premises, so observation is required in order to 
arrive at a conclusion (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). Otherwise stated, the 
deductive approach starts with an already developed theory that is used to design a 
number of hypotheses and test them to arrive at a conclusion that could be explained 
by the theory. In contrast, the inductive approach starts with data collection based on 
  103 
a number of observations and explorations and then builds a theory based on 
conclusions from the data analysis. The following table 4.1 differentiates between the 
deductive and the inductive approach in terms of logic, generalizability, the use of 
data, and theory, according to Saunders et al. (2015).  
 
Table 4.1 The Deductive and Inductive Approach to Social Science 
 Deduction Induction 
Logic 
When the premises are true the 
conclusion must be true 
Unknown premises are used to generate 
an untested conclusion 
Generalizability 
Generalising from the general to the 
specific 
Generalising from the specific to the 
general 
Use of data 
Data are used to evaluate 
hypotheses related to an existing 
theory 
Data are used to explore a phenomenon, 
identify patterns, and create a framework  
Theory Theory is rejected or supported Theory is created and built 
Source: Saunders et al. (2015, P.145) 
 
The direction in a deductive research goes from theory, observation, to findings; 
while, in an inductive research, it goes from observation, findings, to theory (Bryman 
and Bell, 2015). Bryman and Bell (2015) suggest that a deductive strategy of linking 
data and theory is typically associated with quantitative research; by contrast, an 
inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research is usually 
associated with qualitative research.  
In addition to the role of theory in research (the deduction and induction 
approach), quantitative and qualitative research are different in a number of other 
aspects. Quantitative research is generally associated with positivism while qualitative 
research tends to be preferred by those emphasising an individual’s interpretations of 
the social world (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Second, quantitative research views the 
social reality as an external, objective reality, whereas qualitative research views it as 
a product of an individual’s creation (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Furthermore, the most 
obvious difference is the numerical measurements and statistical tests used by 
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quantitative research, and the naturalistic and interactive data collection techniques 
used in qualitative research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). 
The quantitative/qualitative distinction is present in classifying social science 
research. It is argued that research objectives and the way in which researchers pose 
research questions will inevitably impact on the choice between the quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2015). The current 
study aims to assess the level of voluntary disclosure in the GCC stock markets and to 
identify the relationships between the ownership structure, board attributes and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. The deductive approach and the 
use of quantitative methods are considered to be suitable for the purpose of this thesis, 
and they fit well with the functionalist paradigm and objective philosophy adopted in 
this study.  
4.3 The Theoretical Framework for Corporate Voluntary Disclosure 
In the context of corporate governance, it is argued that a commonly accepted 
theoretical base or framework does not exist (Parum, 2005). Different theoretical 
frameworks have been adopted to explain and investigate corporate governance 
practices and it may be noted that agency theory and stakeholder theory are popular in 
this respect (Abdel-Fattah, 2009). Similarly, regarding disclosure as an accounting 
principle, there is no single comprehensive theory that fully explains the practice of 
disclosure in general and voluntary disclosure in particular (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Several theories have been employed in the accounting literature to explain the 
reasons underpinning corporations’ decisions to voluntarily disclose more and/or 
higher quality information. This study focuses on agency theory in explaining 
voluntary disclosure in GCC listed firms due to the nature of the independent 
variables included to explain the differences in the level of voluntary disclosure 
between firms; namely, ownership structure and board of directors’ characteristics. 
4.3.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory has been largely adopted by disclosure studies (e.g. Firth, 1980; 
Cooke, 1989; Lutfi, 1989; Taylor and Craswell, 1992; Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et 
al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Gray et al., 1995; Chau and 
Gray, 2002; Haniffa and cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Leventis and Weetman, 
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2004; Barako et al., 2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; 
Khodadadi et al., 2010; Rouf and AlHarun, 2011). Jensen and Meckling define an 
agency relationship “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 308). According to agency theory, a contract exists between a 
provider of capital (the principal) and a controller of capital (the agent). This 
separation of ownership and control introduce the need by the principals (shareholder) 
for some assurance that they will receive returns on their capital. They need to be 
assured that the agent (manager) is not expropriating their interests. Nevertheless, 
agents are expected to deviate from the interests of the principals, since those who 
initiate and implement important decisions are not the main residual claimants and 
therefore do not endure a substantial risk as a result of their decisions (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Both agent and principal wish to maximize their own utilities, the 
agent works to maximize his income while the principal invests to maximize his 
returns. Both outcomes depend on the efforts and decisions of the agent (Saam, 2007). 
Most modern corporations are characterized by the separation of the decision 
management from the residual risk bearing by separating the managers’ initiation and 
implementation activities and principals’ control and monitoring activities (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). This separation of management and finance in the corporation contract 
creates a conflict of interests between the principals and agents, which is known as the 
agency problem. 
The agency problem may be summarized as the principal always questioning if the 
managerial behaviors absolutely serve her or his interests and whether the managers 
are wasting funds on ineffective projects or projects that solely favor their interests 
over those of the firm. Principals need information regarding managers’ actions and 
motivations in order to evaluate their decisions and gain some assurance that their 
goals are being achieved. In agency theory, an information asymmetry is assumed to 
the advantage of the agent (Saam, 2007; Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). 
Principals encounter two problems as a result of information asymmetry; namely, 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Saam, 2007). Moral hazard deals with hidden 
actions, as the agent has the freedom to choose from different actions to complete the 
job delegated to him (Saam, 2007). The agent’s actions cannot be easily observed and 
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evaluated by the principal; hence he cannot verify whether or not the agent is acting to 
the benefit of the firm (Husted, 2007). Adverse selection, on the other hand, deals 
with hidden information: information about agents’ qualifications and skills, 
information on agent’s intentions, and information relevant to evaluating agents’ 
performance and work results (Saam, 2007). Under the lack of information, the 
principal is unable to verify whether or not his decision to hire an agent with certain 
characteristics and intentions was the right one, and also unable to evaluate the agent 
outcomes because of the absence of information and knowledge needed for such 
evaluation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Saam, 2007).  
In order to solve the agency problem, the preferences of the shareholders and 
managers need to be aligned and the hidden actions and information need to be 
disclosed. It is suggested that rewarding a manger with incentives depending on his 
actions will motivate him to work hard to fulfil the shareholders’ targets. That makes 
both shareholders and managers interested in achieving the same outcome, which is a 
high level of returns for shareholders that will lead to a high level of incentives for 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Saam, 2007). Monitoring, signalling, and 
bonding are recommended by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to deal with the problem 
of hidden actions and information. Shareholders are expected to collect information 
on managers’ actions, activities, and performance in order to monitor their wealth. 
Managers are also expected to signal their special skills and characteristics to 
convince the shareholders of their ability to look after their wealth and help them to 
make an offer that is appropriate for the managers’ characteristics and knowledge 
(Saam, 2007). Although these solutions could, to some extent, solve the agency 
problem, they have resulted in agency costs incurred by the shareholders related to 
monitoring activities and by the managers related to bonding activities. To avoid these 
costs, we can simply argue for more disclosure of information. If managers 
voluntarily provide information on their activities, qualifications, and performance, 
the shareholders will then be able to monitor their welfare at less cost (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Limiting the information asymmetry by disclosing more information 
contributes toward solving the agency problem and mitigating the agency costs. 
Therefore, disclosure in the corporate annual reports is considered a mechanism for 
helping to reduce the agency costs by reducing the need for direct monitoring and 
bonding expenditure. “Managers are predicted to disclose more information in annual 
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reports in order to reduce agency costs entailed in monitoring activities” (Huafang 
and Jianguo, 2007, p. 607). Accordingly, managers have the incentive to agree 
voluntarily to supply additional information that is relevant to an assessment of their 
work in order to reduce the costs associated with the agency problem (Craswell and 
Taylor, 1992). 
Researchers view agency theory as a theory that explains the variations in 
disclosure in the annual reports of listed corporations. Corporate disclosure is 
considered an important corporate governance mechanism that limits the information 
asymmetry and agency conflicts between the managers and shareholders. This study 
employs agency theory to examine the relationship between ownership structure, 
board attributes and voluntary disclosure by GCC listed corporations. It seeks to 
explain the effect of different types of ownership (shareholders) and board 
characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure based on the understanding of 
agency theory regarding the relationship between principal and agent.  
4.3.2. Ownership Structure and Disclosure 
According to the previous discussion, while managers manage the capital of 
the shareholders, they make more observations and obtain better information 
about the business. Shareholders request this private information for monitoring 
purposes in order to justify the managers’ decisions and ensure that the allocation 
of the business resources is serving their interests. If the manager is the sole owner 
of the firm, he has the motivation and possesses the information needed to protect 
his own interests. This situation has zero agency costs as suggested by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and therefore, managers combine the rules of managing and 
monitoring. On the contrary, if the manager owns zero interest in the firm, he is 
expected to depart from the interests of the owners in order to favour her or his 
own interests. In this case, the agency costs are high and owners need to perform a 
powerful monitoring job. Agency costs are adversely related to managerial 
ownership (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000). It is apparent that the ownership structure 
determines the level of agency costs and, as a result, the level of monitoring. That 
shareholders, especially large ones, exert their power to control corporations is 
evident from the corporate governance literature as an effective corporate 
governance mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Large shareholders aim to 
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maximize their returns, and have enough power and rights to have their interests 
respected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, the type and size of the shareholders 
will probably influence the amount of pressure they exert in requesting the 
information that enables them to monitor their interests. 
Ownership structure is considered a reliable corporate governance mechanism 
for controlling conflicts of interest through the role of monitoring applied by 
different types of shareholders (Connelly et al., 2010). In the course of their 
monitoring, shareholders mainly rely on information disclosure and financial 
reporting. Ang et al. (2000) and Armstrong et al. (2010) document that high 
quality, transparent financial reporting lowers the agency conflict and so, 
consequently, the costs of direct monitoring. They highlight that the level of 
demand for public disclosure and financial reporting varies cross-sectionally with 
the structure of ownership in corporations. The attitudes of different types of 
owners regarding monitoring activities and demanding information are not 
homogenous, due to the various risk preferences, investment objectives, 
expectations, legal and regulatory environments, and the ability and power to 
request and process information (Connelly et al., 2010; Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 
2017). 
This study aims to explore the impact of ownership structure (namely 
government, family, institutional, foreign, board members, and audit committee 
ownership) on the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of firms in 
GCC countries. The severity of the agency problem differs among countries 
depending on the ownership structure and level of development of the specific 
country (Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 2016). Using agency theory, the 
study aims to capture how the voluntary disclosure in the annual report differs 
among corporations depending on the structure of ownership and the extent to 
which ownership structure might explain the variation in voluntary disclosure 
found among corporations’ annual reports in the GCC countries. 
4.3.3 Board of Directors and Disclosure 
Another corporate governance mechanism is the board of directors. This is 
considered a primary venue for shareholders to employ control and monitoring 
over the management, and is ultimately an assuring tool that shareholders’ 
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interests are favored and the agency costs are reduced (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008). According to the agency argument, that emphasizes the misalignment 
between the interests of the owners and managers, a monitoring instrument such 
as the board of directors is needed to reduce agency costs and confirm that the 
management decisions are in favor of the shareholders’ interests.  While the board 
members are fulfilling their monitoring duties, they may promote the disclosure of 
certain information in order to reduce the asymmetry of information between the 
shareholders and management. Such disclosure provides transparency and allows 
investors to better predict future returns (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). According 
to Cheng and Courtenay (2006), the board’s monitoring effectiveness is 
influenced by its composition, independence, and size, implying that the 
disclosure of information generated by the board members is determined by the 
board attributes. The disclosure decision is one of the corporate control functions 
of the board (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010) and investors can pressure the 
managers to provide more information through their representatives on the board. 
Thus, the board’s monitoring capacity and ability to request the disclosure of 
information are likely to vary depending on the board characteristics such as the 
number of board members, the level of board independence, and the board 
remuneration policy. 
Therefore, this study is motivated to investigate the impact of different board 
attributes (namely, board size, board independence, board compensation, board 
meetings and attendance, board cross-directorship, and audit committee size) on 
the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC countries where the socio-economic and 
political environments are unique.   
4.4 Hypothesis Development  
Following the previous section, which provides the theoretical framework for 
the study, this part aims to develop testable hypotheses to examine the relationship 
between ownership structure, board attributes and voluntary disclosure. Owners 
differ in terms of their preferences, wealth, competence, and objectives. This 
difference in owners’ identities affects the way they exercise their power and 
rights to alter the management behaviors, so, it is expected that different types and 
sizes of owners have different impacts on corporations’ reporting strategies 
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(Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003; Connelly et al., 2010). The existing empirical 
literature suggests different ownership variables that potentially explain the level 
of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. Ownership concentration, board 
ownership, government ownership, family ownership, institutional ownership 
foreign ownership, and audit committee ownership are the main variables used in 
this study. Similarly, board characteristics are expected to have an impact on 
board monitoring effectiveness and so, consequently, on the disclosure practice. 
The board attributes examined in this study include: board size, board 
independence, board compensations, board meetings and attendance, board cross-
directorship, and audit committee size. 
In addition, the study tests for the effect of a number of firm characteristics 
factors; comprising firm size, audit firm size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, and 
industry type. The selection of variables is mainly based on the corporate 
disclosure literature and their applicability to developing countries, especially to 
GCC once.  
4.4.1 Ownership Structure Factors 
4.4.1.1 Ownership Concentration 
Theoretically, the agency cost is higher in firms with a dispersed ownership 
structure. When there are many owners (residual claimants), the separation of 
ownership and control is greater. Hence, the information asymmetry and 
divergence between the interests of the managers and owners are greater too. In 
this case, the disclosure by the management is a vital means of enabling the 
owners to perform a monitoring role over their interests and prevent managerial 
opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Managers are 
likely to provide more information when the ownership is dispersed among many 
shareholders (Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Raffournier, 1995). 
On the contrary, concentrated ownership, with fewer owners who, however, 
enjoy significant control and cash flow rights, helps to reduce the agency cost 
relative to widely-held firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). When the control rights 
are concentrated in a small number of shareholders with major cash flow power, 
they can easily monitor the management, either directly or through their 
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representatives on the board, and impose their preferences on it compared to when 
these rights are shared by many shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
alignment between the interests of the large shareholders and managers is obvious 
because of the limited separation between the ownership and control, the hand 
selection of the directors and managers, and the intense monitoring of the 
managers; therefore, the need for high quality financial reporting and disclosure as 
a monitoring tool seems to be lower in firms with a concentrated ownership 
structure than in firms with a diffuse one (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). 
Concentrated owners rely on their significant, powerful rights in monitoring the 
management more than on disclosure and financial reporting. 
In addition, proprietary cost theory supports a negative association between 
ownership concentration and disclosure from a different point of view. It is argued 
that low financial transparency is found in firms with concentrated ownership 
because large shareholders tend to secure private information from their 
competitors (Fan and Wong, 2002). Since large shareholders already have direct 
access to private information, they are less likely to promote high quality 
disclosure and transparency (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005; Khlif, Ahmed 
and Souissi, 2017).  
The empirical literature has documented a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and voluntary disclosure (Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 
2017). In their meta-analysis, Khlif et al. (2017) document this negative 
association and find it more present in companies operating in less developed 
markets compared to highly-developed ones, suggesting that concentrated owners 
in countries, where the equity markets are less well developed, are in an 
entrenched position to extract the needed information and expropriate the minority 
interests. They argue that one explanation for this result is that concentrated 
owners are the main source of capital in the less developed markets, which makes 
the use of voluntary disclosure to attract funds less relevant there. Firms in the 
European Union, whose shares are more closely held in term of their ownership 
structure, are found to disclose less corporate governance information (Bauwhede 
and Willekens, 2008). Hossain et al. (1994) find a significant negative relation 
between ownership concentration as measured by the top ten shareholders and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. Darus et al. (2014) report a negative association 
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between ownership concentration and corporate social responsibility disclosure. 
Barako (2007) finds that shareholder concentration is negatively related to 
general, strategic, and financial disclosure in Kenya. In Saudi Arabia, an increase 
in block ownership significantly lowers the voluntary disclosure of corporate 
governance information (Al-Bassam et al., 2015). A similar association regarding 
block ownership and voluntary disclosure is found in South African corporations 
(Ntim et al., 2012). Chau & Gray (2002) provide evidence of a positive 
association between a wider ownership structure and voluntary disclosure in 
companies in Hong Kong and Singaporean.  
Nevertheless, Haniffa & Cook (2002) report a positive relationship between 
the proportion of shares held by the top ten shareholders and voluntary disclosure 
in Malaysia. Using the same variable (ownership by the top ten shareholders), 
Ghazali & Weetman (2006) find no association with disclosure. Similarly, 
Depoers (2000) records an insignificant relationship between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure in the French context. Eng & Mak (2003) 
also prove that blockholder ownership is unrelated to disclosure. 
Based on agency theory and the results of previous studies, the current study is 
motivated to test for the negative association between ownership concentration 
and the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed companies using an overall 
hypothesis.   
H1 There is negative association between ownership concentration and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed companies. 
4.4.1.2 Board Ownership 
Board ownership, the proportion of shares held by the board of directors, helps 
to bring into line the interests of the managers with those of the other 
shareholders. When managers own a high proportion of the firm, they are more 
likely to work toward maximizing the firm value and hence, minimizing the 
agency conflicts and costs. In contrast, when the board ownership is limited, 
managers have an incentive to serve their own interests rather than those of the 
firm, which results in a greater agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agency costs vary adversely with managerial ownership (Ang, Cole and Lin, 
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2000). In the instance of low board ownership, outside shareholders may need to 
increase their monitoring efforts on the managers’ behaviors, which leads to an 
increase in the monitoring costs realized by the firm. Managers could deal with the 
resulting monitoring costs by willing to voluntarily disclose more information. 
Thus, voluntary disclosure is seen as a substitute for monitoring (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The lower the board ownership, the 
greater the need for monitoring, and more voluntary disclosure is expected as a 
way to reduce the costs associated with monitoring. 
 Following the same agency theory assumption, it is expected that voluntary 
disclosure decreases when managerial ownership increases. A higher proportion of 
insider ownership reduces the capacity for monitoring by outsiders, leading to 
increased opportunistic behaviors and decreased voluntary disclosure 
(Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010; Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 2017). The empirical 
literature supports the theory by proving the negative relationship between 
managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure. Khlif et al. (2017) document a 
negative association between managerial ownership and voluntary disclosure. End 
and Mak (2003) find lower managerial ownership to be associated with greater 
voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Chau and Gray (2002) provide evidence of a 
negative association between insider ownership and voluntary disclosure.  
According to agency theory and the previous literature, the current study tests 
for a negative association between board ownership and voluntary disclosure 
H2 There is a negative association between board ownership and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.1.3 Government Ownership 
Government ownership is a main feature of GCC companies. Government 
investment institutions and government-controlled bodies own a substantial 
portion of the GCC stock markets; therefore, the majority of listed companies are 
government- or family owned (Baydoun et al., 2013; Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman 
and Alazzani, 2016). The governments of these countries tend to invest in their 
stock markets through government treasury funds. This could be a possible reason 
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underlying the high proportion of government control within listed firms (Al-
Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 2016).  
Theoretically, there is no consensus regarding the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and ownership by government institutions (Khlif, Ahmed and 
Souissi, 2017). Eng and Mak (2003) argue that the agency costs are higher in 
firms with massive government ownership due to conflicting objectives between 
firm profit maximization goals and other government political goals, creating a 
need for more communication with other shareholders which means greater 
disclosure by the firm. They provide evidence supporting this argument in their 
study. Alternatively, it is also argued that the government is interested in 
enhancing a good reputation through promoting public wealth and enhancing 
transparency in financial reporting. Being accountable to the public, the 
government could exert some pressure on companies to disclose additional 
information (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Wang and Claiborne, 2008). 
Wang and Claiborne (2008) show that state-owned shares are positively related to 
overall disclosure and strategic information. In addition, Khlif et al. (2017), in 
their meta-analysis study, prove a positive association between government 
ownership and voluntary disclosure, suggesting that firms with a higher 
government stake legitimize themselves in the society by providing more 
environmental and social disclosure. Similarly, Al-Bassam et al. (2015) find that 
firms with higher government ownership disclose more corporate governance 
information, implying that formal support by the Saudi government for the 
corporate governance reform encourages firms with shares owned by the 
government to comply with the corporate code by increasing their disclosure. 
Ntim et al. (2012) also find a positive relation between government ownership and 
voluntary disclosure in South Africa. Naser et al. (2006) find moderate support for 
the idea that the government promotes corporate social disclosure in the Qatari 
stock market (Naser et al., 2006). Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find government 
ownership to be not significant in any category of disclosure. 
On the other hand, government ownership is expected to have a negative effect 
on voluntary disclosure, for several reasons; first, firms with government shares 
might have little incentive to voluntarily disclose information since they have easy 
access to finance and rely on government funding rather than raising funds 
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externally, which makes them less interested in disclosing more in order to 
minimize the cost of capital (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). Second, firms 
with government ownership operating in developing countries are expected to 
have strong political connection. In order to protect their political linkages and 
interests, they tend to disclose less information (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006). Firms could be politically influenced by the government through the 
appointment of the top management and board members (Choi, Sami and Zhou, 
2010). Choi et al. (2010) conclude that, when the government ownership is high, 
political influence could play a major role in increasing the information 
asymmetry in China; however, this effect appears to be nominal in the period 
when new privatization reforms and corporate governance mechanisms are put in 
place. Consistent with the political influence argument, Al-Janadi et al. (2016) 
provide evidence that government ownership weakens the directors’ monitoring 
role. They suggest that the intervention by the Saudi government in appointing the 
board of directors could jeopardize the board independence, resulting in poor 
monitoring and insufficient disclosure.  
Government ownership generates two opposite directions regarding financial 
reporting and disclosure. Increased agency costs and promoting a good public 
reputation are linked to a higher level of voluntary disclosure, while cheaper 
sources of finance and political influence suggest little disclosure and 
transparency. 
 According to agency theory and due to the unique society in GCC countries 
where labor unions and pressure groups are absent, the study expects an active 
positive role for the government in seeking more transparency and disclosure as a 
way to show that it cares most about the public’s benefit. Hence, the current study 
expects a positive association between government ownership and voluntary 
disclosure.  
H3 There is a positive association between government ownership and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
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4.4.1.4 Family Ownership 
Like government ownership, family shareholders are common in the GCC 
stock markets (Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 2016). Family ownership 
in the current study is represented by the shares owned by the founder of the firm 
or his descendants (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). It is a distinctive 
ownership structure, in that “founding-families represent a unique class of 
shareholders that hold relatively undiversified portfolios, are long-term investors 
(multiple generations), and often control the senior management position” 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003, p. 620).  
As a form of concentrated ownership in GCC family-controlled firms, family 
shareholders ease the agency conflict between the management and control. The 
controlling family fulfills the role of monitoring the managers (Ang, Cole and Lin, 
2000). Due to their extensive knowledge of the firm’s activities, their long 
investment horizons compared to other shareholders, and their presence within the 
top management and the board of directors, family shareholders have strong 
incentives to provide superior monitoring over their wealth, which includes the 
wealth of the other shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan, 2007). As a result, the degree of disclosure of information is 
expected to be low because of the limited demand for information from the other 
shareholders since effective monitoring is already being performed by the family 
owners. Others argue that, because of the family members’ position within the 
management and the board of directors, firms may have weak corporate 
governance structure resulting in poor monitoring and disclosure. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find that firms with a higher 
proportion of family members on the board disclose less voluntary information in 
their annual reports. Chau and Gray (2002) provide evidence indicating that as a 
concentrated ownership, family shares are negatively and significantly associated 
with voluntary disclosure. Likewise, a higher percentage of shareholding by the 
founding family is found to reduce the extent of segment disclosure in Malaysia 
(Jalila and Devi, 2012)  
Although family ownership reduces the typical agency conflict between the 
management and control, it creates more severe agency problem with 
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outside/minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan, 2007). The founding family enjoy substantial control over the firm 
as a result of their massive equity holding, voting rights, and representation on the 
board of directors; giving them an opportunity to serve their interests at the cost of 
the other shareholders (Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan, 2007). For example, they 
may try to hide the adverse effect of related party transactions or facilitate the 
appointment of family members to management positions (Ali, Chen and 
Radhakrishnan, 2007). In this scenario, the minority shareholders are likely to 
demand more information that will help them to safeguard their benefits in the 
firm. To reduce the agency problem between the controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders, firms with family ownership are willing to meet the great demand 
and make more and better information disclosure (Wang, 2006). Moreover, the 
willingness to provide more information in firm with family ownership is derived 
from the family’s long-term presence in the firm and its intention to preserve the 
family name and reputation to pass to future generations (Wang, 2006). Wang 
(2006) documents an association between founding family ownership, higher 
earnings quality and greater earnings informativeness. Ali et al. (2007) find 
similar results, reporting that family controlled firms have better quality earnings, 
are more timely in reporting bad news, and also have a larger analyst following 
and more accurate analysts’ forecasts. Cascino et al. (2010) also suggest that the 
financial reporting by the family firm is both more transparent and less 
manipulated by the management. He concludes that the positive effect of family 
ownership on the financial reporting quality is derived from the presence of the 
family itself rather than ownership concentration (Cascino et al., 2010). In the 
Saudi context, Al-Janadi et al. (2016) find no significant effect of family 
ownership on voluntary disclosure. 
The vertical and horizontal agency problem provide opposite predictions 
regarding the effect of family ownership on voluntary disclosure in the literature. 
The argument of concentrated ownership supports the negative effect of family 
ownership on voluntary disclosure, and the argument of greater agency conflict 
between family and non-controlling shareholders supports the positive impact of 
family ownership. Thus, the difference in the severity and the type of agency 
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problems is believed to be the reason for the difference in disclosure practices 
between family and non-family firms (Ali, Chen and Radhakrishnan, 2007).  
In GCC, due to the severity of the agency conflict between the controlling 
family and the other shareholders, and the unique nature of family owners who 
care most about their family name, reputation, and future generations, this study 
tests for a positive effect of family ownership in GCC countries where family 
relationship, reputation, and heritage are considered to be among the most 
important values in the society. 
H4 There is a positive association between family ownership and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.1.5 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors are a class of large shareholders with a relatively 
significant stake of ownership, which enables them effectively to monitor the 
management and consequently reduce the agency costs and information 
asymmetry (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Institutional investors differ from all 
of the other types of concentrated shareholders in terms of the level of 
sophistication and knowledge they retain. They are professionals with great 
incentives to acquire the timely disclosure of information and great voting power, 
that means that they are better-placed to evaluate the management’s decisions and 
take corrective action when it is deemed necessary (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). 
Moreover, due to their long-term investment horizon and large investments 
portfolio, institutional investors can gather and analyze information efficiently 
through their easy access to databases and analytical tools (Hope, 2012). 
Institutions are found to be more interested in stocks in firms with a greater level 
of disclosure (Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999). Ajinkya et al. (2005) find 
institutional ownership to be favorably associated with accurate and more frequent 
management forecasts. Khlif et al. (2017) document a significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure. This 
positive effect of institutional ownership is more present in low investor protection 
countries and low market development settings, implying that institutional 
ownership is an effective monitoring mechanism, forcing the management to meet 
their informational needs and provide better disclosure (Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 
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2017). This effect is pronounced in the Saudi settings where corporations with 
higher institutional ownership are found to disclose considerably more 
information (Al-Bassam et al., 2015). In Kenya and Bangladesh, Barako et al. 
(2006) and Rouf et al. (2011) find institutional ownership to be positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure. However, in Qatar and Malaysia, the 
positive impact of institutional investors is very small (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Naser et al., 2006).  
In certain circumstances, institutional ownership might negatively affect 
disclosure. It is argued that, when the institutional ownership is highly 
concentrated and/or operates within a less-developed corporate governance 
system, they behave like insiders in obtaining private information to serve their 
interests at the expense of the minority shareholders rather than to contributing to 
information transparency (Choi, Sami and Zhou, 2010). Choi et al. (2010) suggest 
that, due to the breakdown in the corporate governance system in the emerging 
market of China, institutional investors have an incentive to use private 
information to their own advantage. Their finding contradicts that of Khlif et al. 
(2017), who documents that a positive effect on disclosure by the institutional 
shareholders is more present in the less developed markets, indicating the 
significant role of institutional investors in monitoring and promoting 
transparency in a setting that lacks a well-structured corporate governance system. 
The primary argument regarding institutional ownership and its relation to 
disclosure is summarized by the possibility that their incentives as professional, 
sophisticated investors outweigh their incentives as concentrated shareholders, in 
addition to the important influence of the corporate environment in which the 
firms operate. 
Although institutional ownership has been relatively low within the Saudi 
context and other GCC countries, the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) is 
keen to attract sophisticated institutional investors as part of the broader efforts to 
raise the level of professionalism of the market participants and improve the level 
of transparency (Al-Bassam et al., 2015). Similarly, other GCC stock market 
authorities are aware of the importance of institutional investors for the future 
development and stability of the capital markets in general. Therefore, the current 
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study tests for a positive association between institutional ownership, as measured 
by the proportion of shares held by institutional investors, and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in GCC countries. 
H5 There is a positive association between institutional ownership and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.1.6 Foreign Ownership  
Foreign investors are usually assumed to have an information disadvantage 
compared to domestic ones (Choe, Kho and Stulz, 2005). Giving their 
geographical and language barriers and lack of knowledge of the local accounting 
standards and operating environment, foreign investors face higher information 
asymmetry relative to local ones (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Choi et al., 2013). 
If this is the case, foreign investors who happen to come from more developed and 
transparent regimes may place a greater demand and pressure for a higher level of 
disclosure by local firms (Choi et al., 2013). Accordingly, the management may 
increase the voluntary disclosure to fulfill the foreign shareholders’ expectations 
regarding disclosure and transparency. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) prove a positive 
association between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. 
Barako et al. (2006) also find that, the higher the percentage of shares held by 
foreign shareholders, the higher the level of voluntary disclosure by Kenyan 
companies. Similar results are documented in China, suggesting that the presence 
of foreign ownership has a positive effect in monitoring the management and 
encouraging more disclosure (Wang and Claiborne, 2008). Khlif et al. (2017) 
emphasize the importance of investors’ identity in the corporate governance 
literature through proving the positive and significant effect of foreign ownership 
on the level of voluntary disclosure based on 20 disclosure studies, which supports 
the agency theory and information asymmetry argument.  
On the other hand, if we ignore investors’ identity as foreign shareholders and 
focus on the size of their holdings, foreign ownership can have the opposite effects 
on the information environment. Foreign blockholders may be motivated to take 
advantage of their superior access and processing capability to pursue their 
personal interests. As controlling shareholders who have access to private 
information, they might further limit the firm disclosure to secure information for 
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their own benefit (Choi et al., 2013). That suggests a positive association between 
foreign ownership and information asymmetry. The more concentrated the foreign 
shareholdings, the less voluntary disclosure is expected by the firm. In the 
emerging market of China where less investor protection and less restricting 
disclosure requirements exist, Choi et al. (2013) and Choi et al. (2010) support the 
former argument by providing evidence that foreign investors seems to use their 
superior access to private information to serve their personal benefits rather than 
promote general market transparency.  
However, unlike developed countries, foreign investors’ holdings in the GCC 
are very low due to certain restrictions and limitations applied to non-Arab 
investors. Hence, according to agency theory, foreign investors are expected to 
behave as minority shareholders who are keen to monitor their wealth and demand 
a higher level of disclosure to protect their investments (Jalila and Devi, 2012). 
Foreign investments accounted for 14% of the value held in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, of which only 26% was related to foreign 
investments in GCC countries (Amico, 2016). Despite the relaxation concerning 
the foreign investment limitation, such as the recent opening of the Saudi market, 
which is larger than all of the other GCC markets combined, to qualified 
institutional foreign inventors and the market upgrades of Saudi, the UAE, and 
Qatar, the inflow of foreign investments remains subject to certain restrictions, 
like the maximum 49% that foreign investors are allowed to acquire. The low 
foreign stake in the developing markets has an imprecise effect on the level of 
disclosure. In Malaysia, Jalila and Devi (2012) find that foreign ownership has no 
significant effect on disclosure. Nevertheless, Liang et al. (2012) show that foreign 
ownership is associated with the likelihood of holding conference call in Taiwan 
where the foreign investment is low. They suggest that the long-term investments 
horizon and the investment maturity may motivate the management to satisfy 
foreign institutional investors despite their small shareholding (Liang, Lin and 
Chin, 2012).  
Consistent with agency theory, foreign ownership, as measured by the 
proportion of shares held by non-Arab investors, is expected to enhance the level 
of voluntary disclosure and transparency. 
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H6 There is a positive association between foreign ownership and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.1.7 Audit Committee Ownership 
Agency theory suggests that board monitoring is reinforced by the existing of 
an effective and experienced audit committee (Akhtaruddin and Haron, 2010). The 
audit committee mitigates the agency costs through overseeing the board’s 
monitoring function and ensuring adequate financial reporting and disclosure 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013). When the audit committee members hold a stake in 
the firm, they become insiders who have interests in the firm. Therefore, they are 
expected to look after their wealth and eventually the wealth of the other 
shareholders through their position as committee members. Their role of 
monitoring reduces the need for shareholders monitoring and therefore the need 
for disclosure. The demand for information by the shareholders for the purpose of 
monitoring may be reduced when the audit committee members own shares in the 
firm. Audit committee stake ownership has been proven to have a positive impact 
on firm performance (Bolton, 2014). However, to the best of our knowledge, audit 
committee ownership has not been examined in terms of its relation to disclosure 
practices. Nevertheless, board members’ ownership has been largely studied and 
found to have a beneficial impact on firm performance and a negative influence on 
the disclosure of information in accordance to agency theory (Bolton, 2014). 
Based on the same reasoning, audit committee ownership is expected to have a 
positive impact on firm performance, which reduces the need for shareholders 
monitoring and thus disclosure. The current study expects a negative effect of 
audit committee stake ownership on the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC 
listed firms.  
H7 There is a negative association between audit committee ownership and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.2 Board of Director Attributes  
4.4.2.1 Board Size 
 The role of the board of directors in monitoring and overseeing the 
management performance is widely recognized in the corporate governance 
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literature. It is argued that as the number of members on the board increases, it 
becomes more difficult for them to communicate and express their opinions to 
reach a consensus regarding important decisions (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). These 
barriers may result in ineffective board performance and so, consequently, low 
firm performance. Accordingly, Yermack (1996) finds an inverse association 
between board size and firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q, indicating that boards 
with a small number of directors are more cohesive and therefore more effective 
in evaluating and monitoring the management, which results in higher firm value 
(Yermack, 1996). The lack of communication and cohesion that usually 
characterizes large decision-making groups makes large boards less likely to be 
involved in strategic decisions including the disclosure policy (Goodstein, Gautam 
and Boeker, 1994). 
 Nonetheless, expanding the size of the board increases the level of diversity 
and expertise as well as the representation of independent directors, which is 
assumed to enhance the corporate governance environment and disclosure 
(Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). It is 
believed that, as the size of the board increases, the directors’ ability to monitor 
the CEO rises until it reaches a threshold (11 members) where the relationship 
becomes negative (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 2000). A greater number of 
directors on the board with multiple perspectives motivates the management to 
provide more voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) find a positive association between board size and voluntary disclosure. A 
similar positive conclusion is drawn in South Africa by Ntim et al. (2012). 
Eventually, board size appears to have an unclear effect on the wellbeing of the 
corporate governance environment; accordingly, this study is motivated to include 
board size to capture any effect on voluntary disclosure. 
H8 There is an association between board size and voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.2.2 Board Independence 
 According to agency theory, shareholders are uninvolved in the management 
of their corporations, and instead delegate such responsibility to a number of 
board members to ensure a close monitoring of the major strategic decisions. 
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Directors own the right to hire, fire, and set the compensation rate of the top level 
decision managers, Therefore, it is expected that the higher the proportion of 
independent directors, who are outside professionals who do not hold a position 
and have no interests in the firm, The greater the effectiveness of the board in 
performing its role of representing the shareholders’ interests and offering more 
information to the public (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The appointment of 
independent directors to the board can serve as a commitment to a transparent 
reporting environment (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). Independent 
directors have incentives effectively to monitor the management and reduce the 
information asymmetry because the value of their human capital mostly depends 
on the performance and transparency of the firm where they hold a membership 
on its board (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In monitoring the management, 
independent directors demand the disclosure of information and reduce the 
withholding of information in order to protect their reputation as shareholders’ 
representatives. Board independence has been largely positively connected to 
voluntary disclosure in disclosure literature (Jaggi, 2000; Ajinkya, Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2005; Babío Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Khaled and Khaled, 2007; Lim, Matolcsy and 
Chow, 2007; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Samaha et al., 2012), suggesting that the 
independent directors’ role of monitoring may extend to the financial reporting 
process. However, the same reason that could motivate independent directors to 
promote more disclosure, which is their reputation, could in other cases encourage 
them to withhold firm’s low performance indicators from being published 
(Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2005). This, in addition to the substitute 
relationship suggested between independent directors and disclosure in 
monitoring, may explain the negative relation found between board independence 
and voluntary disclosure in some studies, such as, Eng and Mak (2003), Barako et 
al (2006), and Gul and Leung (2004). Despite the negative effect of board 
independence on voluntary disclosure found in these studies, on balance, the 
corporate governance literature promotes the positive impact of independent board 
members on firms’ performance and reporting strategies. Thus, the current study 
includes board independence as independent variable and predicts a positive 
association with voluntary disclosure.  
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H9 There is a positive association between board independence and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.2.3 Board Compensation 
 From an agency theory perspective, it is preferable for the board members to 
be compensated in order to motivate them to attend meetings, read materials, 
engage in corporate activities, and take decisions that contribute toward the firm’s 
interests (Payne, Benson and Finegold, 2009). Well-compensated members are 
expected to perform better in terms of their duty of monitoring (Perry, 2000). 
Perry (2000) finds an influential relationship between board compensation and 
board monitoring. He shows that, when directors receive compensation, the 
likelihood of CEO turnover following poor performance increases. In India, a 
positive and significant correlation is also determined between board remuneration 
and different measures of firm performance (Aggarwal and Ghosh, 2015). Since 
board compensation is statistically related to the board’s monitoring function and 
firm performance, it is reasonable to predict more disclosure when the board 
effectiveness increases. More remuneration encourages a desirable level of 
information transparency that is needed for the board members to perform their 
task of monitoring effectively. This study includes board compensation, as 
measured by total cash compensation, as independent variable and predicts a 
positive relationship with voluntary disclosure.  
H10 There is a positive association between Board compensations and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.2.4 Board Meeting and Board Attendance 
 Time is considered a key factor in determining the effectiveness of the board’s 
functioning as a group (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Payne, Benson and Finegold, 
2009). The more frequently the board members meet, the more time they have to 
discuss and evaluate the management behaviors, which consequently results in a 
more successful monitoring role. Board meetings are where the directors exercise 
their responsibility of reviewing the meeting materials, asking questions and 
seeking explanations of problems, understanding the audit and supervisory 
communications, and providing independent judgments (Lin, Yeh and Yang, 
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2014). Payne et al. (2009) provide evidence that boards that spend a large amount 
of time on board-related matters are more effective. However a positive but 
insignificant relationship between board meetings and firm financial performance 
is documented in Pakistani listed firms, suggesting that the effectiveness and the 
quality of board meetings is a more important element in affecting firm 
performance than the number of meetings held (Akram Naseem et al., 2017). In 
addition, higher board monitoring is linked to higher firm value, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). As suggested by agency theory, 
effective monitoring activities promote disclosure and transparency hence, a 
positive relationship is predicted between the monitoring activities represented by 
board meetings and attendance (measured by the number of meetings per year, 
and percentage of the board members’ attendance during the year, respectively) 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
H11 There is a positive association between the number of board meetings and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
H12 There is a positive association between board attendance and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.2.5 Average Board Cross-directorships 
 Empirical research has recognized the importance of directors’ experience and 
knowledge in achieving board effectiveness (Payne, Benson and Finegold, 2009). 
When directors hold more than one membership of several corporate boards, their 
level of expertise increases. They will gain wider experience and knowledge 
related to monitoring the management and safeguarding the shareholders’ 
interests, which will be reflected in the effectiveness of the whole board (Kosnik, 
1987). Sitting on many boards may increase the quantity and quality of that 
information that directors obtain regarding the business environment. Having 
directors with valuable and timely information reduces the transaction cost and 
uncertainty, provides access to opportunities, and strengthens firms’ competitive 
position (Payne, Benson and Finegold, 2009). Board members with other 
directorships are also more likely to perform better in order to preserve their 
reputation in the capital market for being experienced board members (Gul and 
Leung, 2004). In their study, Gul and Leung (2004) use other directorships as a 
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proxy for directors’ experience. In addition, it is suggested that sitting on many 
boards helps to make the information more transparent since directors have greater 
access to information in more than one company, and that reduces the desire for 
confidentiality by companies (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  However, there is also 
research suggesting that the busyness of the board can inversely impact its 
effectiveness in terms of monitoring the management (Ferris, Jagannathan and 
Pritchard, 2003). As a result firm performance suffers when the board is 
dominated by members with multiple directorships (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) provide evidence that boards containing members who 
hold three or more directorships are associated with poor performance and weak 
corporate governance. Another study in the GCC shows that families in family-
controlled firms appoint busy directors to their boards in order to maintain control 
over the minority shareholders (Eulaiwi et al., 2016), suggesting that busy 
directors are less effective in performing their main responsibility of monitoring. 
Accordingly, multiple directorships are expected to have an impact on the board 
effectiveness and corporate governance practice of the firm; therefore, the number 
of other directorships in listed companies is included as an independent variable 
that may impact on the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed firms. 
H13 There is an association between the number of other directorships held by 
the board members and the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
GCC listed firms. 
4.4.2.6 Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee is always viewed as a monitoring mechanism that 
oversees the preparation and communication of financial information and 
enassures the flow of such information to external parties (Forker, 1992; Babío 
Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005). Prior empirical studies have identified a 
positive association between the presence of an audit committee and corporate 
disclosure (Babío Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 
2006; Bader and Waleed, 2010). It is suggested by agency theory that an audit 
committee mitigates the agency costs by reducing the information asymmetry and 
enhancing investor confidence in the financial reporting (Samaha et al., 2012). 
The corporate Governance rules in GCC countries require companies to establish 
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an audit committee containing a minimum of three members; therefore, the current 
study aims to examine the effect of audit committee size, as measured by the 
number of members siting on the committee, on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Although, there is no specific recommended size for an audit committee, it is 
evident that the available resources and expertise provided by the committee 
members largely impact on the effectiveness of the audit committee (Ahmed Haji, 
2015). Hence, it is argued that, the larger the audit committee the more knowledge 
and expertise is available. However, larger groups may have communication 
difficulties that cause delays in the decision-making process and consequently 
threaten the effectiveness of the committee. Some studies show a positive 
relationship between audit committee size, audit quality and disclosure practices 
(Ahmed Haji, 2015; Osariemen et al., 2018). 
H14 There is a positive association between audit committee size and 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms. 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
Along with agency motivations, managers’ disclosure decisions depend solely 
on a costs and benefits evaluation. A trade-off between the benefits of the 
disclosure (including the cost of capital reduction, forecast accuracy, and market 
liquidity) and the costs of disclosure (especially the proprietary costs, and costs of 
producing, certifying and circulating the information) may determine firms’ 
disclosure policies (Farvaque, Refait-Alexandre and Saïdane, 2011). As each firm 
is different regarding the costs and benefits surrounding its disclosure decisions, it 
is expected that the level of voluntary disclosure may vary with firms’ specific 
characteristics beside the corporate governance factors and the type and size of the 
shareholders of the firm (the main independent variables). Therefore, the current 
study tests some control variables based on the prior research on voluntary 
disclosure’s determinants to clarify and explain the variation in the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms.  
Firm size, firm size has been largely and significantly associated with the level 
of disclosure (Cooke, 1992; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). There is a general 
agreement that larger firms have a higher level of disclosure. Several reasons have 
been advanced to explain this positive association. First, larger firms have a higher 
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need for external finance; therefore, potential conflicts of interest among the 
managers, creditors, and shareholders are expected (Inchausti, 1997). Larger firms 
tend to provide more disclosure to overcome this conflict and reduce the cost of 
capital. Second, larger firms are more likely to be in a position to afford the costs 
associated with collecting and disseminating information, since they already 
produce detailed information for internal managerial use (Firth, 1979). Third, 
larger firms’ annual reports receive greater exposure to the public and government 
bodies, which puts them under pressure to disclose more information to avoid 
public criticism or government intervention in their business (Firth, 1979; 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Cooke, 1989b; Raffournier, 1995). The 
higher political costs faced by larger firms lead to a greater level of disclosure 
(Urquiza, Navarro and Trombetta, 2010). In addition, larger firms face less 
proprietary disclosure costs compared to smaller ones. The fuller disclosure by 
smaller firms may put them at a competitive disadvantage compared to the other 
larger firms in their industry (Firth, 1979; Raffournier, 1995). Last but not least, 
larger firms tend to be more complex and have wider ownership structure, which 
resulted in higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leftwich, Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1981). Complexity requires sufficient and sophisticated information 
outputs to meet the managerial needs, and a larger number of shareholders means 
more diversity within the information disclosed to meet their heterogeneous needs. 
Accordingly, agency theory suggests that a higher level of disclosure is associated 
with larger firms. The current study tests for firm size, as measured by total assets, 
as a control variable and expects a positive relationship between firm size and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Audit Firm, the size of the audit firm has been linked to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in many studies (e.g. (McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; 
Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Jalila and Devi, 2012). 
Auditing activities are a corporate governance mechanism that reduces the agency 
costs through mitigating the information asymmetry and management 
opportunistic behaviors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A high quality auditor can 
play a significant role in defining firms’ disclosure and financial reporting policies 
(Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010), where a high quality auditor is typically 
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assumed to be a large audit firm (big-4) that puts its reputation at risk when 
conducting an audit (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). Because they are very 
eager to preserve their reputation as high quality auditors and an effective 
monitoring mechanism, the big-4 firms are likely to encourage their clients to 
disclose a significant amount of information (Hossain and Rahman, 1995). 
Raffournier (1995), Craswell and Tylor (1992), and Jalila and Devi (2012) find a 
positive association between auditor size and the extent of disclosure. Other 
studies fail to find any significant link between audit firm size and voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. (Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Barako, Hancock 
and Izan, 2006; Soliman, 2013). Whether the audit firm is a big-4 or not is 
included in the current study as a control variable and expected to have a positive 
association with voluntary disclosure as predicted by agency theory. 
Leverage, agency costs are higher for firms with more debt in their capital 
structure since the potential wealth transfer is greater from debt-holders to the 
managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mitchell, Chia and Loh, 
1995). Therefore, highly-levered firms are more motivated to provide more 
voluntary disclosure in order to reduce both the agency costs and the cost of debt 
financing (Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). 
Firms satisfy the needs of the current and expected debt-holders, through 
voluntarily disclosing financial information that helps them to assess firms’ 
solvency and reduces the risk associated with uncertainty. The evidence on the 
relation between leverage and disclosure is mixed. While some studies find 
positive relationship (Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Mitchell, Chia and Loh, 1995; 
Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Iatridis, 2008; Payne, Benson and Finegold, 
2009), others find an insignificant one (Craswell and Taylor, 1992; Meek, Roberts 
and Gray, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Mathew, Elsie and 
Joseph, 2007; Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008). The current study proxies for 
leverage with the debt ratio (total liabilities to total assets) and expects a positive 
relationship with voluntary disclosure as reported by agency theory. 
Profitability, profitable firms are more inclined voluntarily to disclose 
information for several possible reasons. According to agency theory, the 
managers of profitable firms are motivated to disclose more information in order 
to signal their performance and obtain personal advantages like the maintenance 
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of their positions, justifications for compensation packages, and the preservation 
of the value of their human capital (Inchausti, 1997; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 
2006). Furthermore, in line with signaling theory, firms with high profitable ratios 
are motivated to extend their level of disclosure to signal their superior 
performance in order to distinguish themselves from the less profitable firms 
through extending their level of disclosure (Inchausti, 1997; Watson, Shrives and 
Marston, 2002; Leventis and Weetman, 2004). More profitable firms also face 
more political costs; hence they tend to disclose more detailed information to 
justify their financial performance and avoid regulatory intervention (Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009). Profitability is found to be positively associated with the level 
of disclosure in some studies (Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002; Iatridis, 2008; 
Soliman, 2013); however, it offers no explanation in regard to disclosure in other 
studies (McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995; 
Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009). Profitability is included in this study as a control variable and 
measured by return on assets ratio (ROA). 
Liquidity, liquidity measures assess a firm’s ability to meet its short-term 
obligations (Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002). In agreement with signaling 
theory, firms with high liquidity have incentives to disclose more information to 
highlight their secure financial positions to current and potential investors. 
However, it has been suggested (Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994) that firms 
characterized by low liquidity may need to disclose more information to explain 
the poor performance as part of their accountability to the annual report users. 
Barako et al. (2006) find no significant relationship between liquidity and the level 
of voluntary disclosure while Wallace et al. (1994) find a negative one. The 
current study includes liquidity, as measured by the current ratio (current assets to 
current liabilities), as a control variable and makes no prediction regarding the 
direction of the relationship since the results of the empirical literature are 
inconclusive. 
Industry Type, it has been suggested that the specific industry influences 
firms’ disclosure practices (Wallace, Naser and Mora, 1994). Different 
characteristics which may relate to accounting treatments, political sensitivity, 
competition, product differentiation, industry structure, country and cultural 
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differences, and historical reasons found in various industries may result in 
different levels of disclosure across different industries (Cooke, 1992; Mitchell, 
Chia and Loh, 1995; Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Therefore, it is expected that 
firms from the same industry may adopt additional disclosure practices to those 
required of firms in all industries. If the firm does not adopt the same disclosure 
strategies as others in the same industry, the lower level of disclosure compared to 
others could be interpreted as an indication that they are concealing bad news 
(Inchausti, 1997; Watson, Shrives and Marston, 2002). Cooke (1992) and 
Raffournier (1995) find that manufacturing companies disclose more information 
than non-manufacturing ones. Meek et al. (1995) provide evidence supporting 
industry influence on disclosure in that companies in the oil, chemical, and mining 
industries provide more non-financial information related to the environment. 
Cooke (1989) finds that trading companies disclose less information than 
companies in the manufacturing, services, and conglomerate industries. In 
addition, Watson et al. (2002) find that companies in the media and utilities 
industries are less likely to disclose their financial ratio than firms in other 
industries, which indicates that although utilities is considered to be a highly 
regulated industry in the UK, they are less likely to provide more information. 
This suggests that companies that are well-regulated feel that they are already 
providing a sufficient amount of information and need no further legitimization. 
Industry effect is also documented in Leventis and Weetman (2004). The current 
study classifies companies in the GCC markets into energy, manufacturing, and 
services and expects a variation in the level of voluntary disclosure that could be 
explained by industry types.  
4.5 Data and Methods used in this Study 
The focus in this study is on the level of voluntary disclosure in six GCC 
countries; namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, 
Oman, and Bahrain. The investigation covers, three years; 2014, 2015, and 2016. The 
majority of voluntary disclosure studies focus on the disclosure practice at one 
specific point of time; examples include Haniffa and Cooke (2002), End and Mak 
(2003), and Ghazali and Weetman (2006). A few studies examine the disclosure over 
period of time, like Barako et al. (2006), and Firth (1980). The current study is 
considered a longitudinal and cotemporary study, uses panel data from the most 
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recent years at the time when the study was conducted in order to capture any 
differences in the level of voluntary disclosure and its categories over time. The next 
section outlines in detail the sample selection and data collection, in addition to the 
research methods relevant to achieving the study objectives. 
4.5.1 Data Collection 
4.5.1.1 Sample Selection 
The sample population in the current study is all non-financial firms listed on 
seven stock exchanges: the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), Kuwait Bourse, Abu 
Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), Dubai Financial Market (DFM), Qatar Stock 
Exchange, Muscat Securities Market, and Bahrain Bourse; comprising 144, 95, 
31,26,27,16, and 17 non-financial listed firms, respectively. Like the majority of 
disclosure studies (Cooke, 1989b; Depoers, 2000; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Rouf and 
Al Harun, 2011), financial firms including banks, insurance companies, and financial 
services institutions are excluded from the study population since they are subject to a 
different set of laws and corporate regulations than that followed by non-financial 
firms; hence their annual reports will not be comparable to those of other companies. 
After eliminating companies that become listed during the period of the study 
between 2014 and 2016, companies with missing annual reports, and companies with 
missing data regarding their ownership structure, the final study sample consists of 
220 listed firms with 660 collected annual reports, as shown in table 5.2. The 
industrial classification for firms is based on Bloomberg’s classification, which 
includes the following sectors: nine energy, 47 materials, 47 industrial, 34 consumer 
discretionary, 25 consumer staples, five healthcare, 15 telecommunication, four 
utilities, 32 real estate, and one information technology. However, due to the small 
number of companies in certain industries, and to obtain more concentrated and 
observable results regarding the effect of industry type, the companies are categorised 
into four different industry groups, nine in energy, 94 in manufacturing, 32 in real 
estate, and 85 in services, as illustrated in table 4.3. 
The study covers the most three recent years at the time when the research was 
conducted; 2014, 2015, and 2016. The reason underlying the choice of this period is 
the recent increased awareness of the role of transparency and good corporate 
governance structure in enhancing the capital market development in the GCC 
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countries in addition to the recent efforts by the capital market authorities to promote 
transparency as a means of attracting foreign investments and gaining a higher market 
classification in the international global indexes. Another reason is the fact that new 
corporate governance codes have been issued in some GCC countries reflecting the 
increasing amount of attention being paid to the role of corporate governance in GCC 
market development. In Oman, a new corporate governance code was issued in 2015 
to replace that of 2002; in Qatar, in 2016, a new corporate governance code was 
issued to replace that of 2009; in 2016, a new corporate governance code was issued 
in the United Arab Emirates to repeal that of 2009; and, in Saudi Arabia, new 
governance rules were issued in 2017 to replace those of 2006. These new codes came 
into force after 2016, which will make a comparison between the levels of voluntary 
disclosure over this period more reasonable; yet, the new tendency toward improving 
the transparency and corporate governance regulations could, to some extent, explain 
the level of voluntary disclosure. 
The six GCC member states were selected to be examined in this thesis; Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain. The 
selection of these countries is because what they have in common concerning cultural 
economic, politics, and religious aspects. The social environment in the GCC is 
characterized by strong family connections and attentiveness to the importance of 
Islamic principles. Their economies are characterized by a high reliance on the oil 
industries; however, there is a new movement toward diversifying the source of 
income. Last but not least, in regard to the corporate sector, the ownership structure 
found in GCC markets is highly concentrated with a dominance of government 
holdings in addition to the restrictions on foreign investments in the capital markets. 
All these common features justify the combination and analysis of these countries in a 
single study. 
4.5.1.2 Collection of the Data 
There are two different sources of data employed in this study. The first one is 
companies’ annual report. Companies in all GCC countries except Kuwait are 
required to submit their annual reports to either the capital market authority or the 
stock exchange in order to check if they meet all of the disclosure and corporate 
governance requirements imposed by the authorities. In Kuwait, however, companies 
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are required to publish their annual report via their websites. Therefore, annual reports 
have been collected from the capital market authority website in Saudi Arabia, the 
securities exchange websites in UAE, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain, and from each 
company website in Kuwait. Annual reports are collected for the purpose of assessing 
the level of voluntary disclosure and to collect data related to the control variables. 
The annual reports used in this study include financial statements, notes to the 
financial statements, auditor reports, and reports by the boards of directors. The 
second source of data is Bloomberg. Data regarding the ownership structure, 
including the type and size of ownership, are collected from Bloomberg Terminal 
since such data are not disclosed in firms’ annual reports in most of the GCC 
countries. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Total Number of Final Investigated Sample 
 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Full Sample 559 559 559 1677 
(-) Financial (233) (233) (233) (699) 
(-) Missing report (97) (97) (97) (291) 
(-) Missing ownership (9) (9) (9) (27) 
Final sample 220 220 220 660 
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Table 4.3 Distribution of the Sample Across GCC Countries and Industry Sectors 
Sector/Country Saudi 
Arabia 
Kuwait UAE Qatar Oman Bahrain Total 
Energy 4 (3.8%) 3 (8.1%) 2 (6.9%) 0 0 0 9 (3.9%) 
Manufacturing 54 (51.4%) 10 (27%) 10 (34.5%) 10 (47.6%) 8 (53.3%) 2 (15.4%) 94 (42.4%) 
Real Estate 9 (8.6%) 14 (37.8%) 5 (17.2%) 4 (19%) 0 0 32 (14%) 
Services 38 (36.1%) 10 (27%) 12 (41.4%) 7 (33.3%) 7 (46.7%) 11 (84.6%) 85 (39.7%) 
Total/Year 105 (100%) 37 (100%) 29 (100%) 21 (100%) 15 (100%) 13 (100%) 220 (100%) 
Total for Three 
Years 
315 (100%) 111 (100%) 87 (100%) 63 (100%) 45 (100%) 39 (100%) 660 (100%) 
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4.5.2 The Variables and Research Instrument 
This section illustrates the variables used in this study and how they were 
measured. The following paragraph presents the research instrument (disclosure 
index) that is used to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure in GCC firms, and 
explains the method of weighing and scoring the index. The rest of the section 
provides definitions of the independents and control variables along with their 
measurements.  
4.5.2.1 Measuring the Level of Voluntary Disclosure 
Disclosure is the process by which information is disseminated to the 
stakeholders; it is the communication of financial and non-financial information to the 
public domain (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011).For the purpose of the current study, 
voluntary disclosure is defined as any information in excess of that required by the 
statutory laws, accounting standards, listing rules, or stock exchange regulations in all 
GCC countries. It is argued that information disclosure cannot be measured directly 
because it is an abstract concept and thus it is difficult to determine its intensity or 
quality (Cooke and Wallace, 1989). It is, therefore, suggested by Cooke and Wallace 
(1989) that, in order to justify any scale chosen to quantify disclosure, one should 
prove the validity and reliability of the measures by specifying the scoring procedures 
and how the numbers and weights are assigned to the empirical properties (disclosure 
items). The following paragraphs are designated to this purpose. 
Based on the literature, the measurement of disclosure in the annual report 
involves two main approaches: disclosure proxies that do not directly examine the 
original disclosure vehicle (such as a disclosure survey, attributes of analysts’ 
forecasts and the number of analysts following the company), and disclosure proxies 
based on examining the original disclosure vehicle (such as content analysis and the 
disclosure index) (Hassan and Marston, 2011).  
The first approach has been criticized as it relies on users, perceptions drawn from 
questionnaires and interviews or from analysts following to determine the quality of 
the disclosure rather than examining the disclosure vehicle themselves. Thus, the 
objectivity of the investigated users is questionable, given that no one knows their 
motivation in providing the ratings (Hassan and Marston, 2011). In addition to the 
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unsuitability, this approach involves a certain context where analysts’ ratings are 
absent as is the case in the GCC. 
The second approach, which involves examining of the original disclosure vehicle 
such as annual report to determine the level of disclosure, is commonly used in 
disclosure studies. The methods employed within this approach include content 
analysis and disclosure indices (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). Content analysis 
converts and codifies qualitative and quantitative information into different groups 
based on specific criteria to create patterns in the presentation and reporting of 
information (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). It can be conceptual analysis, where the 
existence or frequency of key words or concepts within texts is determined or rational 
analysis, in which the relationships among the concepts in a text are examined 
(Hassan and Marston, 2011). This method suffers from some limitations; in addition 
to the labor intensity, time, and effect of the level of knowledge and linguistic ability 
of the coder, it can yield misleading results due to using words or key words in 
isolation of the meaning of the whole sentence or, if certain key words appear more 
than once in the annual report, the score will be higher regardless of the actual 
disclosure quality (Hassan and Marston, 2011; Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). 
Moreover, some automated content analysis software is limited to certain form of files 
or to English text applications only (Hassan and Marston, 2011). 
Another research instrument that examines the targeted disclosure vehicle is the 
disclosure index. An index of disclosure is a list of selected items of information used 
to measure the extent of financial reporting in a particular disclosure vehicle by a 
particular entity (Hassan and Marston, 2011). It could be used to determine the level 
of compliance with certain rules and regulations or to assess the level of voluntary 
disclosure depending on the nature of the disclosure items and whether they are 
required by law or not (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The first use of such an index 
was by Cerf in 1961, and since then, many researchers have followed this method 
(Hassan and Marston, 2011). The persistence in using indices in disclosure studies 
over time indicates their usefulness as a research tool that has provided researchers 
with the expected answers (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
A review of the literature implies that the level of subjectivity varies depending on 
the type of disclosure index used. Some studies use disclosure indices published by 
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professional organizations, such as, the Association of Investment management and 
Research (AIMR) ratings, Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure scores, 
and the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) 
evaluations (Hassan and Marston, 2011; Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). The main 
disadvantage of such indices is that they are not available for all countries and may 
change from time to time (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). Other researchers choose 
to construct their own indices to suit the purpose and context of their studies. Even 
though self-constructed indices are more likely to capture what is intended, they 
involve a subjective judgment on the part of the researcher, which reduces the 
reliability of the index (Healy and Palepu, 2001); also, Cooke and Wallace (1989) 
argue that this method may not be useful in large cross-national studies that involve 
different countries with distinctive economic, social and political systems since the 
index may become irrelevant to some of them. To overcome the subjectivity involved 
in constructing an index and to increase index reliability, some researchers adopt and 
tailor existing indices to meet their own needs (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Using an 
index that have been developed and tested in earlier studies has the advantage of 
increasing index reliability in addition to the ability to compare with previous 
research work (Hassan and Marston, 2011).  
Many researchers adopt a previously developed disclosure index and made some 
modifications to it in order to make it fit with their own perceived context and 
environment. Marston and Shrives (1991, p.198) list some examples, 
“Belkaoui & Kahl (1978) adapted the work of Cerf (1961), Barrett (1976), 
Singhvi & Desai (1971) and Buzby (1975) to construct an index suitable for use 
in the Canadian context. Firer & Meth (1986) adapted the index of Firth (1979) 
to achieve an index relevant to South Africa.”  
For the purpose of measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed 
firms, this study adopts the disclosure index developed by Meek et al. (1995). Many 
studies have either totally or partially relied on the disclosure index developed by 
Meek et al. (1995) (Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Ferguson, Lam and Lee, 2002; Gul 
and Leung, 2004; Leventis and Weetman, 2004; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; 
Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Wang and Claiborne, 
2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013; Scaltrito, 
2016). The choice of this particular index is first derived from its comprehensiveness. 
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It covers three categories of information; strategic and financial information which are 
highly relevant to investors’ needs, and non-financial information which relates to a 
company’s social accountability (Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995). Second, using an 
index that has been tested in previous research increases its validity and reliability, 
which are essential concepts when we aim to measure an object that cannot be 
measured directly (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Hence, it is crucial to assess the reliability and validity of the measurement, which 
is, in this study, the disclosure index. Reliability refers to the consistency of the 
results on repeated trials (Hassan and Marston, 2011). It concerns stability, 
reproducibility, and accuracy; stability is achieved when the same score is replicated 
by the same coder, reproducibility is achieved when different coders reach the same 
score, and accuracy is the extent to which the classification of the data matches 
specific criteria or norms (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). In the current study, 
reliability is achieved by testing for stability. After measuring the voluntary disclosure 
score for the study sample, we randomly choose a number of companies and repeat 
the scoring procedures to obtain the same scores that were achieved in the first 
attempt. Validity on the other hand deals with the strength of the conclusion and 
whether the measuring instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Hassan 
and Marston, 2011). In other words, do the index scores have any meaning as a 
measure of disclosure (Marston and Shrives, 1991)? It has been argued that since 
there is no other popular method to measure disclosure than disclosure indices, the 
scores have been accepted as valid (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). Furthermore, the 
adoption of an index that have been used in other disclosure studies is considered a 
source of validation (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). The validity of the index in the 
current study is obtained from the index’s evident ability to measure the level of 
voluntary disclosure for multinational corporations in the study of Meek et al. (1995). 
4.5.2.2 Voluntary Disclosure Index 
 The first step toward developing a disclosure index is the selection of the items, 
which can be achieved either by reviewing the previous studies in conjunction with 
the disclosure recommendations and legal requirements, or by employing an existing 
index from the literature (Marston and Shrives, 1991). For the purpose of this study, a 
disclosure index that was developed by Meek et al. (1995) is adopted as mentioned 
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earlier. The adopted index consists of 85 items that were selected based on relevant 
research studies, comprehensive surveys, and national disclosure requirement (Meek, 
Roberts and Gray, 1995). With the aim of assessing the level of voluntary disclosure 
in GCC listed firms, we checked the 85 items against the respective rules and 
regulations applicable to all GCC countries, including, company laws, accounting 
standards, listing rules, stock exchange regulations, and corporate governance 
regulations. A voluntary disclosure item is one that is not required in all GCC 
countries during the period of the study. Defining voluntary disclosure in this way, 
even though it eliminates some items that are voluntary in some countries, establishes 
a common scale for all of the countries in the sample. After eliminating items that are 
required by law and items that are voluntary in some countries but mandatory in 
others, the final list consists of 71 items of information. Table 4.4 presents the final 
list of items. The number of items on the index is considered reasonable compared to 
prior voluntary disclosure studies; for examples, an index of 53 items was used to 
assess the level of voluntary disclosure in Malaysia (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006), a checklist of 47 voluntary items was used in Kenya (Barako, Hancock and 
Izan, 2006), an index of 30 items was used in China (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), of 
78 items in Malaysia (Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994), and of 68 voluntary items in 
Bangladesh (Rouf and Al Harun, 2011).   
 The items on the index are categorized into three main groups: strategic, non-
financial, and financial information. They are further classified into 11 subgroups; 
namely, general corporate information, corporate strategy, acquisitions and disposals, 
future prospects, information about directors, employee information, social policy and 
value added information, segmental information, financial review, foreign currency 
information, and stock price information, as shown in table 4.5. The reason for this 
classification is that the variables affecting voluntary disclosure may vary depending 
on the type of information since the decision relevance of the information varies by 
type (Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). For instance, strategic and financial 
information have strong decision relevance to investors while non-financial 
information is related more to other stakeholders like employees and society.  
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Table 4.4 Voluntary Disclosure Index  
Strategic Information 
General Corporate Information 
1. Brief history of company 
2. Organizational structure/chart 
Corporate Strategy 
3. Statement of strategy and objectives – general 
4. Statement of strategy and objectives – financial 
5. Statement of strategy and objectives – marketing 
6. Statement of strategy and objectives – social 
7. Impact of strategy on current results 
8. Impact of strategy on future results 
Acquisitions and Disposals 
9. Reasons for the acquisitions 
10. Effect of acquisition on current results 
11. Effect of acquisition on future results 
12. Reasons for the disposals 
13. Effect of disposal on current results 
Future Prospects 
14. Qualitative forecast of sales 
15. Quantitative forecast of sales 
16. Qualitative forecast of profits 
17. Quantitative forecast of profits 
18. Qualitative forecast of cash flow  
19. Quantitative forecast of cash flow 
20. Assumptions underlying the forecasts 
Nonfinancial Information 
Information about Directors 
21. Age of the directors 
22. Picture of the directors 
23. Educational qualification (academic and professional) 
24. Commercial experience of the executive director 
25. Commercial experience of the non-executive directors 
26. Position or office held by executive directors 
Employee Information 
27. Geographical distribution of employees 
28. Line-of-business distribution of employees 
29. Categories of employees by gender 
30. Number of employees for two or more years 
31. Amount spent on training 
32. Nature of training 
33. Number of employees trained 
34. Safety policy 
35. Data on accidents 
36. Cost of safety measures 
37. Equal opportunity policy statement 
38. Recruitment problems and relate policy 
Social Policy and Value Added Information 
39. Safety of products (general) 
40. Environmental protection programs – quantitative 
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41. Environmental protection program - qualitative 
42. Amount of charitable donation  
43. Community programs (general) 
44. Value added statement 
45. Value added data 
Financial Information 
Segmental Information 
46. Geographical profit – quantitative 
47. Geographical capital expenditures – quantitative 
48. Geographical production – quantitative 
49. Line-of-business production – quantitative 
50. Competitor analysis – qualitative 
51. Competitor analysis – quantitative 
52. Market share analysis – qualitative 
53. Market share analysis – quantitative 
Financial Review 
54. Profitability ratios 
55. Liquidity ratios 
56. Gearing ratios 
57. Advertising information – qualitative 
58. Advertising expenditures – quantitative 
59. Effects of inflation on future operations – qualitative 
60. Effects of inflation on results – qualitative 
61. Effects of inflation on results – quantitative 
Foreign Currency Information 
62. Effect of foreign currency fluctuation on future operations – qualitative 
63. Effect of foreign currency fluctuation on current results – qualitative 
64. Major exchange rates used in the accounts 
65. Long-term debt by currency 
66. Short-term debt by currency  
67. Foreign currency exposure management description  
Stock Price Information 
68. Market capitalization at year end  
69. Market capitalization trend 
70. Size of shareholdings 
71. Type of shareholder 
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Table 4.5 Number of Voluntary Disclosure Items by Category 
Voluntary Disclosure Groups Items Voluntary in All GCC 
Strategic Information 
1. General Corporate Information 
2. Corporate Strategy 
3. Acquisitions and Disposals 
4. Future Prospect Information 
No. 
 2 
 6 
 5 
 7 
% 
 3% 
 8% 
 7% 
 10% 
Non-financial Information 
1. Information about Directors 
2. Employee Information 
3. Social Policy and Value Added Information 
 
 6 
 12 
 7 
 
 8% 
 17% 
 10% 
Financial Information 
1. Segmental Information 
2. Financial Review Information 
3. Foreign Currency Information 
4. Stock Price Information 
 
 8 
 8 
 6 
 4 
 
 11% 
 11% 
 8% 
 6% 
Total  71  100% 
 
The next step in measuring the level of voluntary disclosure is scoring the list of 
items. Previous disclosure studies have used different approaches to score the 
disclosure checklist. A few studies, such as Firth (1979, 1980) and McNally et al 
(1982), have used the weighted approach, in which disclosure items are scored based 
on their relative importance as ranked by a group of annual reports’ users, while the 
majority of disclosure studies, such as Cooke (1989, 1992), Meek et al. (1995), and 
Raffournier (1995), have used the un-weighted approach, in which disclosure items 
are scored 1 if they are present in the annual report and scored 0 otherwise. Following 
the majority of disclosure studies, this study will adopt an un-weighted approach, 
where each item of disclosure is assumed to be equally important. Un-weighted scores 
are used in this study for several reasons. The first, is the subjectivity involved in 
rating the items, which leads to a variation in the level of importance assigned to each 
item among different users groups with different preferences and perceptions (Cooke 
and Wallace, 1989). Second, it is suggested that companies that are better at 
disclosing important items are also better at disclosing less important ones; hence, 
companies should be scored regardless of the level of item importance (Meek, 
Roberts and Gray, 1995). Third, identical results are found by Chow and Wong-Boren 
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(1987) when applying weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987). 
In order to conduct the study, the sample annual reports were thoroughly 
examined and compared to the disclosure index. Each item in every company was 
scored 1 or 0 depending on its presence or absence in the annual report. Then, a total 
voluntary disclosure (TVD) score is calculated for each company in the form of the 
ratio of the actual score awarded to the company divided by the maximum potential 
score that is applicable to that company. Applicability in this context means that 
companies were not penalized for irrelevant items. If the item is absent from the 
annual report because it is inapplicable to the company’s activities, the company 
disclosure score is not affected by this absence.  
TVD = Actual score awarded / Potential applicable score (≤ 71) 
4.5.2.3 Measurement of the Independent and Control Variables  
After identifying the voluntary disclosure score, we follow the literature in 
examining the association between voluntary disclosure and the number of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms. This study is interested in 
assessing the relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure in GCC non-
financial firms through testing six ownership variables; specifically, government 
ownership, family ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, board 
ownership, and audit committee ownership, and seven board attributes including 
board size, board independence, board meetings and attendance, board compensation, 
board cross directorship, and audit committee size. Besides the independent variables, 
a number of control variables are tested in order to identify any potential effect on the 
level of voluntary disclosure. The control variables include firm characteristic factors, 
like firm size, audit firm, leverage, profitability, liquidity, industry type. Table 4.6 
summarizes the definitions and measurements of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables, and table 4.7 illustrates the definitions and measurements of 
the control variables. 
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Table 4.6 Definitions and Measurements of the Dependent and Independent 
Variables 
 
 
                                                        
5 All institutions that are not family, government, or foreign 
6 GCC institutions operating in GCC markets are not considered foreign, so they are excluded 
7 Shares held by members of the board sitting on the audit committee are excluded to avoid double counting 
Variables Definition Measurement 
Dependent 
VDT 
VDS 
VDNF 
VDF 
 
Total voluntary 
disclosure 
Strategic voluntary 
disclosure 
Non-financial 
voluntary disclosure 
Financial voluntary 
disclosure 
 
The ratio of total score awarded to the maximum potential score 
The ratio of the total score of strategic information disclosed to 
the maximum potential score 
The ratio of the total score of non-financial information disclosed 
to the maximum potential score 
The ratio of the total score of financial information disclosed to 
the maximum potential score 
GOVOWN Government ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by the government to the total 
shares issued 
FAMILOWN Family ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by family members to the total 
shares issued in family firms 
INSTOWN5 Institutional ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors to the 
total shares issued 
FOROWN6 Foreign ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by foreign investors to the total 
shares issued 
BOWN Board ownership 
The percentage of shares owned by all board members (executive 
and non-executive) to the total shares issued 
AUDOWN7 
Audit committee 
ownership 
Percentage of shares held by the audit committee members to the 
total shares issued 
BSIZE Board size Number of members on the board of directors 
BIND Board independence 
The percentage of independent directors as classified by the firm 
to the total number of directors on the board 
BCOMP Board compensations 
The natural logarithm of total cash compensation awarded to all 
board members during the year 
BMEET Board meetings Number of board meetings during the year 
BATTEND Board attendance 
Percentage of total board members’ attendance during the year to 
the multiplication of board meetings and number of board 
members 
DIRECTORSHIP Cross-directorship 
Average number of other directorships held by the board 
members 
AUDSIZE Audit committee size Number of members on the audit committee 
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Table 4.7 Definitions and Measurement of the Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Definition Measurement 
FIRMSIZE Firm size Measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
AUDFIRM Audit firm 
Dummy variable when the audit firm is a “big four” (1) and (0) 
otherwise 
ROA Profitability Return on assets= net income/total assets 
LEVER Leverage Debt ratio= total debt/total assets 
LIQUID Liquidity Current ratio= current assets/current liabilities 
IND1 
IND2 
IND3 
IND4 
Industry type 
Energy industry firm, dummy variable for energy firm (1) and (0) 
otherwise 
Manufacturing industry firm, dummy variable for manufacturing (1) 
and (0) otherwise 
Services industry firm, dummy variable for services (1) and (0) 
otherwise 
Real estate industry firm, dummy variable for real estate (1) and (0) 
otherwise 
2014 
2015 
2016 
Years (2014,2015,and 
2016) 
Dummy variable coded (1) for the year 2014 and (0) otherwise 
Dummy variable coded (1) for the year 2015 and (0) otherwise 
Dummy variable coded (1) for the year 2016 and (0) otherwise 
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4.5.3 Statistical Analysis and Tests 
Studies that aim to establish a relationship between disclosure and other firm 
characteristics and corporate governance factors mostly perform parametric tests, 
specifically multiple linear regression (Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). Yet, some 
studies combine both parametric and non-parametric tests to investigate the 
association between disclosure and a number of independent variables. Therefore, to 
test the hypotheses in this study both univariate and multivariate techniques are used 
following a number of disclosure studies (Cooke, 1989b; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; 
Hossain, Tan and Adams, 1994; Depoers, 2000; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; 
Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). 
4.5.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
Bivariate analysis is used to examine the relation between each single independent 
variable and the dependent variable (Collis and Hussey, 2009). In the current study 
two types of univariate analysis are applied: descriptive analysis for the dependent 
variable and independent variables, which include the mean, median, minimum, 
maximum, and standard deviation, in addition to correlation analysis; namely, the 
Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient. The descriptive statistics are employed 
to provide important figures regarding the dependent variable (voluntary disclosure) 
and its items and categories plus the independent and control variable. The correlation 
tests are applied to investigate the strength and the significance of the relationship 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure as a dependent variable and each of the 
independent and control variable. SPSS software (version 25) is used to carry out the 
univariate tests.  
4.5.3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Multivariate analysis is applied to several variables simultaneously. It tests the 
linear relationship between a single (dependent variable) and a combined set of 
variables (Collis and Hussey, 2009). A multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model has been used frequently in many previous disclosure studies to assess the 
influence of specific corporate characteristics on the level of disclosure (Lutfi, 1989; 
Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003; Alsaeed, 2006; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007). Therefore, an OLS regression model is used in this study to test the 
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simultaneous effect of six ownership variables (government ownership, family 
ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, board ownership, and audit 
committee ownership), seven board attributes variables (board size, board 
independence, board meetings, board attendance, board compensation, cross-
directorship, and audit committee size), and a number of control variables (firm size, 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, and industry type) on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The objective is to identify which of these variables could explain the 
variation in the level of voluntary disclosure found in GCC listed firms. SPSS 
software (version 25) is used to perform the multivariate tests. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The chapter discusses the research philosophy, approach, and empirical methods. 
Philosophically, the study is placed in the functionalist paradigm with an objective 
approach to society; hence, the deductive approach and quantitative methods are 
considered to be especially suitable for the current study. 
This chapter goes on to outline the theoretical framework used to address the 
research questions that are related to the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed 
firms. It illustrates the connection between agency theory and ownership structure as a 
corporate governance mechanism and how agency theory provides a good fit for 
studying the relationship between ownership structure, board attributes and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
The chapter proceeds to develop 14 testable hypotheses related to ownership types 
and board attributes in addition to explain, the potential effects of a number of control 
variables that have been identified in earlier studies as having an impact on the extent 
of voluntary disclosure.  
The chapter continues to explain the data collection procedures and justify the 
methods employed to measure the level of voluntary disclosure, beginning by 
developing and scoring the disclosure index and ending by calculating the voluntary 
disclosure score. It also provides measurements of the independent and control 
variables. 
Finally, this chapter briefly describes the statistical tools (univariate and 
multivariate analysis) used to test the research hypotheses. 
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Chapter 5: Ownership Structure, Board attributes and 
Voluntary Disclosure in GCC Listed firms- Empirical 
Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to investigate the influence of ownership structure and board 
composition on the extent of voluntary disclosure provided by GCC listed firms. The 
chapter begins by presenting the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the 
empirical analysis. The descriptive analysis includes a detailed analysis of the 
dependent variable, voluntary disclosure score, based on its information categories, 
six different countries, four industry groups, and three corresponding years. It also 
includes a comprehensive analysis of the independent and control variables across the 
overall sample. The chapter then outlines the result of the correlation matrix showing 
the Pearson correlation between all variables in the study. This helps not only to 
examine the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the explanatory variables, 
but also to identify any associations among the independent variables and any 
multicollinearity issues. The chapter then provides the results of a multivariate 
regression analysis that tests the hypotheses listed in the previous chapter. The 
multivariate analysis consists of four regression models to investigate the impact of 
ownership structure and board attributes on the level of total voluntary disclosure and 
its three components; strategic, non-financial, and financial voluntary disclosure. The 
multivariate analysis is followed up by a comparative analysis of big and small firms. 
This includes the independent sample t-tests, which compares the mean and mean 
rank values of the study’s variables between large and small firms as well as 
undertaking a multivariate regression analysis of both of these different sets of 
samples. The comparison between large and small firms is motivated by the 
significant effect of firm size that is found in the majority of disclosure studies. 
Finally, the chapter ends with a summary of the empirical analysis. 
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1 Total Voluntary Disclosure (the Dependent Variable) 
In order to measure the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed firms, a 
disclosure index is employed consisting of 71 Items classified into three main groups 
(strategic, non-financial, and financial information), with 20, 25, and 26 items in each 
group, respectively. The index is an adaptation of that created by Meek et al. (1995), 
which is considered a cornerstone index that is employed by a significant number of 
disclosure studies (Hossain and Rahman, 1995; Ferguson, Lam and Lee, 2002; Gul 
and Leung, 2004; Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010; 
Qu, Leung and Cooper, 2013; Scaltrito, 2016). The multiple use of the index in the 
disclosure literature adds to its validity. To further support our discussion on index 
validity and reliability presented in chapter four, in this chapter an assessment of the 
index reliability is provided in tables 5.1 and 5.2 by examining the internal 
consistency between total voluntary disclosure scores and the different disclosure 
groups through conducting a Pearson correlation analysis of total voluntary disclosure 
and its categories (Abdel-Fattah, 2009; Alotaibi, 2014), in addition to a Cronbach’s 
alpha test (Bonett and Wright, 2015). The results show that all three main categories 
are highly and significantly correlated at the 1% level with the total voluntary 
disclosure, which means that the total voluntary disclosure, and its groups have high 
internal consistency reliability. The correlation among the groups themselves is also 
significant. Similarly, table 5.1 illustrates that all 11 sub-groups are highly correlated 
with the total voluntary disclosure scores except for the future prospect (FP), which 
does not correlate significantly with voluntary disclosure. This may be caused by the 
tremendously low disclosure of future prospects documented in GCC firms at an 
average of 1 per cent. In addition, table 5.2 presents the result of the Cronbach’s alpha 
test, which indicates the reliability of the subgroups. The high and significant 
correlation coefficient between total voluntary disclosure and its main and sub-groups 
indicates how well the disclosure instrument interprets the total voluntary scores. As a 
result, the validity and reliability of the voluntary disclosure index are confirmed 
which supports the validity and reliability of the statistical results presented in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
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Table 5.1 Correlation analysis of VDT score and its main groups 
Pearson correlation VDT VDS VDNF VDF 
VDT 1    
VDS .465** 1   
VDNF .887** .286** 1  
VDF .795** .215** .477** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Where: VDT is the level of total voluntary disclosure, VDS the strategic voluntary disclosure, VDNF 
the non-financial voluntary disclosure, and VDF the financial voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table 5.2 Reliability test for the voluntary disclosure sub-groups 
 VDT sub-group Pearson correlation 
Cronbatch’s alpha 
Alpha if group 
deleted 
GCI .382** 
0.60 
0.509 
CS .401** 0.552 
AD .210* 0.594 
FP .138 0.610 
ID .633** 0.534 
EI .500** 0.597 
SPV .641** 0.545 
SI .384** 0.596 
FR .329** 0.596 
FCI .173** 0.610 
SPI .654** 0.501 
   
     
 **. Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
   *. Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
Where: VDT is the level of total voluntary disclosure, GCI the general corporate information, CS 
the corporate strategy, AD the acquisitions and disposals, FP the future prospects, ID the information 
about the directors, EI the employee information, SPV the social policy and value added information, 
SI the segmental information, FR the financial review, FCI the foreign currency information, and SPI 
the stock price information.  
 
The disclosure index is used to analyse 660 annual reports for the years 2014, 
2015, and 2016 in four different industries and six GCC countries. The next section 
provides a descriptive analysis of voluntary disclosure and its categories.  
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain descriptive statistics regarding the level of voluntary 
disclosure and its groups across the whole sample and for each country separately. 
The mean of total voluntary disclosure is 12 per cent across the study sample with a 
range from as low as 3 per cent up to a maximum of 36 per cent. The mean of the 
strategic and non-financial voluntary disclosure is 13 per cent with a minimum of zero 
per cent and a maximum of 29 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively. The level of 
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financial voluntary disclosure is slightly less than that of the other two groups with a 
mean of 12 per cent and ranging from zero per cent to a maximum of 39 per cent. The 
level of total voluntary disclosure is considered to be very low compared to that found 
in previous studies conducted in GCC countries or other developing environments; for 
example, the level of voluntary disclosure is found to be 41.85 per cent in UAE 
companies and 31.73 per cent in Saudi companies with an average of 36 per cent for 
the whole sample in a study that compares the level of voluntary disclosure between 
two GCC countries (Al-Janadi, Rahman and Omar, 2012). In other studies in Saudi 
Arabia, the voluntary disclosure score has a mean of 32.3 per cent (Al-Razeen and 
Karbhari, 2004) and 33 per cent (Alsaeed, 2006). The result of a third study shows a 
mean of 44.61 per cent for the voluntary disclosure of Saudi corporate governance 
code recommendations (Al-Bassam et al., 2015). Furthermore, in Qatar, the average 
voluntary disclosure is documented to be 37 per cent (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). 
In Kuwait, the mean of voluntary disclosure is found to be 19 per cent (Al-Shammari 
and Al-Sultan, 2010) and 12.90 per cent in another study (Alotaibi, 2014). The mean 
of voluntary disclosure in this study is also lower than that recognized in developing 
countries, such as 31 per cent in Egypt (Abdel-Fattah, 2009), 37 per cent in Greece 
(Leventis and Weetman, 2004), and 31 per cent in Malaysia (Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006). 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for the voluntary disclosure across the GCC 
Firms  
All Countries (N=660) Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std.Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Total voluntary disclosure 0.03 0.36 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.77 0.42 
Strategic  0.00 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.47 0.07 
Non-financial  0.00 0.56 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.75 0.45 
Financial  0.00 0.39 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.95 0.52 
  
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics for the total voluntary disclosure by the GCC 
countries 
Country N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std.Deviation 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) 315 0.03 0.35 0.12 0.11 0.06 
Kuwait (KU) 111 0.03 0.24 0.08 0.08 0.04 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 87 0.10 0.36 0.20 0.20 0.05 
Oman (OM) 45 0.06 0.20 0.13 0.14 0.04 
Qatar (QA) 63 0.03 0.24 0.12 0.11 0.05 
Bahrain (BH) 39 0.08 0.29 0.13 0.11 0.06 
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The mean of the voluntary disclosure by country is presented in Table 5.4. The 
highest mean voluntary disclosure is by UAE firms (0.20), followed by Oman and 
Bahrain (0.13), then Saudi Arabia and Qatar (0.12), and lastly Kuwait (0.08). 
Noticeably, the mean for voluntary disclosure in each country and the sequence of 
countries by level of voluntary disclosure are significantly different from the prior 
work in this area, such as Boshnak (2017). The only similarity is regarding Kuwait 
that has the lowest voluntary disclosure level on both studies. 
The number and nature of the disclosure items, the type and size of the study 
sample, and the time when the study was conducted are essential factors that can 
explain the significant difference in the level of voluntary disclosure across studies. 
Samaha et al. (2015) show that the type and measure of disclosure, the proxies used to 
measure the explanatory variables, and the research settings affect the results in the 
disclosure literature.  
The disclosure indices are a commonly used instrument comprising of a number of 
items that when scored, provide a measure of the level of disclosure. Consequently, 
when different indices are used, the comparability between the studies is impaired 
(Kavitha and Nandagopal, 2011). Also, the selection and scoring of the disclosure 
items considerably impact the level of disclosure measured. For instance, in the study 
of Al-Janadi et al. (2012), they used an index consisting of only 22 items that were 
scored based on a three level scale (2, 1, 0) instead of the two level scale (1, 0) 
commonly found in the literature. Similarly, the respective studies of Al-Razeen et al. 
(2004) and the study of Alsaeed (2006) use disclosure indices containing only 15 and 
20 voluntary items, respectively. The study of Al-Bassam et al. (2015) focuses on 
measuring the level of voluntary compliance with the Saudi corporate governance 
code, compliance with which was intended to be mostly voluntary at that time; 
therefore, their disclosure index is solely derived from the corporate governance code 
provisions.  
Moreover, the study sample has an important role in forming the study results. 
The sample in the study of Abdel-Fattah (2009) consists of 64 most active companies, 
listed in two Egyptian stock markets, according to their trading value. Likewise, the 
sample in the study of Boshnak (2017) consists of only the top 20 listed firms selected 
by the highest market weight compared to the sample of this study that includes all 
  155 
listed companies, so comparing the level of voluntary disclosure is considered 
irrational between the two studies. Similarly, the time in which the study is conducted 
also affects the study results. For instant, the low level of voluntary disclosure in this 
study could be explained by the recent move toward better corporate governance and 
transparency witnessed in the GCC countries, which led some countries to issue new 
corporate governance codes that enhance the transparency and disclosure 
requirements. This new law made it mandatory to disclose items which were 
previously disclosed voluntarily, leaving corporations with a bigger challenge to 
increase their disclosure beyond what is obligatory by law. The results of this study 
indicate the low level of voluntary disclosure in the GCC countries and focus on 
identifying the factors that enhance the level of disclosure in excess of what is 
mandatory by law. 
Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the total voluntary disclosure and 
its groups, country and year wise. Total voluntary disclosure by year suggests a trend 
toward more disclosure across countries. In 2014, the voluntary disclosure score in 
Saudi Arabia was 11 per cent, which increased to 12 per cent in 2016. In Kuwait, it 
increased from 8 per cent to 10 per cent, and in the UAE from 19 per cent to 21 per 
cent. Similarly in Bahrain, it rose from 13 per cent to 14 per cent. However, in Oman 
and Qatar, the voluntary disclosure score remains the same over the three years. The 
move toward more disclosure over time is also captured in the study of Boshnak 
(2017), which shows an increase in the voluntary disclosure between 2010 and 2013 
for all GCC countries except Kuwait and Qatar. Although Qatar shows no 
improvement over the years in both studies, Kuwait’s voluntary disclosure score 
increased by 2 per cent between 2014 and 2016 in the current study. 
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Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics for voluntary disclosure by country and year 
Voluntary Disclosure KSA KU UAE OM QA BH 
 
 
Total voluntary disclosure 
Year Mean 
% 
Year Mean 
% 
Year Mean 
% 
Year Mean 
% 
Year Mean 
% 
Year Mean 
% 
2014 11% 2014 8% 2014 19% 2014 13% 2014 12% 2014 13% 
2015 12% 2015 7% 2015 21% 2015 13% 2015 12% 2015 13% 
2016 12% 2016 10% 2016 21% 2016 13% 2016 12% 2016 14% 
Strategic 2014 13% 2014 11% 2014 11% 2014 9% 2014 12% 2014 12% 
2015 14% 2015 11% 2015 15% 2015 10% 2015 12% 2015 13% 
2016 14% 2016 11% 2016 16% 2016 9% 2016 11% 2016 14% 
Non-financial 2014 10% 2014 6% 2014 21% 2014 16% 2014 12% 2014 15% 
2015 12% 2015 5% 2015 21% 2015 15% 2015 13% 2015 15% 
2016 12% 2016 11% 2016 22% 2016 17% 2016 13% 2016 15% 
Financial 2014 10% 2014 8% 2014 23% 2014 12% 2014 11% 2014 12% 
2015 11% 2015 7% 2015 23% 2015 13% 2015 12% 2015 12% 
2016 11% 2016 8% 2016 23% 2016 12% 2016 12% 2016 12% 
Where: KSA is Saudi Arabia, KU Kuwait, UAE United Arab Emirates, OM Oman, QA Qatar, and 
BH Bahrain.  
In addition, table 5.6 illustrates further how voluntary disclosure has increased 
over the three-year period through examining the frequency distribution of the total 
voluntary disclosure (VDT) score for the total sample and for each year individually. 
In 2014, 204 out of the 220 companies (representing 92.7%) disclosed 20 per cent or 
less of the voluntary items; notably, this number decreased to 190 out of the 220 
companies (representing 86.3%) in 2016 since more companies have moved toward 
providing more voluntary disclosure. In 2016, 30 companies (representing 13.63%) 
engage in more than 20 per cent of voluntary disclosure compared to 25 companies 
(representing 11.36%) and 16 companies (representing 7.27%) in 2015 and 2014, 
respectively. Although the frequencies of the disclosure scores shows the low level of 
voluntary disclosure in the GCC countries since all sample companies voluntarily 
provide disclosure at less than 50 per cent, table 5.6 shows the increase in voluntary 
disclosure over these three years. That may indicate the recent attention paid to better 
corporate governance practices in the GCC stock markets. 
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Table 5.6 The frequency of voluntary disclosure score (VDT) by year 
VDT Pooled 2014 2015 2016 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
<0.04 29 4.4 10 4.5 11 5.0 8 3.6 
0.05-0.10 222 33.6 83 37.7 75 34.1 64 29.1 
0.11-0.20 338 51.2 111 50.5 109 49.5 118 53.6 
0.21-0.30 66 10.0 15 6.8 23 10.5 28 12.7 
0.31-0.40 5 0.8 1 0.5 2 0.9 2 0.9 
>0.40 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Total 660 100 220 100 220 100 220 100 
 
5.2.1.1 The Extent and Trend of the Voluntary Disclosure Categories 
Regarding the voluntary disclosure groups, the mean of each group also increases 
over the three years period, as shown in table 5.5. Strategic voluntary disclosure 
increased in 2016 by 1 per cent compared with 2014 in Saudi Arabia whereas, in the 
UAE, it increased by 5 per cent, and in Bahrain by 2 per cent. However, it remained 
the same in Kuwait and Oman and decreased by 1 per cent in Qatar. Non-financial 
voluntary disclosure significantly increased over the three years in all countries except 
for Bahrain, where it remained unchanged. Kuwait made the most improvement, since 
it increased by 5 per cent, while Saudi Arabia increased by 2 per cent, and the UAE, 
Oman, and Qatar by 1 per cent between 2014 and 2016. Finally, financial voluntary 
disclosure shows an increase only in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, indicating that the 
disclosure of financial information underwent a slight improvement compared to the 
other groups of disclosure. Financial information has been documented as being the 
least affected by market pressure for more disclosure compared to strategic and non-
financial information, despite its high relevance to investors’ needs (Gray, Meek and 
Roberts, 1995). This may be due to an unwillingness to disclose financial information 
that companies believe to be sensitive and has a high proprietary cost such as profit 
forecast, cash flow information, and the rate of return (McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 
1982). 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 shed more light on the voluntary disclosure sub-groups within 
the main three components; strategic, non-financial, and financial voluntary 
disclosure. The mean of voluntary disclosure varies widely across the groups, from as 
low as 1 per cent for future prospect information to a maximum of 55 per cent for 
general corporate information.  
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Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics for the voluntary disclosure sub-groups 
Group of voluntary disclosure Number 
of items 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation 
Strategic information           
General corporate information 2 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.17 
Corporate strategy 6 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.29 
Acquisitions and disposals 5 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.29 
Future prospects 7 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.04 
Non-financial information      
Information about directors 6 0.00 0.83 0.20 0.25 
Employee information 12 0.00 0.50 0.07 0.10 
Social policy and value added information 7 0.00 0.86 0.14 0.13 
Financial information      
Segmental information 8 0.00 0.50 0.06 0.08 
Financial review 8 0.00 0.38 0.03 0.09 
Foreign currency information 6 0.00 0.50 0.24 0.11 
Stock price information 4 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.34 
 
It can be seen from table 5.8 that there is an increase in each category over the 
three years with a gradual variation in the increasing level among the categories. For 
example, while corporate strategy increased by 8 per cent, from 30 per cent in 2014 to 
38 per cent in 2016, and information about directors moved from 18 per cent in 2014 
to 23 per cent in 2016, employee information and financial review disclosure 
improved by only 1 per cent. However, the order of the categories is similar in each 
year. General corporate information is the highest in all years followed by corporate 
strategy, then, foreign currency information and stock price information at an equal 
level of disclosure, information about directors, social policy and value added 
information, segmental information, financial review, and finally future prospects. 
Yet, the acquisitions and disposals category, occupied second place in 2014 and third 
place in both 2015 and 2016. That might be attributed to the applicability of the items 
in this category to each company rather than to a change in the disclosure level. 2014 
may have more acquisitions and disposals events than the other two years, which 
could explain the decrease in the disclosure mean of this group. The consistency of 
the order of voluntary disclosure categories over the years suggests a disclosure 
policy adopted by GCC firms that focuses on voluntarily disclosing one type of 
information and minimally disclosing or completely ignoring other information 
groups. This provides an opportunity for the stock market regulators in the GCC 
countries to motivate transparency and disclosure practice and required more 
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disclosure especially in the most neglected information categories like future 
prospects and financial review while continuing to encourage companies to keep up 
and even provide more information in the moderate disclosed categories such as 
general corporate and corporate strategy information. 
Table 5.8 Voluntary disclosure sub-groups over the three years 
Voluntary disclosure sub-groups Mean % 
2014 2015 2016 
Strategic information       
General corporate information 52 57 57 
Corporate strategy 30 37 38 
Acquisitions and disposals 38 32 36 
Future prospects 1 1 1 
Non-financial information    
Information about directors 18 19 23 
Employee information 7 8 8 
Social policy and value added information 13 14 16 
Financial information    
Segmental information 5 5 6 
Financial review 3 3 4 
Foreign currency information 23 24 24 
Stock price information 23 24 24 
 
To further understand the disclosure policy applied by GCC firms, it may be 
helpful to examine the trend of disclosure over the years in each category. For the 
highest means in the index, General corporate and corporate strategy 
information, the two groups combined consist of eight items that have a general 
nature aiming to give a broad picture of the company, its history, organizational 
structure, and strategy and objectives. The average of the general corporate 
information is 52 per cent in 2014, and 57 per cent in 2015 and 2016; while the 
average score for strategic information is 30 per cent in 2014, 37 per cent in 2015, and 
38 per cent in 2016. Both groups range from a minimum of zero per cent to a 
maximum of 100 per cent. The mean is considered to be acceptable when compared 
to earlier studies, such as Al-Janadi et al. (2012), who use seven items of general and 
financial information and find a mean of 44.89 per cent for the overall sample 
(52.25% in the UAE, 39.56% in Saudi Arabia). Abdel-Fattah (2009) who uses seven 
items of general information in Egypt and finds an average of 41 per cent during the 
period between 2003 and 2006; and Alotaibi (2014) who uses ten general information 
items in Kuwait and finds a mean of 48 per cent over the years from 2007 to 2010; 
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however, Boshnak (2017) finds a higher average of 67 per cent in the GCC when he 
uses ten items of general information. The simple and general nature of the 
information in this category justifies the moderate level of disclosure for such 
information. While the general information is essential for stakeholders to first attract 
them to specific corporations initially, it is easy to obtain and has a low processing 
cost, which makes disclosing it favorable from the firm standpoint. In addition, this 
type of information is not sensitive since it gives a brief description of firms’ 
corporate structures and their strategies without declaring any detailed information 
that might jeopardize their competitive position. The GCC country with the highest 
mean of voluntary disclosure level in general corporate information group is the UAE 
(77%), followed by Bahrain (58%), Qatar (57%), Oman (53%), Saudi Arabia (52%), 
and finally Kuwait (50%). In the corporate strategy group, the highest voluntary 
disclosure mean is found in UAE (47%), followed by Bahrain (41%), Saudi Arabia 
(38%), Qatar (36%), Kuwait (25%), and finally Oman (17%). 
In the acquisitions and disposals group, which consists of five items, the 
voluntary disclosure score varies from a minimum of zero per cent to a maximum of 
100 per cent with a mean of 38 per cent in 2014, 32 per cent in 2015, and 36 per cent 
in 2016. The decreasing tendency observed here is most likely due to the applicability 
of the item to the company under investigation. Because the disclosure of such 
information is linked to the occurrence of an event of acquisition or disposal, the 
voluntary score may vary across the years depending on the frequency of such events. 
Items within this category focus on the reasons for the acquisitions and disposals and 
their effects on the current and future results. The mean of this group is acceptable 
taking into account its ranking as the third highest group in the whole index. 
Managers may perceive such information as a sign of a positive future growth, which 
may motivate them to communicate the information with their shareholders in order 
to signal their effective and productive decisions. This theory is supported by the 
result of this study since the number of companies disclosing the “reasons for the 
acquisitions” item is 50% more than the number of companies disclosing the “reasons 
for the disposals” item suggesting that the management may view acquisitions as a 
positive indication of the company’s current and future financial position. The highest 
voluntary disclosure mean in this group is found in Bahrain (58%), followed by Saudi 
Arabia (38%), the UAE (37%), Kuwait and Oman (33%), and finally Qatar (18%). 
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The lowest voluntary disclosure mean among all of sub-categories is 1 per cent for 
the future prospects group. Seven items in the group represent both the qualitative 
and quantitative forecasts of sales, profits, cash flow, and any assumptions underlying 
the forecasts. Although extremely low, the nominal mean of this group was 
predictable in the context of GCC as Middle Eastern countries where a secretive and 
conservative culture predominates (Abdel-Fattah, 2009). The avoidance of disclosing 
future forecasts by the management may be accredited to their level of conservatism 
in dealing with sensitive information that could benefit their competitors at the 
expense of their interests, or to their concerns about losing their credibility when 
forecast information turns to be inaccurate or significantly diverges from the actual 
results. The remarkably low disclosure of forecast information documented in the 
GCC markets necessitates intervention by corporate and accounting regulators to 
require more disclosure and ensure the minimum level of future prospects information 
that is deemed important in forming investor decisions. The Future prospect category 
is also found to have the lowest mean in previous studies, such as that by Boshnak 
(2017) who finds a mean of 7 per cent in GCC listed firms. Future information is also 
ranked the lowest in Egypt by Abdel-Fattah (2009) with an average of 14.58 per cent. 
The voluntary disclosure mean for this group is 2 per cent in Saudi Arabia, 1 per cent 
in Oman, and zero per cent in the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain. 
The voluntary disclosure score in the group of information about directors 
varies widely, between zero per cent to a maximum of 83 per cent with an average 
score of 20 per cent for the whole sample. The mean increased from 18 per cent in 
2014 to 19 per cent in 2015, and then to 23 per cent in 2016. The increase between 
2014 and 2016 implies that firms listed in the GCC markets have recently realized the 
importance of sharing their directors’ information as a mean of assuring investors that 
their interests are being looked after by a qualified team of directors. However, the 
mean is still considered low, which leaves room for market regulators to promote the 
importance of such information to investors and other stakeholders considering that 
the board of directors is their main tool for managing their interests and investments. 
Items within this group concern information about the directors’ age and photos, 
educational qualifications and commercial experience, as well as their positions in the 
case of executive directors. The mean is comparable to what was found by Abdel-
Fattah (2009) in Egypt, which was a mean of 21 per cent in the corporate governance 
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disclosure group that consists of eight items. In Kuwait, Alotaibi (2014) finds a mean 
of 26 per cent for the board of directors and management group. The highest average 
voluntary disclosure for this group is in the UAE (49%), followed by Qatar (38%), 
Bahrain (36%), Oman (27%), Kuwait (16%), and finally Saudi Arabia (8%). 
In the employee information group, the mean voluntary disclosure score is low at 
7 per cent, with a minimum of zero per cent and a maximum of 50 per cent. The mean 
increases by only 1 per cent over the years from 2014 to 2016 as shown in table 5.8. 
This group contains 12 items about employees, such as their number, gender, 
geographical distribution, the nature and cost of their training, the safety policy, and 
any recruitment problems. The mean in this study is similar to that found by Alotaibi 
(2014) in Kuwait, who documents a 7.72 per cent as the average of the employee 
information group that consists of seven items. Boshnak (2017) also finds a low 
average for employee information, at 17 per cent, in GCC firms. The items in this 
category give stakeholders and investors a conception of the employees’ level of 
qualifications and professionalism, as well as an idea of how eager the management is 
to empower its staff by offering a well-structured training plan and safety policy. 
Thus, GCC firms need to pay more attention to this group of information in order to 
build the shareholders’ confidence in firms’ employees. The highest level of 
voluntary disclosure in this category is in Saudi Arabia and Oman (11%), followed by 
the UAE and Bahrain (5%), and finally Kuwait and Qatar (3%). 
The final category of non-financial information is social policy and value added 
information, which consists of seven items and has a mean score of 14 per cent that 
varies between zero per cent and a maximum of 86 per cent. The information in this 
group includes firms’ policy toward the safety of products, environmental protection, 
community programs, and value added information. Compared to the other groups of 
information, the social policy and value added group shows a decent level of increase 
over the three years, rising from 13 per cent in 2014 to 16 per cent in 2016. This 
reveals the increasing awareness of such information over the years. Nonetheless, the 
mean in this study is lower than that documented by both Boshnak (2017) who uses 
seven items for the social policy and value added group in GCC firms and finds an 
average voluntary disclosure of 23 per cent, and Alotaibi (2014) in Kuwait who uses 
six social policy and value added items and finds a score of 18 per cent. In general, 
the mean voluntary disclosure for social policy and value added information 
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recognized in GCC countries’ studies reflects the low awareness of such information 
in the process of promoting the transparency and disclosure practices recently 
observed in the GCC stock markets. The sophisticated nature of such information may 
explain why the GCC firms pay less attention to information regarding economic and 
social development since they are in the early stages of endorsing transparency and 
disclosure; therefore, they concentrate their efforts toward increasing the disclosure of 
a more basic type of information, especially corporate governance information, which 
is the main focus of the market regulators. On the other hand, the low disclosure in 
this group may be attributed to the difficulty of assessing if a particular item is 
applicable to the company such as “amount of charitable donation”. It is hard to 
evaluate the absence of such items as indicating whether no donations have occurred 
or whether the management simply thinks that there is no benefit of such disclosure 
(Leventis, 2001). The highest voluntary disclosure mean is found in the UAE (27%), 
followed by Oman (15%), Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (14%), and finally Kuwait and 
Qatar (8%).  
Segmental information, the first group in the financial category information, 
consists of eight items that concern information about the geographical distribution of 
profit, capital expenditure and production, in addition to information about competitor 
analysis and market share analysis. The average voluntary disclosure in this group is 
low at 6 per cent, with a very slight increase from 2014 (5%) to 2016 (6%). The 
maximum score found in this group is 50 per cent. This type of information, although 
highly relevant to risk and return assessment, is associated with a high competitive 
disadvantage cost (Leventis, 2001). Therefore, firms in the GCC seem to disclose less 
information that could harm their competitive position in the market. The highest 
voluntary disclosure mean for segmental information is in Saudi Arabia (7%), 
followed by Oman and Qatar (6%), UAE (5%), and finally Kuwait and Bahrain (3%). 
The Financial review group also has a low mean at 3 per cent, with a range from 
zero to 38 per cent. The information in this group concerns financial ratios; namely, 
profitability, liquidity, and gearing, in addition to quantitative and qualitative 
information about advertising and inflation. Information about the financial ration is 
easy to obtain from the financial statements and has low cost in terms of both 
production costs and proprietary costs; however, the management in GCC firms may 
perceive that such information is available for investors and analysts to acquire 
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through the published financial statements, and so are unconcerned about its 
disclosure in the annual reports. Another reason for the low disclosure in this group 
may be that the management chooses not to disclose the ratios with the intention of 
avoiding any further interpretations or clarifications that usually accompany these 
ratios, especially in the cases of poor performance (Leventis, 2001). There is another 
information group where the effort of the market regulators to encourage or even 
require the disclosure of financial review information is important because this type 
of information and any further interpretations of it could remarkably impact investors’ 
decisions. The highest average voluntary disclosure in this group is found in Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar (5%), followed by the UAE and Oman (2%), Bahrain 
(1%). 
The mean voluntary disclosure in the foreign currency information group, which 
consists six items, is considered to be high, at 24 per cent, compared to the other 
voluntary disclosure groups. The average ranges between zero and 50 per cent, with a 
slight increase from 2014 to 2016. The items in this group relate to the foreign 
currency fluctuation effect on current and future results, the major exchange rate used, 
and the long- and short-term debt by currency. The mean in this study is lower than 
that found in Boshnak (2017) who uses five foreign currency information items and 
finds a mean of 45 per cent in GCC firms, which appear to pursue a good level of 
voluntary disclosure of foreign currency information, possibly, due to their 
implementation of international financial standards in preparing the financial reports. 
Thus, the disclosure of voluntary information on foreign currency may be driven by 
the requirements of standard IAS 21 (the effects of changes in foreign exchange rate). 
Bahrain (29%) discloses the most in this group, followed by Oman and Qatar (26%), 
Saudi Arabia (24%), the UAE (23%), and finally Kuwait (21%). 
The last group of financial category is stock price information. This group 
contains four items about market capitalization information and shareholders 
information. The voluntary disclosure in this group ranges from zero to 100 per cent 
with a mean of 24 per cent. The mean in this study is comparable to that found by 
Abdel-Fattah (2009) who uses six shareholder information items and finds a mean of 
23 per cent for Egyptian firms. Compared to the other information groups, GCC firms 
moderately disclose information about their stock price combined with its trend 
during the past few years, in addition to information about the size and type of their 
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shareholders. The reason for this moderate level of disclosure in this group is because 
most companies disclose information related to their share price and its trend on the 
stock market website, which makes it easier for them to provide the information in the 
annual report as well; this is more noticeable in companies operating in the UAE and 
Oman. Similarly, GCC firms are required to disclose major shareholders who own 5% 
or more of the company shares in any venue but not necessarily in the annual report. 
Therefore, providing the same information with extended details of the shareholders’ 
type in the annual reports is very straightforward. The highest mean in this group is 
found in the UAE (100%), followed by Oman (27%), Bahrain (25%), Qatar (14%), 
Saudi Arabia (12%), and finally Kuwait (4%). 
In summary, GCC listed firms appear to disclose more information in groups such 
as: general corporate, corporate strategy, acquisitions and disposals, foreign currency, 
and stock price. In contrast, they disclose very minimal information in groups such as 
future prospects, segmental information, and financial review. These results could be 
referred to the low cost of preparing and disclosing this general information such as 
corporate strategy information in addition to the low competitive disadvantage cost 
associated with such information when disclose with minimum details. The increased 
disclosure also could be due to the benefits obtained from the disclosure; like the 
disclosure of information related to an acquisition event in order to signal 
management good performance. On the other hand, GCC firms may avoid the 
disclosure of future prospects or financial review information due to the secretive 
culture of the GCC societies in addition to the high sensitivity and competitive 
disadvantage associated with such information. Thus, GCC companies have a very 
good opportunity to enhance their transparency by providing more information in 
general and more financial and future information in particular. 
Table 5.9 illustrates the descriptive statistics for total voluntary disclosure level by 
industry groups. The proprietary and political costs vary across industries (Meek, 
Roberts and Gray, 1995). Therefore, firms’ disclosure policy is affected accordingly. 
The difference between industries in terms of the level of disclosure is minor as 
shown in table 5.9. The energy and services sectors make more voluntary disclosure 
than manufacturing and real estate. This may indicate that energy firms are politically 
sensitive (Mitchell, Chia and Loh, 1995) and so, provide more information in order to 
avoid any government interventions or penalties, while services, especially 
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telecommunication companies, in the GCC are followed more closely by the public; 
and thus provide more information as a means of meeting the public’s demand (Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010). 
Table 5.9 Descriptive statistics for voluntary disclosure groups by industry 
All Countries (N=660) Energy Manufacturing Real Estate Services 
Total voluntary disclosure 0.134 0.120 0.119 0.130 
Strategic voluntary disclosure 0.131 0.124 0.122 0.130 
Non-financial voluntary disclosure 0.133 0.122 0.122 0.130 
Financial voluntary disclosure 0.136 0.115 0.113 0.129 
 
On the other hand, manufacturing and real estate have a lower voluntary 
disclosure score, which suggests that the firms in these sectors may face more 
property costs, so they provide less information in order to preserve their competitive 
advantages (Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). Voluntary disclosure by groups of 
information also supports these theories. Energy and services disclose more or similar 
strategic and financial information whereas manufacturing and real estate disclose 
more strategic than financial information, taking into account that financial 
information serves competitors more than general strategic information does.  
In summary, the results of the descriptive statistics indicate that the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the GCC listed firms is poor, with a mean of 12 per cent; 
however, a gradual improvement in the level of disclosure over the study period is 
noticeable both in terms of the total voluntary disclosure and its components. The low 
level of voluntary disclosure provided by GCC listed firms may be a reflection of a 
number of corporate governance and environmental factors such as the concentrated 
ownership with a domination of government and family holdings, the limited role 
played by institutional and foreign investors, the intervention of major shareholders in 
the nominating and appointing members to the board along with a number of factors 
characterized the GCC setting such as the secretive culture, the over-reliance on 
family and friend relations, and the presence of political connections. However, the 
level of voluntary disclosure show an improvement during the three years period 
which prove the recent awareness of the importance of corporate governance and 
transparency in the process of developing GCC stock markets. There is a tendency 
toward providing more strategic general information and less financial information, 
which may indicate that GCC firms balance the costs and benefits before disclosing 
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any information that might damage their competitive position. Future prospects and 
financial review information have the lower disclosure level, suggesting the 
importance of the capital market authorities’ involvement in imposing and requiring 
further disclosure in these categories, considering their high relevance to investors’ 
needs. In addition, among the GCC countries, the UAE has the highest voluntary 
disclosure mean followed by Oman, Bahrain, then Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and finally 
Kuwait. Furthermore, firms performing in the energy and services sectors disclose a 
higher level of information than firms in the manufacturing and real estate sectors. 
This result is reasonable taking into consideration the political sensitivity and 
competition factors existing in each industry. 
The following section presents the descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables (Ownership structure, and Board attributes) and the control variables as a 
means of preparing for the univariate and multivariate analysis. 
5.2.2 The Independent Variables  
Table 5.10 contains descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables 
for the whole sample used in this study, while table 5.11 consists of descriptive 
statistics for the independent and control variables for each country of the Gulf 
Council. Of particular interest to this study are the descriptive statistics related to two 
groups of independent variables: ownership structure, and board of directors’ 
attributes. In relation to ownership structure, Government ownership is also obvious 
in GCC firms, with an average of 12 percent. The range of government ownership 
starts from as low as zero per cent and rises up to as high as 84 per cent. The 
maximum percentage of government ownership is seen in the Saudi market while the 
highest mean is for firms in Bahrain (21%) followed by Oman (19%), Qatar (18%), 
the UAE (17%), Saudi Arabia (9%), and finally Kuwait (5%). Government ownership 
has been proven to be the most common ownership structure in the GCC markets 
having access to and control over the board of directors in listed companies (Al-
Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Alazzani, 2016), due to the fact that the government funds 
in GCC, such as the Public Investment Fund in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi 
Investment Council in the UAE, tend to invest in listed companies.  
Family ownership is also present in the GCC capital market although is less 
frequent than government ownership because most family corporations are not yet 
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listed in the market. Family ownership in the current study is defined as the shares 
held by one person or by various members of one family in a firm that is entirely or 
majorly owned by that family. Family ownership has a mean of 3 per cent which 
varies from as low as zero per cent up to a maximum of 85 per cent in Saudi Arabia, 
65 per cent in Kuwait, and 70 per cent in the UAE. Saudi Arabia has the highest mean 
for family ownership, at 5 per cent, followed by Kuwait and the UAE, at 2 per cent. 
However, family shares are not detected in Oman, Qatar, or Bahrain, possibly due to 
the limited number of companies in these markets besides the difficulty of assessing 
this type of ownership compared to the Saudi market where almost all family firms 
are named after the family name and the family members are excessively present on 
the board of directors whereas in Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar, family firms do not 
necessarily have the name of the controlling family.  
 For institutional share ownership, the average for the whole sample is high, at 27 
per cent with a variation between zero and 96 per cent. The mean institutional 
ownership is similar to that found in GCC firms by Boshnak (2017). The highest 
mean is found in Kuwait (45%) followed by the UAE (32%), Oman (30%), Bahrain 
(26%), Qatar (23%), and finally Saudi Arabia (20%). The high level of institutional 
holding perceived in Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman is likely due to a large number of 
investment corporations whose main activity is to invest in the stock markets.  
Foreign ownership has an average of 5 per cent, which is higher than previous 
studies in the GCC, such as Boshnak (2017), who finds an average of 3 per cent 
foreign ownership. The average varies from a minimum of zero per cent to a 
maximum of 48 per cent. The UAE is the country with the highest mean of foreign 
ownership at 13 per cent followed by Oman at 6 per cent, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain at 
3 per cent, Kuwait at 2 per cent, and Qatar at 1 per cent. This gap regarding foreign 
shareholdings between the UAE, Oman and the other GCC countries may be 
attributed to foreign investment regulations and restrictions in addition to corporate 
governance and transparency quality in the stock markets, which determine how 
accessible and welcoming the market is to foreign ownership. Foreign investments in 
Bahrain are not restricted to a specific percentage, so foreign investors can own up to 
100% of the company’s shares. In Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE, foreign investors can 
own up to 49% of the total shares; in Oman, foreign ownership is limited to 49%, 
which may be increased up to 65%, subject to an approval by the Minister of 
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Commerce and Industry and to 100% for projects that contribute to national economy 
development upon the approval of the Development Council .In Saudi Arabia, the last 
country to allow direct foreign investment, direct ownership by qualified foreign 
investors of up to 49% has been recently allowed since June, 2015, after foreign 
investors were exclusively permitted to invest through mutual funds. Although 
foreign investments have no national limitations, Bahrain has the lowest percentage in 
this regard. The UAE and Oman, on the other hand, have the highest average of 
foreign investments even though such investments are subject to certain limitations. 
In the case of Bahrain, which is considered a financial hub in the region, the low 
percentage of foreign ownership may be endorsed by the fact that the sample of this 
study excludes financial corporations in which foreign investors mainly invest in the 
Bahraini Bourse since other sectors are too small to attract them. This suggests that 
laws and regulations are not the only factors affecting foreign investors to consider a 
market as a good investment opportunity. Corporate governance practices, 
transparency level, investors’ protection programs, political and economic stability, 
and how welcoming the market is to foreign investors are all elements that play a 
major role in forming investors’ decisions to invest in foreign markets.  
This study also captures the ownership of the audit committee members since 
there is supporting evidence that audit committee members who own shares in the 
company tend to be more effective in monitoring the financial reporting practice. 
However, audit committee ownership has a very low average of 1 per cent with a 
minimum of zero per cent and a maximum of 18 per cent. Audit committee ownership 
is also low in each country and was difficult to detect in Kuwait, the UAE, and Oman 
either because of its absence or due to disclosure deficiencies. Board members’ 
ownership has a mean of 7 per cent and a median of 2 per cent. The maximum board 
ownership is 66 per cent observed in the UAE. The UAE has the highest mean at 29 
per cent, followed by Kuwait at 16 per cent, Oman at 12 per cent, Qatar at 7 per cent, 
and finally Saudi Arabia and Bahrain at 5 per cent. 
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Table 5.10 Descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables across the GCC firm 
               
                         
 
 
 
All Countries (N=660) Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std.Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Independent variables        
Ownership structure        
Government ownership 0.00 0.84 0.12 0.00 0.19 1.92 2.92 
Family ownership 0.00 0.85 0.03 0.00 0.12 4.32 18.76 
Institutional ownership 0.00 0.96 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.59 -0.49 
Foreign ownership 0.00 0.48 0.05 0.01 0.09 2.72 7.13 
Audit committee ownership 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.02 4.66 24.39 
Board ownership 0.00 0.66 0.07 0.02 0.11 2.46 7.34 
Board attributes        
Board size (number of member) 5.00 18.00 8.11 8.00 1.67 0.34 1.03 
Board independence 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.44 0.25 0.16 -0.46 
Board meetings (number of meeting) 0.00 17.00 5.96 6.00 2.28 1.56 3.90 
Board attendance 0.54 1.00 0.89 0.91 0.08 -1.00 1.37 
Board compensations (SQ) 0.00 3118.12 779.91 700.23 552.03 1.27 2.45 
Average cross-directorship 0.00 2.78 0.48 0.37 0.49 1.24 1.95 
Audit committee size 1.00 6.00 3.42 3.00 0.68 1.41 2.15 
Control variables        
Audit firm (big4) 0.00 1.00 0.72 1.00 0.45 -0.97 -1.05 
Firm size (Log of total assets) 7.26 11.03 8.87 8.77 0.66 0.56 0.34 
Profitability (ROA) -0.56 0.38 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.86 9.08 
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Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std.Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Control variable        
Leverage 0.00 1.02 0.39 0.39 0.20 0.23 -0.61 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 0.01 9.95 2.07 1.54 1.68 2.08 4.82 
Industry type (Energy=1) 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.19 4.64 19.64 
Industry type (Manufacturing=1) 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.49 0.29 -1.91 
Industry type (Services=1) 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.48 0.48 -1.76 
Industry type (Real estate=1) 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.00 0.35 1.96 1.86 
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Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables by country 
Variables 
Saudi Arabia 
(N=315) 
Kuwait (N=111) UAE (N=87) Oman (N=45) Qatar (N=63) Bahrain (N=39) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Independent variables             
Ownership structure             
Government ownership 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.09 
Family ownership 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Institutional ownership 0.20 0.09 0.45 0.44 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.36 0.23 0.13 0.26 0.23 
Foreign ownership 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Audit committee ownership 0.01 0.00 ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Board ownership 0.05 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.29 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.04 
Board attributes             
Board size (number of member) 8.50 9.00 6.56 7.00 8.57 9.00 7.47 7.00 8.40 8.00 8.49 8.00 
Board independence 0.50 0.42 0.19 0.20 0.73 0.80 0.68 0.71 0.20 0.10 0.46 0.42 
Board meetings (number of meeting) 5.44 5.00 8.55 8.00 6.59 6.00 6.60 6.00 6.39 6.00 5.46 5.00 
Board attendance 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.82 0.82 0.91 0.91 
Board compensations (SQ) 772.70 745.61 490.93 489.38 882.39 773.85 542.00 573.80 1496.60 1528.05 659.04 684.16 
Average cross-directorship 0.61 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.50 0.66 0.57 0.34 0.28 0.55 0.42 
Audit committee size 3.49 3.00 3.11 3.00 3.31 3.00 3.44 3.00 3.23 3.00 3.56 3.00 
Control variables             
Audit firm (big4) 0.62 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.77 1.00 
Firm size (Log of total assets) 8.92 8.80 8.78 8.77 8.99 8.97 8.37 8.36 9.31 9.39 8.31 8.33 
Profitability (ROA) 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Leverage 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.36 0.30 0.38 0.37 0.18 0.12 
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Saudi Arabia 
(N=315) 
Kuwait (N=111) UAE (N=87) Oman (N=45) Qatar (N=63) Bahrain (N=39) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Liquidity (Current ratio) 2.15 1.59 1.71 1.26 2.02 1.50 2.23 1.69 2.05 1.75 2.50 1.77 
Industry type (Energy=1) 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry type (Manufacturing=1) 0.51 1.00 0.27 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.53 1.00 0.43 0.00 0.15 0.00 
Industry type (Services=1) 0.36 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.85 1.00 
Industry type (Real estate=1) 0.09 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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In relation to the second group of independent variables, board attributes, the 
board of directors has on average, 8.11 members, with a median composition of eight. 
The median of the members on the board varies between seven and nine among the 
six GCC countries, with Saudi Arabia and UAE having the highest median at nine and 
Kuwait and Oman having the lowest median at seven. The average frequency of the 
board meetings is 5.96 times during the year with a median of six meetings per year. 
On average, board meetings are attended by 89 per cent of the members. The board of 
directors in GCC firms during the period 2014 to 2016 comprises an average 
proportion of independent directors at 50 per cent. This average is lower than that in 
the study of Boshnak (2017), who finds an average of 63 per cent. This may be due to 
the nature of his sample that comprises the 20 highest market weight companies. 
Firms in the UAE have the highest mean board independence at 73 per cent, followed 
by Oman at 63 per cent, Saudi Arabia at 50 per cent, Bahrain at 46 per cent, Qatar at 
20 per cent, and finally Kuwait at 19 per cent. This study also investigates the impact 
of board members’ compensation on the effectiveness of their role of monitoring and 
on their efforts to reduce information asymmetry and best serve the shareholders’ 
interests. The average compensation paid to the board members is 912,534 US 
dollars, ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 9,722,644 US dollars. The 
highest average compensation is found in Qatari firms ($2,648,701), followed by 
UAE firms ($1,489,136), Saudi firms ($773,463), Bahraini firms ($507,950), Kuwaiti 
firms ($351,339), and finally Omani firms ($307,038). This study also examines the 
impact of holding multiple directorships on board effectiveness and ultimately on 
firms’ financial reporting policies. The average additional directorships held by the 
board members of a single board is 0.48 with a median of 0.37 ranging from zero to a 
maximum of 25 directorships in a single board. The final variable within board 
attributes is audit committee size. Audit committees in the GCC comprise an average 
of 3.42 members with a median of three members in all GCC countries. 
This study also constructs control variables to represent several firm 
characteristics that may determine the level of voluntary disclosure by firms. On 
average, 72 per cent of GCC firms are audited by one of the big 4 auditing firms. 
Firms in Qatar has the highest average of firms audited by a big 4 firm at 95 per cent 
followed by the UAE at 85 per cent, Oman at 78 per cent, Bahrain at 77 per cent, 
Kuwait at 71 per cent, and Saudi Arabia at 62 per cent. The average company size 
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based on total assets is $3 billion ranging from as low as $18 million up to as high as 
$107 billion. Firms in Saudi Arabia are the largest compared to the other countries; 
however, the highest mean is in the UAE and Qatar, probably due to the vast 
difference in the number of companies in Saudi Arabia and the other two stock 
exchanges, respectively. The highest mean total assets is in Qatar and the UAE, at $4 
billion, followed by Saudi Arabia at $3 billion, Kuwait at $1 billion, Bahrain at $587 
million, and finally Oman at $404 million. The mean ROA of the firms is 6 per cent. 
Oman has the most profitable firms with an average ROA of 10 per cent. The 
Leverage levels, are on average, 39 per cent, while the liquidity ranges from 0.01 to 
9.95, with a mean of 2.07 and a median of 1.54. Boshnak (2017), who investigates 
disclosure in the GCC, reported an average profitability of 8 per cent, a leverage level 
of 40 per cent, and liquidity at 2.35, which is very close to the result of the current 
study. Firms in Bahrain are the least leveraged, at 18 per cent, and the most liquid is at 
2.50. Industry descriptive is based on the industry classification explained in chapter 
4. Four industry groups are identified; namely, energy, manufacturing, services, and 
real estate. The majority of firms in the GCC markets operate in the manufacturing or 
service sector, with a mean of 43 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, followed by 
real estate firms with a mean of 15 per cent and finally energy at 4 per cent. Energy 
firms are more present in Kuwait and the UAE; while there are more manufacturing 
firms in Oman and Saudi Arabia. Services corporations dominate in Bahrain, at 85 per 
cent and real estate firms exist more in Kuwait and the UAE. 
5.3 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.12 contains a correlation matrix, presenting two-way Pearson correlations 
between all of the variables included in this study. These correlations add meaning to 
this type of study since they identify the relationships between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and each explanatory variable and also highlight the associations among 
the independent variables. The correlations in column 1 show the level of association 
between each independent variable and the total voluntary disclosure. The double and 
single stars in the correlation table represent the degree of statistical significance at 
one per cent and five per cent, respectively. In relation to ownership variables, 
government ownership, family ownership, and foreign ownership are all positively 
correlated with total voluntary disclosure, as expected. This positive association 
reflects the high agency costs in firms with government and family ownership and the 
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need for more communication with the other shareholders, which is achieved in the 
form of greater disclosure by firms. The negative and significant correlation between 
audit committee ownership and total voluntary disclosure may reflect the reality that 
audit committee members who hold a stake in the firm tend to provide superior 
monitoring over the firm’s financial reporting, which reduces the demand for 
disclosure by the shareholders. Disclosure and monitoring could be substitutes for 
each other based on agency theory, since disclosure is viewed as a means of reducing 
the monitoring costs. Because the monitoring is economically and effectively 
provided by a group of shareholders who perform a role in the firm, the need for 
disclosure decreases due to the belief by other stakeholders that their interests are 
being carefully protected. The results also show that board and institutional ownership 
are not correlated with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 5.12 Pearson correlation between total voluntary disclosure and the independent and control variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1VDT 1                                    
2GOVOWN .251** 1                                  
3FAMILOWN .078* -.147** 1                                
4INSTOWN -.024 -.324**  -.178** 1                              
5FOROWN .280** -.099  -.099  -.006 1                            
6BOWN .043 -.254** -.147**   0.099 -.147  1                          
7BSIZE .284** .175**  -.062  -.174**  .148**  -.120*  1                        
8BIND .148**  .053 -.040  -.089*  .193**   -.045  .006 1                      
9BCOMPSQ .239**  .193** .073   -.076 -.080  -.003  .323**  -.120**  1                    
10BMEET .128**  .259** -.039 -.015  .113  -.076  -.098*  .019  .015  1                  
11BATTEND -.110*  .028 .118**  -.077   -.126  -.110*  -.034 -.155**  .029  .008  1                
12AVGDIRECTOR .288**  .085* -.036  -.041   .003   -.089 .275**  .114**  .155**  -.056  .075  1              
13ACSIZE .210**  .288** -.137**   -.115**  .022  -.075 .333** .143**  .039  .118**  .060  .178**  1            
14ACOWN -.018 -.114* -.040   -.097 -.085   .250** -.026  -.018  -.172**  -.095  -.068  -.020  -.087  1          
15AUDFIRM .230**  .103** -.021  .223 ** .178**  -.074   .131** -.040  .213**  .064  -.099*  .159**  .098*  -.112*  1        
16FIRMSIZE .297**  .358**  -.078* -.026   .077  -.150** .345**  -.198**  .439**  .167**  .011  .150**  .254**  -.169**  .273**  1      
17Profitability .020  .072 .059   -.047 -.208**   .013  .076 -.077  .293**  -.085*   .079  .087* -.033   -.051 .118**  -.053  1    
18LEVER .122**  -.038  .111**  .055  .235**  -.003 .013  -.014  .008   .047  -.030  .069  .022  .007 .098*  .347**   -.352**            1  
19LIQUId 
 
-.057  .078* -.018   -.061 -.069   -.078 .027  .024  -.025  -.127**  -.006  -.030  -.013   .064 -.056  -.183**  .209**  -.527**            
   1 
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Variables definitions 
Dependent variable: VDT = total voluntary disclosure 
Independent variables: BHNUMBER = number of blockholders; BHOWN = percentage of shares 
owned by blockholders; GOVOWN = percentage of shares owned by the government; FAMILOWN = 
percentage of shares owned by the family members; INSTOWN = percentage of shares owned by the 
institutions; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by foreign investors; BOWN = percentage of 
shares owned by the board members; ACOWN = percentage of shares owned by the audit committee 
members; BSIZE = the number of members in the board of directors; BIND = percentage of 
independent directors on the board; BMEET = the number of meetings held by the board of directors 
during the year; BATTEND = percentage of board members’ attendance during the year; BCOMPSQ = 
the square root of the amount of compensation paid to the board members during the year; 
AVGDIRECTOR = the average directorships held by the board members; ACSIZE = the number of 
audit committee members; AUDFIRM = a dummy variable indicating occasions when the audit is 
performed by one of the big 4 audit firm; FIRMSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = 
return on assets; LEVER = percentage of total debt to total assets; LIQUID = percentage of current 
assets to current liabilities. 
 
In respect to board attributes, the results reveal that board size, board 
independence, and the frequency of board meetings are all positively and significantly 
associated with the total voluntary disclosure, suggesting that at least at the univariate 
level, larger, more independent, and more active boards are more effective in 
performing their role of representing the shareholders’ interests and offer more 
information to the public. Nevertheless, it is unclear why the board’s level of 
attending meetings is negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. This finding 
may be influenced by the concept of quality over quantity, suggesting that the 
attendance of the board members does not reflect their efforts and effectiveness in 
their supervision and monitoring role. They may attend while providing low 
performance and, on the other hand, not attend, yet successfully accomplish their 
duties. There is also a positive association between both board compensations and 
average cross-directorship with the level of voluntary disclosure suggesting that 
highly compensated and experienced directors are expected to perform better in 
achieving their duty of monitoring and enhancing transparency. Audit committee size 
is also positively correlated with total voluntary disclosure level as the level of 
knowledge and expertise increases with the number of committee members hence 
positively affecting the committee’s supervisory role and firms’ financial reporting 
practice. 
Consistent with prior studies, a positive correlation between firm size, audit firm 
size, and leverage with voluntary disclosure is observed indicating that larger firms, 
firms audited by one of the big 4, and leveraged firms provide better voluntary 
disclosure. However, profitability and liquidity are not correlated with voluntary 
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disclosure. With regards to the correlations amongst the independent and control 
variables, board independence is negatively associated with institutional ownership 
and positively correlated with foreign ownership, implying that institutional 
ownership render board independence while foreign ownership promote it. 
Interestingly, board compensation is positively correlated with government 
ownership. In relation to firm size, firms with government ownership tend to be large 
firms, while firms with family ownership are smaller. The correlation table also 
shows a positive correlation between profitability and a number of variables; namely, 
board compensation, board members’ other directorships, and audit firm size (big 4). 
A negative correlation is also identified between profitability and the number of board 
meetings, implying that board members meet more frequently when the profitability 
is low suggesting that the need for board meetings increase in the situation of low 
performance. 
The result shows that all of the correlations between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable are less than 0.7, which indicates a low probability of a 
multicollinearity problem arising between the variables in this study. 
5.4 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Unlike univariate analysis in which the relation between one single independent 
variable and one dependent variable is determined, multivariate analysis concerns to 
identifying the association between one dependent variable and more than one 
independent variable using regression models (Uyanık and Güler, 2013). Regression 
analysis is the most common multivariate technique used in disclosure studies 
(Cooke, 1998). It is performed in situations where cause-effect relations exist between 
a dependent variable and a group of independent variables. Thus, an explanation of 
the variation in the dependent variable is sought in the changes in the independent 
variables. The regression model assumes a normal distribution of the dependent and 
independent variables, linear relationships, no multiple ties between the independent 
variables, and an equal distribution or residuals (homoscedasticity) (Cooke, 1998; 
Uyanık and Güler, 2013). These assumptions should be satisfied in order to rely with 
confidence on the statistical analysis results.  
According to the skewness and kurtosis values presented earlier in the descriptive 
statistics section, some of the variables are not normally distributed. Therefore, a 
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transformation using a natural logarithm and square root was applied firm size and 
board compensations, respectively in order to satisfy the normality assumptions for 
these variables. To test for linearity and homoscedasticity, the study also performs the 
analysis of residuals and the normal probability plot (P-P plot). To examine 
multicollinearity, the correlation values amongst the explanatory variables are 
checked for any significant high correlation. As shown in table 5.12, all of the 
correlation coefficients are below 0.80, which is considered a limit that should not be 
exceeded to suggest that independent variables are free of multicollinearity (Hossain 
and Rahman, 1995; Gujarati, 2003). To investigate further this lack of no multiple 
relations between the variables, the variance inflation factor (VIF) values are 
calculated and they all are below 10, generally believed to be the level of concern 
(Uyanık and Güler, 2013). Except for leverage, that recorded a VIF of 5.7, all of the 
other variables have values below 5. Based on these results, it can be concluded that 
there is no potential multicollinearity problem between the variables in the current 
study. 
In this study, four regression models are developed. All have the same 
independent variables (ownership structure, and board attributes) and different 
dependent variables. The first model investigates the relationship between total 
voluntary disclosure score and the explanatory variables, while the other three models 
examine the associations between the voluntary disclosure groups; namely: Strategic, 
non-financial, and financial disclosure with the same independent variables in the first 
model. This modelling structure aims to capture the influence of ownership and board 
variables on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the GCC firms, and see if the impact 
of the independent variables changes according to the type of information disclosed 
(strategic, non-financial, and financial). 
For each regression model, blockholders number and blockholders ownership are 
excluded from the analysis to avoid the problem of multicollinearity since 
blockholders include government, institution, family, and foreign shares. In all of the 
regressions, year dummies are used to control the use of the same sample firms over 
the three years (2014-2016). In all of the regressions, industry and country dummies 
are included to control for the effect of different industry sector and the six GCC 
countries. Each regression also includes control variables representing firm size, 
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profitability, leverage, liquidity, and whether the audit is performed by one of the big 
4 audit firms. 
5.4.1 Total Voluntary Disclosure and its Categories  
Table 5.14 presents the results of the first main multivariate regression model, 
which illustrates the intensity and direction of the relation between the explanatory 
variables and total voluntary disclosure by GCC firms. 
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Table 5.14 OLS regression explaining the determinants of total voluntary 
disclosure score by 220 firms in the GCC in the period 2014-2016 
Variables Coefficient T-Value Sig VIF 
GOVOWN .028 .550 .584 4.353 
FAMILOWN .186 2.856*** .006 2.535 
INSTOWN .026 .706 .482 2.401 
FOROWN .037 .324 .747 2.458 
BOWN .059 .754 .453 2.279 
ACOWN -.064 -.237 .814 1.933 
BSIZE -.012 -2.413** .018 1.791 
BIND .041 1.056 .294 1.679 
BMEET -.006 -2.012** .048 2.188 
BATTEND -.017 -.168 .853 1.678 
BCOMPSQ 1.614E-5 .800 .426 3.568 
AVGDIRECTOR .029 2.167** .033 1.731 
ACSIZE .022 2.682*** .009 2.156 
AUDFIRM -.009 -.539 .592 1.969 
FIRMSIZE .037 2.452** .016 3.843 
ROA .020 .176 .861 3.653 
LEVER -.055 -.797 .861 5.728 
LIQUID -.006 -1.052 .296 2.136 
Industry dummies Included 
 
 
 
Year dummies Included 
 
 
 
Country dummies Included 
 
 
 
F Test 3.01*** 
R2 0.498 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
0.332 
N 660 
. *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
. ** Statistically significant at 5% level 
. * Statistically significant at 10% level 
Variables definitions 
Dependent variable: total voluntary disclosure 
Independent variables: GOVOWN = percentage of shares owned by the government; FAMILOWN = 
percentage of shares owned by the family members; INSTOWN = percentage of shares owned by the 
institutions; FOROWN = percentage of shares owned by foreign investors; BOWN = percentage of 
shares owned by the board members; ACOWN = percentage of shares owned by the audit committee 
members; BSIZE = the number of members on the board of directors; BIND = percentage of 
independent directors on the board; BMEET = the number of meetings held by the board of directors 
during the year; BATTEND = percentage of board members’ attendance during the year; BCOMPSQ = 
the square root for the amount of compensation paid to the board members during the year; 
AVGDIRECTOR = the average number of directorships held by the board members; ACSIZE = the 
number of audit committee members; AUDFIRM = a dummy variable indicating occasions when the 
audit is performed by one of the big 4 audit firms; FIRMSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
ROA = return on assets; LEVER = percentage of total debt to total assets; LIQUID = percentage of 
current assets to current liabilities. 
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Table 5.15 OLS regression explaining the determinants of the voluntary 
disclosure categories by 220 firms in the GCC in the period 2014-2016 
Variables Strategic Non-financial Financial 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
GOVOWN -.064 -1.539 -.138 1.577 -.024 -.509 
FAMILOWN .026 .492 .351 3.137*** .125 2.073** 
INSTOWN -.035 -1.147 .108 1.696* -.017 -.499 
FOROWN -.105 -1.128 .056 .288 .103 .984 
BOWN -.126 -1.977** .107 .800 .126 1.759* 
ACOWN .453 2.037** .009 .019 -.435 -1.733* 
BSIZE -.011 -2.769*** -.014 -1.619 -.010 -2.270** 
BIND .077 2.456*** .069 1.044 -.011 -.297 
BCOMPSQ 1.180 .714 3.709 1.067 -2.697 -.145 
BMEET -.004 -1.700* -.009 -1.828* -.004 -1.411 
BATTEND -.119 -1.599 .019 .124 .012 .140 
AVGDIRECTOR -.015 -1.327 .060 2.617*** .024 1.975** 
ACSIZE .016 2.346** .014 .963 .033 4.350*** 
AUDFIRM .005 .400 -.012 -.424 -.014 -.901 
FIRMSIZE  .031 2.475*** .062 2.383** .018 1.270 
ROA .172 1.805* -.080 -.399 .017 .161 
LEVER .054 .959 -.110 -.930 -.070 -1.097 
LIQUID -.005 -1.00 -.011 -1.086 -.002 -.231 
Industry dummies Included 
 
 
 
Year dummies Included 
 
 
 
Country dummies Included 
 
 
 
F Test 2.99*** 3.99*** 2.31*** 
R2 0.49 0.56 0.43 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.42 0.25 
N 660 660 660 
 
. *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
. ** Statistically significant at 5% level 
. *  Statistically significant at 10% level 
Variables definitions 
Dependent variable: total voluntary disclosure 
Independent variables: GOVOWN = percentage of shares own by the government; FAMILOWN = 
percentage of shares own by the family members; INSTOWN = percentage of shares own by the 
institutions; FOROWN = percentage of shares own by foreign investors; BOWN = percentage of 
shares own by the board members; ACOWN = percentage of shares own by the audit committee 
members; BSIZE = the number of members on the board of directors; BIND = percentage of 
independent directors on the board; BMEET = the number of meetings held by the board of directors 
during the year; BATTEND = percentage of board members’ attendance during the year; BCOMPSQ = 
the square root for the amount of compensation paid to the board members during the year; 
AVGDIRECTOR = the average number of directorships held by the board members; ACSIZE = the 
number of audit committee members; AUDFIRM = a dummy variable, indicating occasions when the 
audit is performed by one of the big 4 audit firms; FIRMSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
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ROA = return on assets; LEVER = percentage of total debt to total assets; LIQUID = percentage of 
current assets to current liabilities. 
 
Table 5.15 contains the results of the other three multivariate regression models 
that illustrate the association between the voluntary disclosure groups, strategic, non-
financial, and financial information, and a number of independent variables. 
As indicated in table 5.14, the first model is significant overall (F = 3.01, p<0.00), 
the R-squared is about 50% and the adjusted R2 is 33%. This implies that the 
proposed main model in this study explains over 30% of the variation in the level of 
total voluntary disclosure for the period 2014 to 2016. The adjusted R Squared in this 
study is comparable to Meek et al. (1995) and Leventis and Weetman (2004)’s 35%, 
and higher than the 20% found by Eng and Mak (2003), the 16% found by Scaltrito 
(2016), and the 28.6% found by Hossain et al. (1994). However, it is lower than the 
46% found by Haniffa and Cooke (2002). Table 5.15 shows the explanatory power of 
the other three models. The non-financial voluntary disclosure model has the highest 
adjusted R-square, at 42%.  
As shown in tables 5.14 and 5.15 in relation to the six ownership structure aspects, 
family ownership is the only ownership type that has a significant and positive 
relationship with total voluntary disclosure at the 1% level. The statistics also show a 
significant association between family ownership and the two groups of information, 
non-financial and financial, at the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
Institutional ownership is not associated with the overall voluntary disclosure score; 
yet it is found to be related to non-financial information disclosure at the 10% level. 
Board members’ ownership is not significantly associated with the total voluntary 
disclosure. However, interestingly, members have the opposite effect on strategic 
(negative) and financial (positive) voluntary disclosure and this possibly resulting in 
the zero net effect.  Similarly, audit committee ownership is positively related to the 
level of strategic disclosure and negatively related with the level of financial 
disclosure. This may be the possible reason of non-significant association of audit 
committee ownership with the overall voluntary disclosure.  
In regard to board attributes, the results show a negative and significant 
relationship between board size and the level of total voluntary disclosure at the 1% 
level. This negative association also exists regarding strategic and financial 
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information disclosure, at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. This suggests that, the 
fewer the members sitting on the board, the better they are at performing their role of 
monitoring and promoting transparency. In contrast to expectations, the number of 
board meetings during the year has a negative and significant association with the 
level of total voluntary disclosure. Strategic and non-financial information are also 
negatively associated with the frequency of board meetings. The results also indicate 
that the average number of other directorships held by the board members is 
positively and significantly associated with the level of total voluntary disclosure and 
also non-financial and financial information disclosure. This result supports the 
argument that views the multiple directorships held by the member as a sign of 
expertise and knowledge. Audit committee size is positively and significantly related 
to the total voluntary disclosure and to strategic and financial information, suggesting 
that more members on the audit committee is associated with more diligence and 
effectiveness and hence better voluntary disclosure. The difference between board 
size and audit committee size concerning the direction of the relationship with the 
level of voluntary disclosure is surprising since the logic underlying this association is 
similar. This study shows that, while bigger boards affect disclosure negatively, 
bigger audit committees affect it positively. The results of this study also indicate that 
board independence although positively related to total voluntary disclosure, is not 
statistically significant except for strategic information disclosure. Firms provide 
more strategic information when the boards contain more independent members. 
Regarding board compensations and board members attendance, they are not 
statistically significant.  
The variation in the level of voluntary disclosure depending on the type of 
information is explained by a number of variables as indicated in table 5.15. Board 
ownership, audit committee ownership, board size, and audit committee size are the 
determinants of strategic and financial information disclosure. Board meetings and 
firm size significantly explain the variation in the level of disclosure of strategic and 
non-financial information, while, family ownership and the average number of 
directorships held by the board members determine the level of non-financial and 
financial information. Strategic and financial information has the most in common 
regarding the ownership and board attributes’ variable affecting their level. Non-
financial information, while having the highest adjusted R-square at 42%, is explained 
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by the lower number of variables; namely, family ownership, board meetings, average 
directorships, and firm size. 
In terms of the control variables, only firm size measured by total assets is highly 
significant at the 1% level, with total and strategic voluntary disclosure, at the 5% 
level with the non-financial voluntary disclosure; however, firm size proves not to be 
significantly related to the level of financial information disclosure group. This 
indicates that larger firms engage in more voluntary disclosure in general than smaller 
ones, and provide more strategic and non-financial information but not financial 
information. This result is consistent with the majority of disclosure studies that have 
suggested a strong positive relationship between firm size and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure provided by the firm (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006; Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007; Soliman, 
2013). The reason underlying the significant effect of firm size on strategic and non-
financial information but not financial information disclosure may be due to the high 
proprietary costs associated with financial information. Large firms are more 
politically sensitive and have the ability and resources to produce and provide more 
strategic and non-financial information as a mean of satisfying the public demand; 
however, they become more conservative about disclosing financial information that 
could damage their competitive position. Regarding the other control variables, only 
profitability is positively, at the 10% significance level, associated with the level of 
strategic voluntary disclosure. Nevertheless, profitability is found to be unrelated to 
the total voluntary disclosure score. The effect of firm leverage and liquidity is not 
statistically significant with regard to the level of total voluntary disclosure and its 
groups. The study also finds that being audited by one of the big 4 audit firms has no 
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure provided by firms. 
5.4.2 Discussion of the Statistical Results 
5.4.2.1 Ownership Structure Variables 
Six variables related to ownership structure are investigated in the current study to 
determine the impact of ownership type on the extent of voluntary disclosure in GCC 
listed firms. 
  187 
Government Ownership appears to be statistically insignificant both in the case 
of overall voluntary disclosure as well as in relation to various components of 
voluntary disclosure. . The findings may be suggestive of the secretive nature of such 
ownership (Al-Janadi, Abdul Rahman and Omar, 2012) and highlight the fact that 
transparency by way of more voluntary disclosure may not be the overarching goal of 
such owners. This result is consistent with Ghazali and Weetman (2006) who find 
government ownership is not significant in any category of disclosure, indicating that 
the disclosure level is not influenced by government ownership. Some studies have 
reported a positive impact of government ownership on other financial reporting 
issues and corporate performance in the GCC context (Zeitun, 2014; Abdallah & 
Ismail, 2017). Government ownership is found to be a significant determinant of 
corporate performance and also to have a positive and significant effect on firms’ 
performance in the GCC (Zeitun, 2014). Another study illustrates the great 
importance of corporate governance for GCC governments by providing evidence of a 
positive association between corporate governance and firm performance in firms 
with high government share holdings (Abdallah and Ismail, 2017). However, the 
result of this study does not support the significance of the relationship between 
government ownership and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, hypothesis H3, which 
states that there is a significant positive association between government ownership 
and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms, is not supported. 
Family Ownership is positively and significantly, at the 1% level, associated with 
the level of voluntary disclosure in GCC listed firms as illustrated in table 5.14. Thus, 
hypothesis H4 is supported. The result of this study makes an important contribution 
that shows the significant role played by family ownership in promoting voluntary 
disclosure in GCC firms. In the unique structure of ownership in the GCC markets, 
where the family members hold a significant share in the companies that they have 
established, the study proves that family members are highly motivated to preserve 
their family business and reputation through their willingness to reduce the conflicts 
and information asymmetry with the minority shareholders by increasing the level of 
disclosure and voluntarily providing information in excess of the requirements. In 
GCC societies, that value family and personal relations over regulations, family firms 
tend to legitimize themselves by voluntarily providing more information to 
demonstrate that they value minority interests and their family name reputation. They 
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have the ability to impact on the disclosure practice in their firms through their 
significant representation on the board and management (Al-Ghamdi and Rhodes, 
2015). This dominance enables them to make this positive impact on the corporate 
governance and disclosure practices as found in the current study. The result in the 
current study is consistent with evidence documented in prior studies. Wang (2006) 
recognizes a positive association between founding family ownership and earnings’ 
informativeness, while Cascino et al. (2010) show that family firms have greater 
transparency, and this is mainly due to intentions to alleviate agency conflicts 
between family owners and minority shareholders.  
In terms of voluntary disclosure components as shown in table 5.15, family 
ownership is positively and significantly associated with non-financial and financial 
information at the 1% level and 5% level, respectively. This indicates that family 
owners promote the disclosure of non-financial information and financial information. 
Family firms are usually small in size and hence with limited resources. The 
insignificant association in relation to strategic information suggests that these firms 
tend not to disclose such information due to the threat of competitors copying such 
information which may be the only source of their competitive advantage over them.   
The positive impact of family ownership on the level of overall voluntary disclosure 
is a good news for the regulators and they should encourage such ownership patterns 
for the sake of more transparency in the market. 
Institutional Ownership has a positive association with total voluntary disclosure 
as shown in table 5.14; however, this impact not statistically significant, which leads 
to the rejection of hypothesis H5 that predicted a significant positive influence of 
institutional shares. The limited ability of institutional ownership to explain the 
variation in the level of overall voluntary disclosure is consistent with some prior 
studies such as those by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
in Malaysia and Naser et al. (2006) in Qatar respectively. The lack of significance of 
the relationship between the institutional investors and the overall voluntary 
disclosure level is primarily attributed to the presence of a premature institutional 
investors’ community in the GCC market. Institutional investors are mainly local 
investors with a low level of engagement and interaction regarding corporations’ 
strategic and governance issues (Amico, 2016). They generally tend not to perform 
their ownership duties through voting and if they do, the voting results are not 
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disclosed, contrary to the global trend. In addition, institutional investors’ holdings 
are dominated by government and family enterprises whereas globally, investment 
funds are the main source of institutional capital (Amico, 2016). That explains the 
insignificant role played by institutional investors in the GCC stock exchanges. This 
suggests a need to pay more attention to the essential role that institutional investors 
can perform in the process of developing the GCC stock market and promoting 
transparency. Market regulators should prepare and train institutional shareholders to 
actively execute their role as a monitoring mechanism that helps to develop corporate 
governance and financial reporting practices within the GCC stock exchanges. 
In terms of voluntary disclosure components in table 5.15, institutional shares 
have a weak positive association with non-financial information at the 10% level. 
There are two competing arguments regarding institutional ownership in the literature. 
While some argue that such investors are sophisticated and have a strong desire to 
acquire more disclosure in order to take timely decisions especially in less developed 
settings (Khlif, Ahmed and Souissi, 2017), others believe that in such environments, 
institutional investors may act like insiders in gaining private information to serve 
their interests at the expense of those of the minority shareholders (Choi, Sami and 
Zhou, 2010). The reduced positive impact of institutional investors on the disclosure 
of non-financial information may indicate the level of awareness of the recent 
attention directed toward the disclosure of non-financial information in the corporate 
governance practice globally such as social responsibility and environmental 
disclosure. Furthermore, the positive influence of institutional investors on the 
disclosure of non-financial information may reflect the desire of these institutions to 
introduce themselves as promoters of social values either by investing in firms that 
appreciate these values or by demanding more disclosure reveal these values from the 
firms in which they invest. The result of this study illustrates that institutional 
investors may behave like sophisticated, educated investors when it comes to the 
disclosure of non-financial information, like information about the directors and 
employees and social responsibility information to reflect the recent focus on such 
information in the corporate governance practice internationally. 
Foreign Ownership has no significant impact on the overall level of voluntary 
disclosure as well as in terms of its various components as shown in tables 5.14 and 
5.15. Therefore, hypothesis H6 in this study is not supported. The positive yet 
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insignificant association between foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure in GCC 
firms is unsurprising. Foreign investors who come from more developed and 
transparent market environment exert greater pressure over the management to 
provide the information they need for their investment decisions (Choi et al., 2013). 
However, in the context of the GCC market where the foreign investments are 
minimal, foreign ownership fails to significantly explain the variation in the level of 
voluntary disclosure. This finding regarding a lack of statistical significance in this 
study is consistent with the study by Zeitun (2014) who examines the relationship 
between foreign ownership and firm performance in the GCC and concludes that, due 
to the small foreign shareholdings, foreign ownership fails to make any significant 
impact on corporate performance. A similar insignificant effect of foreign ownership 
is also found in Malaysia (Jalila and Devi, 2012). The impact of foreign ownership on 
the level of voluntary disclosure is not observable in the current study mainly due to 
their weak participation in the GCC stock markets. The lack of foreign investors’ 
participation is attributed to a number of non-friendly investment characteristics; 
namely, the foreign ownership regulatory restrictions, the low degree of market 
development, the presence of information asymmetry between investors and 
businesses, the weak transparency mechanisms, and the weak investor protection 
environment (Jamaani and Roca, 2015). These characteristics would discourage 
foreign investors from engaging and participating in the GCC stock exchanges.  The 
GCC stock market authorities should work more on market development and 
information efficiency in order to attract more foreign investments, the value of which 
can be explicitly seen as a mechanism for monitoring the management and demanding 
greater information disclosure. 
Board Ownership, as measured by the percentage of shares held by the board 
members, does not have significant impact on the overall voluntary disclosure as 
indicated in table 5.14. Nevertheless, table 5.15 shows a negative effect of board 
ownership on strategic information disclosure, and a positive impact on financial 
information disclosure.  
In respect to voluntary information groups, the result of a negative impact of board 
ownership on the strategic information disclosure follows the prediction of agency 
theory adopted in this study. Theoretically, board members who hold stake in the firm 
are insiders who are responsible for protecting the stakeholders’ interests through 
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closely monitoring the managers. Hence, monitoring by the other shareholders is less 
needed in this situation and consequently less voluntary disclosure is expected. In 
other words, voluntary disclosure is seen as a substitute for monitoring (Eng and Mak, 
2003). However, the influence of board ownership turns to be positive in relation to 
financial information. 
The inconsistent influence of board members’ ownership regarding the two groups 
of information, strategic and financial, may be attributed to the nature of the role of 
the board of directors. Considering the view that the key role of board members is to 
draw the firm’s strategy (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow, 2007), strategic information 
would be mostly a product of the board whereas financial information is usually 
supplied by the top management. Since strategic information is acknowledged by the 
board members, the need for disclosing this information becomes less important. In 
contrast, financial information is not determined by board members, which raises the 
need for demanding such information for monitoring purposes resulting in the 
voluntary disclosure level to increase. This explains the different results in relation to 
strategic and financial information disclosure. 
Audit Committee Ownership also appears to be statistically non-significant as 
indicated in table 5.14. Audit committee members are expected to execute efficient 
monitoring over the preparation and communication of financial information. The 
insignificant association is surprising however this may be due to the fact that the 
strategic and financial information components are significantly associated in the 
opposite directions and possibly cancelling the impact on the overall disclosure level. 
In terms of voluntary disclosure components, table 5.15 indicates a significant 
positive association between audit committee ownership and the disclosure of 
strategic information and a negative association with the disclosure of financial 
information. Similar to the board ownership, the key role of information in relation to 
audit committee members’ responsibility may explain the opposite association 
regarding the two types of information. Due to the high materiality of financial 
information to the audit committee duties, financial information is more realized by 
audit committee members than strategic information. In the case of strategic 
information, the applicability to the audit committee responsibilities is low, so the 
need for disclosing strategic related information becomes important as a mean to 
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allow shareholders to monitor their interests in the firm. Therefore, ownership of audit 
committee tends to promote the disclosure of more strategic information and less 
financial one.  
5.4.2.2 Boards Characteristics 
Board Size is found to be negatively and significantly at the 1% level associated 
with the overall voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC listed firms as 
shown in table 5.14. This negative association exists in two components of the 
voluntary disclosure indicated in table 5.15. For strategic information, the relationship 
is significant at the 1% level, and for financial information at the 5% level. The result 
in this study is consistent with the lack of communication notion (Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992), which suggests that big boards are less effective in evaluating and monitoring 
the management due to communication deficiencies and poor coordination to reach a 
consensus on strategic decisions like disclosure policy (Yermack, 1996). The benefit 
of a higher monitoring capacity found in big boards may be offset by the cost of poor 
communication typically associated with large groups. Therefore, the study suggests 
that smaller boards in GCC firms are more cohesive and effective in monitoring the 
management’s behaviour and hence better at promoting voluntary disclosure by the 
management. Hence, Hypothesis H8 is supported.  
Board Independence is not significant in relation to total voluntary disclosure as 
indicated in table 5.14. Despite the positive association between the level of total 
voluntary disclosure and independent directors found in this study, hypothesis H9 is 
not supported due to a lack of statistical significance. Board independence on the 
GCC stock exchanges is questionable, which may explain its lack of significance in 
impacting the level of disclosure. Even though board composition and independence 
are governed by effective corporate rules and regulation in the MENA region, the 
major shareholders could damage the independence of the board by significantly 
intervening in the process of selecting board members (Piesse, Strange and Toonsi, 
2012). For example, it is argued that family and government owners in GCC listed 
firms use their controlling rights to appoint board members (Al-Janadi, Abdul 
Rahman and Omar, 2012; Eulaiwi et al., 2016). This implies that the intervention 
exercised by major shareholders in the process of selecting board members 
undermines board independence and therefore reduces the effectiveness of its duty of 
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monitoring. In order to maintain board independence and its important role as a 
corporate governance mechanism, the GCC market authorities should enhance the 
role of the nomination committee in selecting independent members and ensuring an 
appropriate representation of the minority shareholders on the board.  
Regarding voluntary disclosure components, a statistical significance power is 
only present in the strategic information group at the 1% level. More independent 
directors on the board significantly increases the disclosure of strategic information. 
This result is consistent with that of Lim et al. (2007) who finds that independent 
boards provide more voluntary strategic and forward-looking information. Compared 
to insider directors, independent directors who do not hold shares in the firms and 
have limited involvement in the firm daily operations, have incentives to acquire more 
voluntary information, especially that which represent key elements in the corporate 
strategic decisions made by the board (Lim, Matolcsy and Chow, 2007). Furthermore, 
this result supports the agency theory which suggests that independent directors are 
capable of limiting the managerial opportunistic behaviours and reducing the 
information asymmetry (Fama and Jensen, 1983), which maintains their reputation as 
experts in decision control (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  
Board Compensation is insignificantly related to the total voluntary disclosure as 
shown in table 5.14. Table 5.15 also shows insignificant association between board 
compensation and the three groups of information. The result of the current study may 
indicate that the decision to disclose information beyond requirements is not 
influenced by whether or not the members of the board are well compensated. The 
reason underlying the lack of significance could also be the remuneration policy 
implied in GGC firms. In most cases, the board members’ monetary compensation is 
not linked to firm performance or profit. Members are guaranteed a previously 
specified amount of compensation regardless of firm annual performance, which may 
affect their motivations regarding effective monitoring. Therefore, hypothesis H10 in 
the current study is not supported. This may imply that the structure of the 
compensation, rather than its amount, is more effective in motivating the board 
members to perform their responsibilities effectively. 
Board Meetings in the current study are negatively and significantly associated 
with the overall voluntary disclosure score, as shown in table 5.14. This result is 
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opposite to the hypothesis in this study which predicts higher meetings are associated 
with increased voluntary disclosure. It is argued that more time the board members 
spend on discussing and evaluating the management behaviours, the more effective 
the board is in monitoring and demanding transparency for the shareholders (Payne, 
Benson and Finegold, 2009). However, the result of the current study shows more 
board meetings are associated with less voluntary disclosure. This negative and 
significant association may be explained by the view that board meetings’ frequency 
may be linked to poor voluntary disclosure. One possible explanation of this may be 
is that board members may be meeting more to discuss the difficulties faced by the 
firm in this regard. It is documented that board meetings tend to increase following a 
decline in share price, suggesting that the firm value is adversely related to board 
meetings (Vafeas, 1999).  
This negative association also appears in the components of the voluntary 
disclosure as illustrated in table 5.15, albeit less significantly. Strategic and non-
financial information are associated negatively with the number of board meetings at 
the 10% level; yet financial information seems to be insignificantly influenced by the 
frequency of board meetings. The presence of this negative relation in voluntary 
disclosure groups again may be a sign of lack of due diligence or on the other hand 
higher number of meetings may be taking place to discuss the issues surrounding low 
level of disclosure.   
Board Attendance does not appear to have a significant relationship with the 
level of voluntary disclosure or its components as indicated in tables 5.14 and 5.15, 
respectively. This result contradicts agency theory that views directors’ attendance 
behaviour as a proxy for evaluating the effectiveness of the supervisory function of 
the board (Lin, Yeh and Yang, 2014). Director absence means less time spent on 
monitoring the managers and hence a less effective board in terms of exercising its 
duty to protect investors’ interests and improve the level of disclosure. However, in 
the GCC context, time lost as a result of members’ absence can be compensated 
through informal social gathering. Directors usually have close social ties which 
allow them to discuss firm matters outside the corporate setting. This may explain the 
insignificant negative impact of board absence on the effectiveness of the board. 
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Average Board Directorship is positive and significant at the 5% level in relation 
to the total level of voluntary disclosure as illustrated in table 5.14. This positive 
association supports the prediction of hypothesis H13; that boards with multiple 
directorships have wider experience and knowledge regarding monitoring the 
management and looking after the shareholders’ interests, which are consequently 
reflected in better board effectiveness and higher voluntary disclosure. In addition, 
board members with multiple directorships are more likely to perform better in order 
to preserve their capital reputation (Gul and Leung, 2004). The results support Ferris 
et al. (2003) who find no evidence that multiple directorships damage directors’ 
professional responsibilities or undermine their ability to monitor the management 
(Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard, 2003). The current study proves that the 
advantages of holding more than one directorship outweigh the busyness 
shortcomings. 
In relation to voluntary disclosure groups in table 5.15, non-financial information 
and financial components are also positively influenced by the additional 
directorships held by the board members. Board members holding multiple 
directorships are more likely to be exposed to a wider range of financial reports, 
which strengthen their ability to promote disclosing more information. 
Audit Committee Size is positively and significantly at the 1% level associated 
with the overall voluntary disclosure, thereby supporting hypothesis H14 in the 
current study. Specifically, table 5.15 shows that bigger audit committees are also 
associated with the higher voluntary disclosure of strategic and financial information. 
This result is similar to that found in prior studies (Ahmed Haji, 2015; Osariemen et 
al., 2018) suggesting that bigger audit committees have a higher level of knowledge 
and expertise that enables their members to effectively monitor the financial reporting 
and ensure the flow of reliable information to outside parties. Both audit committee 
size and board size in this study are significantly related to the voluntary disclosure 
level, but in opposite directions. While bigger boards are associated with less 
voluntary disclosure, bigger audit committees encourage more disclosure. The audit 
committee size results lean more toward the close monitoring role performed by this 
committee and hence bigger and better resourced committee appear to be enhancing 
disclosure. While the board size results support the poor communication notion 
usually associated with big decision-making groups. This difference found in GCC 
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firms can be explained based on the number of members.  According to the 
descriptive statistics of the current study, the minimum size of the board found within 
the sample is 5 and the maximum is 18 members, whereas, the audit committee has a 
maximum of six members for the whole sample. This may imply that due to the small 
number of audit committee members compared to that in the board of directors, the 
members of the audit committee find it easier to communicate and hence the 
advantage of having multiple professionals becomes clear from the outcome of the 
audit committees and the level of disclosure for firms with a large audit committee. 
On the other hand, regarding the board of directors, the difficulty of communicating 
between the members seems to outweigh the advantage of having several experts on 
the boards.  
5.5 Univariate Analysis 
5.5.1 Independent T-test 
Table 5.16 contains univariate statistics from the independent t-test, showing the 
significant differences in the mean values of the study variables for firms that are 
larger in size compared to those that are smaller. The sample is split into large and 
small sub-samples using the median of the firm size measured by total assets. Because 
firm size has been identified as having a positive association with disclosure in the 
literature, larger firms are expected to provide better voluntary disclosure and to 
employ better corporate governance mechanisms.  
As expected, the statistics from the table show that on average larger firms provide 
more voluntary disclosure compared to smaller ones. The mean total voluntary 
disclosure as well as the mean of its three main components is significantly higher in 
larger firms than firms that are small in size. This finding highlights the fact that large 
firms are better resourced and therefore face less costs associated with voluntary 
disclosure, both in terms of production and proprietary costs (Watson, Shrives and 
Marston, 2002). Another explanation of the variation in the level of voluntary 
disclosure between large and small firms is that the agency costs tend to be higher in 
larger firms since the proportion of outside shareholders is expected to be more than 
that in smaller firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Whereas in small firms, managers 
are mostly shareholders (Afrifa and Tauringana, 2015). Thus, providing greater 
disclosure is a tool used by larger firms in order to mitigate the agency costs.  
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Table 5.16 Independent t-test 
Variable Mean T Value (sig) Mean Rank Z Value (sig) 
Big Small Big Small 
VDT 0.139 0.109 6.339** 368.30 292.47 5.121** 
VDS 0.134 0.118 4.006* 358.28 302.55 3.989** 
VDNF 0.149 0.102 6.124** 369.54 291.22 5.324** 
VDF 0.132 0.110 3.810** 352.39 308.47 3.014** 
GOVOWN 0.155 0.079 5.142** 370.85 285.63 6.202** 
FAMILOWN 0.025 0.036 -1.206* 325.41 334.63 -1.342 
INSTOWN 0.254 0.290 -1.955** 319.04 341.06 -1.489 
FOROWN 0.054 0.043 0.947 161.38 151.79 0.892 
BOWN 0.045 0.093 -4.351** 159.67 209.87 -4.527** 
ACOWN 0.005 0.010 -2.083** 143.87 190.27 -4.521** 
BSIZE 8.53 7.68 6.676 375.07 283.37 6.353** 
BIND 0.471 0.529 -2.733 268.29 304.21 -2.607** 
BMEET 6.18 5.76 2.293* 301.65 270.62 2.286* 
BATTEND 0.895 0.892 0.453 269.47 262.91 0.493 
BCOMPSQ 964.49 594.19 9.098** 393.45 261.14 8.958** 
AVGDIRECTOR 0.535 0.436 2.596 353.74 304.96 3.329** 
ACSIZE 3.53 3.31 3.748** 302.28 268.26 2.957** 
AUDFIRM (big4) 0.80 0.64 4.614** 356.70 304.14 4.544** 
FIRMSIZE 9.380 8.367 30.734** 495.00 165.00 22.232** 
Profitability (ROA) 0.056 0.061 -0.750* 312.37 348.74 2.454* 
LEVER 0.448 0.336 7.235 381.97 278.72 6.957** 
LIQUId 1.786 2.372 -4.520** 298.43 359.67 -4.135** 
 
  . ** Significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
    . * Significant at the 5% level (2-tailed) 
In relation to the ownership structure variables, the government shareholdings are 
significantly higher in large firms than that in small ones. The tendency of the GCC 
governments’ funds to hold a larger stake in big firms is understandable since they 
seek to achieve great returns on their investments in addition to some political and 
economic controlling goals. Family, institutional, board, and audit committee 
ownership on the other hand, is significantly higher in smaller firms than larger ones. 
The result also shows that for foreign ownership although higher in larger firms as 
expected, the difference is not statistically significant.  
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 The study also reveals that the boards of firms that are larger in size meet more 
frequently, pay higher compensation to the board members, and have a bigger audit 
committee compared to firms that are smaller. The means of board size and additional 
directorships held by the board members are also higher in larger firms, but not 
statistically significant. Regarding board independence, the difference is not 
significant between large and small firms, yet the result indicates that smaller firms 
are more independent than larger ones. 
For the control variables, the average audit performed by one of the big 4 audit 
firms is significantly higher in larger firms compared to smaller ones. This indicates 
that the 4 big audit firms tend to audit big firms more than small ones. For the 
financial variable, the mean of profitability and liquidity is significantly higher in 
smaller firms compare to those that larger in size. In addition, larger firms are more 
leveraged; however, the difference is not statistically significant.   
5.5.2 Regression Analysis for Big and Small Firms 
Given the ownership structure and board of directors attributes differences 
between big and small firms as illustrated in the descriptive statistics in table 5.16, the 
regression analysis is needed to recognize whether these factors affect the voluntary 
disclosure differently in big and in small ones. Table 5.17 and 5.18 show the 
regression results related to big and small firms. Since firm size is largely documented 
to have a positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure, the regression of big 
and small firms provides further insight to the differences of the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure between firms that are big in size compared to those that are 
small. Firm size is measured as the total assets. 
Big and small firms are slightly different in terms of total voluntary disclosure 
determinants as illustrated in table 5.17 and 5.18. Board size negatively impacts the 
total voluntary disclosure in both big and small firms. This emphasises the 
communication difficulties associated with large groups discussed earlier in this 
chapter, indicating that smaller boards in GCC firms have more coherence and 
effectiveness in performing their role of monitoring and promoting transparency. Firm 
size is also significant in both big and small firms suggesting that bigger firms 
provide more total voluntary disclosure. This result highlights that bigger firms are 
better resourced and experiencing higher agency costs according to the agency theory. 
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However, family ownership, board ownership, audit committee ownership, board 
independence, board meetings, board compensation, and other directorships influence 
the total voluntary disclosure differently in big and small firms. Family ownership 
results in more disclosure in big firms and less disclosure in small firms. This result 
may be contributed to the level of agency theory problem. The agency problem 
between family ownership and minority shareholders is more evident in bigger firms 
than in small ones due to the large number of shareholders in big firms. Board 
ownership results in an increase in total voluntary disclosure in big firms only and 
audit committee ownership negatively affects the disclosure in small firms only. 
Board independence and board meetings are negatively associated to the level of total 
voluntary disclosure in big firms only. Board compensation and profitability 
positively impact the total voluntary disclosure of small firms and other directorship 
impacted negatively on that. 
Regarding the determinants of voluntary disclosure components, the results are 
different in big and small firms. In relation to strategic information, board ownership 
and board size in small firms are negatively related to the disclosure of strategic 
information. The results also indicate a positive impact of profitability on the 
disclosure of strategic information in small firms. On the other hand, strategic 
information in big firms are not associated with any of the ownership structure and 
board attributes variables. Only firms that are audited by one of the big audit firms are 
documented to provide more strategic information in firms that are large in size. 
The disclosure of non-financial information is significantly different in big and 
small firms in terms of its determinants. Family ownership tends to impact the non-
financial disclosure positively in big firms, and negatively in small firms. Audit 
committee ownership has a positive impact on non-financial disclosure in big firms 
and an adverse one in small firms. Board independence and board meetings seem to 
not have an impact on the disclosure of non-financial information in small firms while 
resulting in less non-financial disclosure in big firms. Foreign ownership, board size, 
and other directorship held by board members are all negatively impacting the 
disclosure of non-financial information in small firms while having no impact in big 
firms. Board compensation is positively related to the disclosure of non-financial 
information in small firms. 
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Financial disclosure determinants are also different in big and small firms. 
Government ownership and institutional ownership is negatively impacting the 
disclosure of financial information in big firms while not affecting this information in 
small firms. Family ownership promotes more financial disclosure in small firms and 
has no impact on financial information in big firms. Board ownership positively 
impacts the financial information disclosure in both big and small firms while audit 
committee ownership negatively influences the disclosure of financial information 
only in small firms. Board size, board independence and board meetings impact the 
disclosure of financial information negatively only in big firms while board 
attendance results in less disclosure in small firms only. 
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Table 5.17 Regression analysis for big firms 
Variables Total voluntary 
disclosure 
Strategic Non-financial Financial 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
GOVOWN -.082 -.964 -.104 -1.267 .009 .060 -.152 -2.175** 
FAMILOWN .231 2.848*** .105 1.341 .493 3.550*** .058 .880 
INSTOWN -.001 -.009 -.013 -.205 .129 1.177 -.114 -2.180** 
FOROWN -.276 -.803 .015 .046 -.622 -1.057 -.099 -.351 
BOWN .371 2.239** .067 .417 .390 1.376 .533 3.932*** 
ACOWN 1.601 1.274 1.594 1.317 3.778 1.732* -.359 -.349 
BSIZE -.018 -2.2772*** -.009 -1.510 -.015 -1.341 -.026 -4.854*** 
BIND -.118 -1.875* .024 .387 -.206 -1.911* -.119 -2.299** 
BMEET -.011 -2.522** -.006 -1.380 -.018 -2.383** -.008 -2.147** 
BATTEND -.070 -.415 -.040 -.249 -.326 -1.131 .159 1.156 
BCOMPSQ 3.985E-6 .142 3.352E-5 1.237 -2.745E-5 -.569 1.527E-5 .663 
AVGDIRECTOR .012 .535 -.023 -1.022 .033 .847 .013 .665 
ACSIZE -.004 -.286 -.005 -.411 -.018 -.848 .011 1.065 
AUDFIRM (big4) .042 1.635 .045 1.827* .057 1.309 .026 1.260 
FIRMSIZE .063 1.848* .051 1.537 .095 1.620 .039 .173 
Profitability (ROA) -.297 -1.081 -.433 -1.637 -.178 -.377 -.342 -1.520 
LEVER -.204 -1.671 -.177 -1.509 -.224 -1.071 -.202 -2.023 
LIQUId .002 .202 -.007 -.782 .014 .926 -.005 -.681 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
Country dummies Included 
F Test 3.46*** 
0.73 
0.52 
1.31 
0.50 
0.12 
3.54*** 
0.73 
0.53 
4.69*** 
0.78 
0.62 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
 
. *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
. ** Statistically significant at 5% level 
. *  Statistically significant at 10% level 
Variables definitions 
Dependent variable: total voluntary disclosure 
Independent variables: GOVOWN = percentage of shares own by the government; FAMILOWN = 
percentage of shares own by the family members; INSTOWN = percentage of shares own by the 
institutions; FOROWN = percentage of shares own by foreign investors; BOWN = percentage of 
shares own by the board members; ACOWN = percentage of shares own by the audit committee 
members; BSIZE = the number of members on the board of directors; BIND = percentage of 
independent directors on the board; BMEET = the number of meetings held by the board of directors 
during the year; BATTEND = percentage of board members’ attendance during the year; BCOMPSQ = 
the square root for the amount of compensation paid to the board members during the year; 
AVGDIRECTOR = the average number of directorships held by the board members; ACSIZE = the 
number of audit committee members; AUDFIRM = a dummy variable, indicating occasions when the 
audit is performed by one of the big 4 audit firms; FIRMSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
ROA = return on assets; LEVER = percentage of total debt to total assets; LIQUID = percentage of 
current assets to current liabilities. 
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Table 5.18 Regression analysis for small firms 
Variables Total voluntary 
disclosure 
Strategic Non-financial Financial 
Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value Coef T-Value 
GOVOWN -.036 -.408 -.044 -.388 -.101 -.600 .015 .261 
FAMILOWN -1.628 -2.223** -.961 -1.028 -4.891 -3.522*** 1.047 2.180** 
INSTOWN -.044 -1.242 -.032 -.709 -.091 -1.371 -.005 -.199 
FOROWN -.194 -1.605 .038 .248 -.482 -2.106** -.088 -1.106 
BOWN -.081 -.943 -.211 -1.935* -.199 -1.227 .124 2.206** 
ACOWN -.703 -2.361** .506 1.331 -1.377 -2.438** -.790 -4.046*** 
BSIZE -.012 -2.400** -.013 -2.019** -.027 -2.741** .002 .589 
BIND .049 1.106 .079 1.388 .080 .947 .002 .056 
BMEET -.002 -.512 -.005 -1.333 -.004 -.628 .003 1.297 
BATTEND -.011 -.109 -.065 -.520 .283 1.535 -.252 -3.944*** 
BCOMPSQ .000 -3.418*** 3.366E-5 .574 .000 -3.271*** .000 -4.976*** 
AVGDIRECTOR -.042 -2.270** -.040 -1.700 -.068 -1.949** -.017 -1.425 
ACSIZE .012 .892 .020 1.199 .009 .351 .011 1.234 
AUDFIRM (big4) -.012 -.710 -.015 -.671 -.018 -.571 -.006 -.518 
FIRMSIZE .167 3.464*** -.018 -.285 .439 4.809*** .018 .569 
Profitability (ROA) .166 1.753* .413 3.417*** .087 .483 .069 1.106 
LEVER -.052 -.804 .095 1.142 -.062 -.502 -.148 -3.472*** 
LIQUId -.009 -1.173 -.007 -.654 -.014 -.947 -.006 -1.157 
Industry dummies Included 
Year dummies Included 
Country dummies Included 
F Test 3.17*** 
0.80 
0.54 
4.06*** 
0.84 
0.63 
3.98*** 
0.83 
0.63 
8.38*** 
0.91 
0.81 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
 
. *** Statistically significant at 1% level 
. ** Statistically significant at 5% level 
. *  Statistically significant at 10% level 
Variables definitions 
Dependent variable: total voluntary disclosure 
Independent variables: GOVOWN = percentage of shares own by the government; FAMILOWN = 
percentage of shares own by the family members; INSTOWN = percentage of shares own by the 
institutions; FOROWN = percentage of shares own by foreign investors; BOWN = percentage of 
shares own by the board members; ACOWN = percentage of shares own by the audit committee 
members; BSIZE = the number of members on the board of directors; BIND = percentage of 
independent directors on the board; BMEET = the number of meetings held by the board of directors 
during the year; BATTEND = percentage of board members’ attendance during the year; BCOMPSQ = 
the square root for the amount of compensation paid to the board members during the year; 
AVGDIRECTOR = the average number of directorships held by the board members; ACSIZE = the 
number of audit committee members; AUDFIRM = a dummy variable, indicating occasions when the 
audit is performed by one of the big 4 audit firms; FIRMSIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
ROA = return on assets; LEVER = percentage of total debt to total assets; LIQUID = percentage of 
current assets to current liabilities. 
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In summary, the determinants of voluntary disclosure in big and small firms vary. 
Regarding ownership structure, family ownership is likely to have a positive impact 
on voluntary disclosure of big firms while in small firms it has a negative impact on 
total voluntary disclosure and its component of non-financial information , no impact 
on the component of strategic information, and a positive impact on the financial 
component. In small firms, Family ownership seems to only promotes the disclosure 
of financial information. Board ownership is increasing the voluntary disclosure of 
financial information in both big and small firms, and it results in less strategic 
information in small firms. This finding illustrates the importance of the type of 
information to the board of directors’ responsibility, which results in demanding less 
strategic information, since such information is the product of the board, and more 
financial information, since they need it to form their decisions. Audit committee 
ownership results in more non-financial information in big firms and less financial 
information in small firms. Because financial information is usually known to audit 
committee members, the need for demanding this information and disclosing it is 
likely to be less important. 
In terms of board attributes, the negative impact of board size is evident in 
both big and small firms, indicating that smaller boards have a positive impact 
on transparency and disclosure of firms in the GCC. Board meetings and board 
independence are negatively affecting total, non-financial, and financial 
disclosure in big firms only while having no impact on small firms’ disclosure 
practice. This highlights the argument that increased number of board meetings 
during the year could be a sign for difficulties facing the firms. Moreover, the 
impact of board independence only became significant in the regression analysis 
of big and small firms, negatively impacting the disclosure of big firms. This 
result may indicate the intervention of big shareholders in the nomination and 
appointing of independent board members in the GCC firms, which results in 
impairing board independence. Big shareholders are likely to invest in big firms, 
which may explain the negative significant effect of board independence in big 
firms only. Furthermore, the evident of the negative association between 
voluntary disclosure and board independence in big firms only may be an 
indication of the inadequate knowledge of the firm and its business by 
independent members compared to insider board members (Anderson and 
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Reeb, 2004). It is expected that understanding all aspect of the firm is easier in 
small firms than bigger ones, which may explain why the negative impact of 
board independence is only found in big firms. Multiple directorships impact 
disclosure negatively in small firm only while having no impact in big firms. The 
insufficient resources found in small firms may explain the negative impact of 
multiple directorships on the disclosure of small firms. Board members in small 
firms need to participate in preparing board material for decision-making 
compared to board in big firms where resources are available and information is 
prepared for board members to enable them to take their strategic decision. 
Therefore, sitting on multiple boards may affect the effectiveness of board 
members in small firms where resources are limited and they need to exercise 
more efforts. 
To sum up, the results show that a reduction in board size and an increase in 
family and board ownership improve the disclosure in big firms. Also, a 
reduction in board size, a decrease in family and audit committee ownership, and 
a diminution of number of directorship held by board members improve the 
voluntary disclosure in small firm. 
In conclusion, all explanations suggested in the above discussion of the 
differences in the determinants of voluntary disclosure between big and small 
firms is a preliminary effort due to the limited literature comparing voluntary 
disclosure practice between big and small firms. Therefore, further research and 
examination is needed to either assert or negate the explanations of the results 
provided in the previous section. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter investigates the impact of a number of ownership structure aspects 
and board attributes on the level of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of GCC 
listed firms. It starts by presenting the descriptive statistics related to the dependent 
variable, voluntary disclosure, followed by the descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables for the pooled sample and for each country individually. This 
analysis reveals that the average level of total voluntary disclosure is low at 12 per 
cent with the highest mean found in UAE firms, at 20 per cent, followed by firms in 
  205 
Oman and Bahrain at 13 per cent, then Saudi Arabia and Qatar at 12 per cent, and 
finally firms in Kuwait at 8 per cent. The results show a trend of increasing voluntary 
disclosure over the three years period from 2014 to 2016.  The chapter then presents 
the results of the univariate analysis; particularly, it features the correlations among 
the different variables used in this study. In relation to ownership type, a number of 
variables show significant and positive correlations with the level of voluntary 
disclosure, government, family, and foreign ownership. This suggests that 
concentrated ownership in addition to government, family, and foreign ownership 
promote greater voluntary disclosure and transparency. In respect to board attribute 
variables, the results reveal that board size, board independence, and frequency of 
board meetings are all positively and significantly associated to total voluntary 
disclosure, suggesting that at least at the univariate level, larger, more independent, 
and more active boards are more effective in performing their role of representing the 
shareholders’ interests and offer more information. There is also a positive association 
between both board compensation and the average number of cross-directorships with 
the level of voluntary disclosure, suggesting that highly compensated and experienced 
directors are expected to perform better and ensure a level of transparency for the 
shareholders.  
Following the correlation analysis, the chapter presents the results of the 
multivariate regression analysis. In summary, the empirical finding reported in the 
total voluntary disclosure model finds that the key factors that promote the disclosure 
of more voluntary information in GCC firms are having family ownership, small 
boards, fewer board meetings, more multiple directorships held by the board 
members, big audit committees, and bigger firms. Other factors seem to have an 
effect on only a particular type of information. For example, the shares owned by the 
audit committee members and proportion of independent directors on the board in 
addition to firm profitability; all of these appear positively to affect the level of 
strategic information disclosure. The impact of institutional ownership is only notable 
in promoting non-financial information disclosure, and shares owned by the board 
members encourage the disclosure of financial information specifically. 
Finally, the chapter continues with the univariate analysis by outlining the 
difference in the means for the study variables between firms that are larger in size 
compared to those that are smaller using total assets as a proxy for firm size. The 
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statistics show that, on average, larger firms provide more voluntary disclosure 
compared to smaller ones; the mean total voluntary disclosure as well as the mean of 
its three main groups is significantly higher in larger firms than in smaller ones. This 
finding supports the idea that large firms can afford the costs associated with the 
production and preparation of information and also the costs of such information 
being used by their competitors.  This followed by a regression analysis of big and 
small firms in relation to voluntary disclosure and its three group of information. The 
results of the regressions indicate a difference in the determinant of voluntary 
disclosure between big and small firms.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Corporate governance has attracted a significant attention during the last two 
decades, particularly after a number of failures and collapses of well-known 
corporations, resulting in either new or amended corporate structures, codes and 
guidelines. Most of the regulatory bodies worldwide have shifted their attention 
toward strengthening the corporate governance environment and increasing the level 
of transparency in order to prevent and detect any inappropriate behaviour in a timely 
manner. Therefore, financial reporting and disclosure are considered an important 
corporate governance mechanism that enables the stakeholders to evaluate the firm’s 
financial position and management performance. The annual report published by the 
firm is the main source of regular, reliable, and comparable information (Botosan, 
1997; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004), which is used by outside stakeholders to 
monitor the management actions and detect any unacceptable behaviour that might 
potentially lead to a major corporate breakdown. The more information available, the 
better the evaluation and monitoring process is, therefore releasing financial and non-
financial information by the firm voluntarily beyond that required by the laws and 
regulations is viewed as a way to increase transparency and enhance the corporate 
governance environment (Scaltrito, 2016). 
This study seeks to examine voluntary disclosure and its determinants. Firstly, it 
aims to measure the level of voluntary disclosure provided by listed firms in six GCC 
countries; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, and Qatar. Specifically, 
the study sample consists of 220 non-financial listed firms with 660 collected annual 
reports relating to a three-year period; 2014, 2015, and 2016. Secondly, this study 
investigates the impact of selected ownership types and board of directors’ 
characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure by GCC firms. It seeks to identify 
the type of shareholders and board’s attributes that enhance transparency and increase 
the level of voluntary disclosure. In order to answer the research questions of the 
study outlined in chapter one and achieve the study objectives mentioned above, a 
deductive approach and quantitative methods were considered suitable. 
To achieve the first objective, a disclosure index consisting of 71 voluntary items 
was employed. The index was adapted based on that developed by Meek et al. (1995). 
The index is divided into three main groups: strategic, non-financial, and financial 
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information, and further categorized into 11 sub-groups; namely, general corporate 
information, corporate strategy, acquisitions and disposals, future prospects, 
information about directors, employee information, social policy and value added 
information, segmental information, financial review, foreign currency information, 
and stock price information. The reason for such a classification is to enhance our 
understanding of the assessment of the level of voluntary disclosure by looking at 
each group of information individually. 
The second objective is achieved by utilizing a correlation matrix and a 
multivariate regression analysis in order to detect the possible relations between 
ownership structure, board attribute, and the level of voluntary disclosure. First, the 
correlation matrix is applied to examine the strength and significance of the relations 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure as a dependent variable and each of the 
independent and control variables. Then, in order to detect any significant relations 
between voluntary disclosure and any of the independent variables, four regression 
models are developed. All have the same independent variable (ownership structure, 
and board attributes) and four different dependent variables (total voluntary 
disclosure, strategic voluntary disclosure, financial voluntary disclosure, and non-
financial voluntary disclosure). This modelling is employed to capture the impact of a 
number of characteristics on the level of voluntary disclosure and whether this impact 
differ based on the type of information disclosed.   
 The results of the descriptive analysis show that the level of voluntary disclosure 
provided by GCC listed firms is low at 12 per cent, ranging from as low as 3 per cent 
up to a maximum of 36 per cent. The level of voluntary disclosure by the UAE firms 
is the highest at 20 per cent while Kuwaiti firms provide the lowest voluntary 
disclosure at 8 per cent. In term of voluntary disclosure groups, GCC firms tend to 
disclose more strategic and non-financial information than financial information. The 
highest mean is found in general corporate and corporate strategy information, which 
belong to strategic information group, at 55 and 35 per cent, respectively, and the 
lowest mean disclosure is found in future prospect information and financial review 
information and, subgroups of strategic and financial information, at 1 and 3 per cent 
level, respectively. This results regarding voluntary disclosure groups indicate the 
need for increasing the disclosure level related to the financial aspect of the firm such 
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as segmental information, future forecasts information, and information on financial 
ratios.  
In regards to industry type, the statistics reveal that the energy and services sectors 
provide more disclosure than do the manufacturing and real estate ones. Although the 
difference in the disclosure level between these industries is minor, it may indicate 
that the political pressure on some industries, such as the energy sector motivate 
companies to disclose more information as a means of avoiding government 
intervention or penalties. It may also indicate the proprietary costs in other industries 
such as the manufacturing sector which leads to a lower disclosure level by such 
companies in order to preserve their competitive positions. 
The result of the regression analysis shows that the voluntary disclosure by GCC 
firs is determined by a number of corporate governance mechanisms. In regards to the 
ownership structure types, the findings show that ownership structure have an impact 
on the voluntary disclosure and its groups of information. Specifically, family 
ownership is found to have a positive influence on the total voluntary disclosure and 
particularly on non-financial and financial information. The results also indicate that 
Institutional ownership is positively influencing the disclosure of non-financial 
information. Both the presence of ownership by board members and audit committee 
members exert a significant impact on voluntary disclosure groups. While board 
ownership increase the disclosure of financial information and decrease the disclosure 
of strategic information, audit committee ownership influence the financial 
information disclosure negatively and the strategic information positively. 
The analysis of the impact of board attributes on the level of voluntary disclosure 
shows significant associations. Board size is proven to have a negative impact on the 
total voluntary disclosure in GCC firms, more specifically on strategic and financial 
disclosure. Board independence exerts no influence on the total voluntary disclosure; 
however; from the findings it results in an increase of strategic information disclosure. 
This study also finds evidence of a negative association between board meeting and 
the total voluntary disclosure, particularly to the disclosure of strategic and non-
financial information, highlighting the idea that more meeting during the year is a 
sign of board members attempts to deal with problems or difficulties encountering the 
firm. Moreover, the study finds evidence that the board members’ expertise and 
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knowledge (measured in terms of multiple holding of board seats in other listed 
companies) has a positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure, especially the 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information. The study also documents a 
positive association between audit committee size and the level of voluntary 
disclosure, more specifically on the strategic and financial information disclosure.  
The analysis of the comparison between big firms and small firms in terms of their 
voluntary disclosure show differences in the determinants of the voluntary disclosure 
between them. Board size is negatively affecting the level of voluntary disclosure in 
both big and small firms. Family ownership promotes the disclosure of voluntary 
information in big firms while having a negative impact on total voluntary disclosure 
and non-financial disclosure in small firms. The results also indicate that an increase 
of board ownership in big firms result in more voluntary disclosure and an increase of 
audit committee ownership in small firms results in less voluntary disclosure. 
 Implications of the Study Findings 
The focus of this thesis is on investigating the level of voluntary disclosure and its 
determinants in GCC listed firms. The results of this study have important 
implications for the regulators, enforcement bodies, and investors within the GCC 
stock exchanges. The low level of voluntary disclosure documented in the current 
study leaves market regulators with large scope for further improvements. The study 
has determined a number of ownership structure types and board characteristics that 
promote transparency and enhance the level of voluntary disclosure. These findings 
can assist market regulators in their efforts to increase transparency within the GCC 
capital markets by implementing corporate governance mechanisms, which have been 
proven to influence the voluntary information disclosure positively. 
This study shows that the most important ownership type with regard to 
influencing voluntary disclosure in GCC listed firms is family ownership. Family 
ownership evidently enhances the level of total voluntary disclosure of both, non-
financial and financial information. This result suggests that the regulators in GCC 
stock markets should focus on encouraging unlisted family firms to go public and 
make their shares available for trading in the GCC capital markets because such firms 
have been proven to provide more disclosure voluntarily, possibly in order to ease the 
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agency problem between family owners and minority shareholders, and to reserve 
their family name’s reputation form one generation to the next. 
The study also shows that institutional shareholders are positively related to the 
level of non-financial voluntary disclosure, such as information about the directors 
and employees and social responsibility information; however, they have a non-
significant impact on the total voluntary disclosure or the other two groups of 
information. The lack of significance between institutional investors and the overall 
voluntary disclosure is primarily attributed to the immature community of 
institutional investors who are mainly local investors (predominantly government and 
family enterprises) with a minimal level of engagement and interactions with firms’ 
related issues. This situation is an opportunity for market regulators to improve and 
diversify the institutional investors community to include foreign and local 
institutions, which are mostly investment funds with a high level of sophistication and 
knowledge that enable them to perform their essential role as a monitoring 
mechanism in the process of developing the GCC stock markets and promoting 
transparency. 
The findings of this study provide an assessment of the disclosure practice in the 
GCC stock markets that might prove beneficial to potential investors, especially 
foreign investors, to help them to form their investment decisions regarding GCC 
related investment opportunities. The low level of voluntary disclosure documented in 
GCC listed firms may explain the minimal participation of foreign institutions even 
after the relaxation of the restrictions applied to foreign investors. Increasing the 
transparency within the GCC stock markets should make the corporate governance 
environment seem more attractive and less risky to foreign investors. Foreign 
investment participation is considered an important element in the process of 
developing the stock market. Foreign investors who come from more developed and 
transparent market environments are expected to transfer their knowledge and 
expertise, which will contributes to the development of both the emerging and 
developing markets.  
The most important variables, in relation to the board of directors’ factors that 
influence the level of voluntary disclosure are board size, board meetings, and cross 
directorships. Smaller boards that meet less frequently and contain members with 
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multiple directorships disclose more voluntary information. This implies that the 
market regulators should keep the number of directors on the board small to ensure 
more cohesive and effective decision-making and monitoring process. They should 
also consider not restricting the number of other memberships held by the board 
members to a minimum number since multiple directorships have proven to increase 
the knowledge and expertise of the members, which is then reflected in the 
functioning of the board. Finally, the frequency of the board meetings may not be an 
indication of board effectiveness and close monitoring but may, rather reflect the 
difficulties facing the firm that require an increased number of meetings to be held 
during the year. 
The findings also suggest an insignificant relation between board independence 
and the level of voluntary disclosure except in the case of strategic information, which 
is significantly and positively related to the percentage of independent members on 
the board. The insignificant relation with board independence may imply that the 
process of selecting the board members is not transparent, indicating that the major 
shareholders exercise their power to select board members who represent their 
interests. This results in board members who are legally classified as independent yet 
have personal relations with the major shareholders who selected them. In order to 
maintain board independence and its role in strengthening board function, the GCC 
markets regulators and authorities should clearly set rules for selecting board 
members and ensure the presence of an independent nominating committee to oversee 
the selection process and confirm a fair representation of minority shareholders on the 
board. 
Moreover, the results of this study shows a weak and insignificant association 
between board compensation and the level of voluntary disclosure, which may 
indicate that the decision to disclose information beyond the requirements is not 
influenced by whether or not the members of the board are well-compensated, or may 
be attributed to the compensation policy employed in most GCC firms whereby the 
compensation is not linked to the performance or profit achieved but is, rather, a 
specific amount that is previously determined, regardless of the financial results. 
Therefore, the market regulators and remuneration committees in the GCC should 
restructure their compensation in order to make it more effective in terms of 
motivating the board members and promoting good corporate governance. The results 
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of this thesis imply that the structure of the compensation matters more than the 
amount in terms of motivating the board members and ensuring their effective 
performance. 
The analysis of big and small firms in relation to their voluntary disclosure 
practice has important implications for policy makers and market regulators. Given 
that the determinants of voluntary disclosure differ in big and small firms, market 
authorities may benefit from the results in this study in their efforts to increase market 
transparency and disclosure level.  
In general, the results of the thesis have important implications for the market 
regulators and current and potential investors because it identifies the corporate 
governance factors that promote transparency and increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, the results will aid the market regulators to make changes and 
modifications to the current rules and regulations based on the study findings in order 
to increase the voluntary disclosure and market transparency. Investors may also 
benefit from the study findings by seeking to invest in firms that possess the corporate 
governance characteristics that have been proven in this study to have a positive 
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 Limitation of the Study 
Even though the study has important findings and implications as illustrated in the 
previous section, there are a number of limitations that need to be addressed before 
these findings can be generalized. First, the study sample consists of 220 non-
financial firms from seven stock exchanges. Therefore, generalizing the findings to 
financial firms, such as banks and insurance companies, or non-listed firms may not 
be applicable. 
The study uses four regression models containing a number of ownership and 
board variables that have been chosen based on the previous literature or theoretical 
assumptions. However, the study fails to explore any environmental and contextual 
factors such as social and cultural norms, economic visions, and political connections, 
that may further explain the disclosure practice in the GCC setting. The study 
provides a description of these contextual aspects of GCC countries in chapter three 
as the key motivations for conducting the study in this context yet, due to 
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measurement difficulties, time limitations, and data unavailability, such aspects are 
not included in the analysis. 
Regarding the theoretical framework of the study, the study has focused on agency 
theory to explain the relations between corporate governance factors and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The selection of agency theory is based on the nature of the 
study variables. The study views the disclosure of information as a tool that the 
management may use to reduce the agency costs related to monitoring by providing 
more information voluntarily in order to enable the stakeholders to perform their role 
of monitoring and supervising over the management. However, the adoption of 
additional theories such as legitimacy theory (Williams, 1999), signalling theory 
(Akerlof, 1970), and political cost theory (Ness and Mirza, 1991), may extend our 
understanding of voluntary disclosure and provide a deeper base for exploring 
disclosure’s determinants.  
A further limitation is the study’s reliance on annual reports (financial statements 
and board of directors or corporate governance reports) as the main source of 
financial and non-financial information. Even though annual reports are considered 
the most reliable source of information in †he GCC (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004), 
there are other avenues relevant to the context of the GCC that may be used by the 
firm to disclose voluntary information, such as the companies’ websites.  
The study uses a disclosure index that was created by Meek et al. (1995) after 
modifying it to fit the disclosure requirements of the six GCC states. The index 
consists of 71 items, which are voluntary in all GCC firms. This number of items is 
reasonable compared to the disclosure literature; however, some firms may not be 
credited for disclosing voluntary information because such information is not 
included in the index. This may imply that the index used to measure the voluntary 
disclosure level does not fully capture all of the voluntary information provided by the 
firms; nevertheless, it contains a realistic number of items that cover 11 groups of 
information, aiming to cover as many of the voluntary items in the GCC context as 
possible.  
While these limitations are recognized, they do not weaken the significant 
contributions to the knowledge of voluntary disclosure and the factors influencing it 
in the context of GCC firms. These limitations can be viewed as opportunities for 
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future researches and extending our understanding of the voluntary disclosure practice 
and its determinants. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations of the current study open up new avenues for further research. 
First, examining the level of voluntary disclosure in relation to contextual factors such 
as social, cultural, economic, and political variables may reveal new relations and 
determinants that add to the generalizing scope of the results to include other 
developing countries that are characterized by similar factors.  
It would also be interesting to study the voluntary disclosure by non-listed firms 
and firms in the financial sector to understand their motivations in providing more 
disclosure, taking into consideration that the users of these firms differ from those of 
non-financial listed ones in terms of both their expectations and their need for the 
information.  
The current study documents a significant positive impact of family ownership on 
the level of voluntary disclosure, which calls for further research on the disclosure 
policy of family firms that could usefully explore whether this increased voluntary 
disclosure is solely determined by the family ownership or by other factors, such as 
the presence of family members on the board. 
The existing literature on voluntary disclosure almost entirely relies on agency 
theory in explaining disclosure practices. The use of other theoretical framework may 
lead to new findings and interpretations.  
A further question raised by this study is to what extent is the presence of other 
directorships held by the board members beneficial regarding the voluntary disclosure 
in particular and corporate governance practice in general? The findings of the study 
also raise the question of the optimum number of members of the board to achieve a 
balance between the level of knowledge and expertise and the effectiveness of the 
communication and decision-making. In addition, the findings regarding board 
meetings require more in depth investigation into whether the increased number of 
meetings reflects board effectiveness in performing its role of monitoring or are 
instead a sign of poor performance and business difficulties that need more attention 
from the board. All of the previous questions suggest the need for qualitative research. 
  216 
The current study documents a variation in the disclosure of three types of 
information, strategic, non-financial, and financial information and their association 
to corporate governance mechanisms. Further research on the disclosure of these 
types of information is an opportunity to expand our understanding of the motivations 
of the disclosure in each information group. 
The investigation of the disclosure determinants in big and small firms addressed 
in the current study may need further examination in order to validate the conclusions 
and explanations that can be drawn from this study.   
Finally, future research might consider examining other variables in relation to the 
level of voluntary disclosure, such as the level of mandatory disclosure, the presence 
of a member of the royal family in the board, and the presence of family members on 
the board.  
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